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Abstract
Following the work of Popper and especially of Kuhn in the 1960s, the attention of 
philosophers of science has been very much concentrated on change in science. Popper’s 
picture was of constant change ("revolution in permanence") at the level of scientific 
theories, but constant change in accordance with fixed methodological standards of 
evaluation. Drawing on Kuhn’s work, however, many recent philosophers of science have 
held that the phenomenon of scientific change is much more radical and far-reaching than 
anything allowed by Popper: specifically, that there have been major changes in 
methodological standards during the history of science alongside changes in accepted 
fundamental theory.
The chief problem facing this no-invariant-methodology thesis is that it seems to 
inevitably entail relativism. If the methods and principles of scientific theory appraisal are 
subject to radical change, then competing theories or research traditions may uphold 
competing (or conflicting) methodologies. When methodologies do conflict, how can 
choice between competing theories or research traditions be rationally adjudicated? How 
can the methods and principles for the correct appraisal of scientific theories themselves 
evolve rationally?
Two major attempts have been made in the recent literature to construct positions 
which accommodate change in methodological standards while nonetheless avoiding 
relativism. These are the versions of methodological naturalism developed by Larry 
Laudan and Dudley Shapere, respectively. This dissertation examines these two positions 
in detail and argues that they fail: in so far as they really incorporate the no-invariant- 
methodology thesis they inevitably embrace relativism. I argue that the way to resolve this
difficulty is to reject the no-invariant-methodology thesis. Moreover, methodological 
naturalists (like Laudan and Shapere) have not succeeded in giving any genuine and 
convincing illustration of radical methodological change.
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CHAPTER 1
Methodological Naturalism
1. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS
In this dissertation, I critically assess one version of the move to make methodology more 
informed by empirical considerations and the workings of science- namely the naturalist 
approach to the study of scientific methodology.
Like most ...isms, there are so many different versions of naturalism that it is 
essential to state precisely the version of it I examine. My subject is a variety of 
naturalism concerned with the status and validity of the methods that are used (or that 
ought to be used1) for the adjudication of scientific theories. This version of naturalism 
is primarily epistemological (not metaphysical). Philip Kitcher describes the general thesis 
of epistemological naturalism as follows:
Naturalistic epistemology confronts a range of traditional questions: What is
'Philosophers have often debated the issue of whether a naturalist philosophy can give normative advice 
on which methods scientists should adopt. I will not consider this issue for two reasons. First, the issue has often 
been confused with that of whether an ought (normative or prescriptive advice) can be derived from an is (a mere 
description of the methods actually employed in scientific practice). But, of course, a naturalist need not claim 
that he derives his methodological postulates from descriptions of scientific practice. Rather, the claim could be 
that from a description of the actual methods used by scientists, we can construct a philosophical thesis which 
also gives normative advice on which methods scientists ought to employ. So even if an ought cannot be derived 
from an is, the naturalist need not abstain from giving normative advice. Moreover, the naturalists I consider in 
this dissertation do not shy away from giving normative or prescriptive advice. I will not, therefore, examine the 
naturalism of philosophers like R.N. Giere and W.V.O. Quine.
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knowledge? What kinds of knowledge (if any) are possible? What methods should 
we use for attaining knowledge, or at least, for improving the epistemic qualities 
of our beliefs? Because the sciences appear to be shining exemplars of human 
knowledge, the pursuit of these questions leads easily into the philosophy of 
science.
Naturalistic philosophy of science emerges from the attempt to understand 
the growth of scientific knowledge. Epistemological naturalism can be 
characterized negatively by its rejection of post-Fregean approaches to these 
investigations. ... [Post-Fregean approaches] have two important presuppositions: 
first, following both Frege and the Wittgenstein of the Tractatusy they pursue 
epistemological questions in an apsychologistic w ay- logic, not psychology, is the 
proper idiom for epistemological discussion; second, they conceive of the products 
of philosophical reflection as a priori— knowledge is to be given a logical 
analysis, ... the improvement of methodology consists in formulating the logic of 
science. ... [Naturalistic epistemology ... is committed to rejecting both 
[presuppositions of post-Fregean approaches]. (Kitcher, 1992, pp.56-58)
Larry Laudan also characterizes the epistemological variety of naturalism as follows:
Epistemic naturalism ... is a theory about philosophic knowledge: in very brief 
compass, it holds that the claims of philosophy are to be adjudicated in the same 
ways that we adjudicate claims in other walks of life, such as science, common 
sense and law. More specifically, epistemic naturalism is a meta-epistemological 
thesis: it holds that the theory of knowledge is continuous with other sorts of 
theories about how the natural world is constituted. It claims that philosophy is 
neither logically prior to these other forms of inquiry nor superior to them as a 
mode of knowing. Naturalism thereby denies that the theofy of knowledge is 
synthetic a priori (as Chisholm would have it), a set of "useful conventions" (as 
Popper insisted), "proto-scientific investigations" (in the Lorenzen sense) or the 
lackluster alternative to "edifying conversation" (in Rorty’s phrase). The 
naturalistic epistemologist takes to heart the claim that his discipline is the theory 
of knowledge. He construes epistemic claims as theories or hypotheses about 
inquiry, subject to precisely the same strategies o f adjudication that we bring to 
bear on the assessment o f theories within science and common sense. (Laudan, 
1990c, pp.44-45, my emphasis)
One main concern of proponents of this sort of naturalism is therefore the repudiation of
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the idea of a priori, invariant (ahistorical), epistemological principles.2 More specifically, 
proponents of this version of naturalism insist that methodology is an empirical endeavour 
just like the natural sciences. It is empirical because the validity, warrant, and applicability 
of the principles and rules of scientific theory appraisal are to be assessed by considering 
substantive claims about the world.
Perhaps the chief source of the particular version of naturalism I consider in this 
dissertation is Thomas Kuhn’s view of scientific change. In the remainder of this chapter, 
I delineate a connection between this version of naturalism and Kuhn’s view of scientific 
change.3
2
Unless otherwise indicated, I v/ill use the term a priori simply as non-empiricat. That is, it would not 
connote the Kantian view of an a prioriwhich is indubitable or absolutely certain. Hence, in my usage of the 
term, a claim which is accepted (or known) on a priori grounds is not necessarily known to be true with absolute 
certainty; it is just a claim which is accepted on the basis of reason alone irrespective of its degree of 
dubitability.
3
There are (at least) two main routes to epistemological naturalism in contemporary philosophy of science. 
One takes its upshot from Quine in the sense that it is primarily concerned with the introduction of psychology 
into epistemology and methodology (or rather, the reduction of epistemology to psychology); while the other is 
mainly concerned with making methodology more informed by the history of science (and hence the repudiation 
of ahistorical, a priori, methodological principles). In this dissertation, I will be concerned only with the historical 
version of naturalism outlined in this chapter.
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2. METHODOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC CHANGE 
I shall, until further notice, use the term "methodology" to mean the study of the rules and 
standards which generally govern the evaluation and appraisal of scientific theories.
Until the early 1960s the belief flourished that scientific methodology is not an 
empirical discipline. If we substitute methodology for philosophy in the following claims 
of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus, we have a very good depiction of this traditional (orthodox) 
attitude to methodology:
4.111 Philosophy is not one of the natural sciences.
4.112 Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts ...
4.1121 Psychology is no more closely related to philosophy than any other
natural science. ...
4.1122 Darwin’s theory has no more to do with philosophy than other
hypothesis in natural science.
Thomas Kuhn’s Structure o f Scientific Revolutions however ushered in a 
revolutionary reaction to this traditional stance. Kuhn’s Structure opens with the well 
known claim that:
History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology, could 
provide a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now 
possessed. ... This essay attempts to show that we have been misled by [the old 
image] in fundamental ways. Its aim is a sketch of a quite different concept of 
science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself. 
(Kuhn, 1962, p .l)
What exactly is "the image of science by which we [were then] possessed"? Kuhn is
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surprisingly unclear. Nevertheless, we can identify various counts on which Kuhn’s view 
of science differs from the traditional view. For instance, the old image held that there is 
a sharp distinction between observation and theory, Kuhn denies this. Proponents of the 
old image held that observation and experiment provide the foundations for the rational 
acceptance of theories over their competitors; but Kuhn seems to claim that theory-choice 
is not a rational (or at least not a fully rational) affair. Proponents of the old image held 
that science can sharply be demarcated from non-science; Kuhn seems to deny this as 
well.
But perhaps the most fundamental contrast between the old image and the new 
revolutionary image is in their different approaches to the relationship between scientific 
method, scientific beliefs, and history.4 According to the older image, scientific beliefs and 
theories may come and go, but the principles for the objective ranking of such beliefs and 
theories are eternal. The old image is therefore that of an ahistorical methodology in 
which the correct rules and standards of theory evaluation have remained stable and 
invariant throughout science’s development. Methodology was regarded as invariant 
because the principles, rules and standards of theory appraisal were taken to be
4I do not wish to claim that only two approaches to methodology are identifiable in the history of 
philosophy of science! My identification of the traditional and revolutionary approaches is a simplification 
adopted for exegetical purposes. By concentrating on these two approaches, I aim to spell out one route 
contemporary philosophers have taken to naturalism. This route to naturalism takes its motivation from the 
Kuhnian historically oriented approach to philosophy of science because Kuhn maintains that: "... writing on 
philosophy of science would be improved if history played a larger background role in its preparation. When 
speaking here of the history of science, I refer to that central part of the field that is concerned with the evolution 
of scientific ideas, methods, and techniques ... when I speak of the philosophy of science, ... I am thinking of 
that central area that concerns itself with the scientific in general, asking, for example, about the structure of 
scientific theories, the status of theoretical entities, or the conditions under which scientists may properly claim 
to have produced knowledge." (Kuhn, 1977, p. 12) Kuhn also insists that "history [is] ... relevant to the 
philosopher of science and ... the epistemologist in ways that transcend its classical role as a source of examples 
for previously occupied positions.... [H]istory is an explanatory enterprise..." (Kuhn, 1977, p.4-5) The approach 
Kuhn and Kuhnians sought to replace is what I describe as the orthodox (traditional) approach, (and I describe 
the Kuhnian approach as the revolutionary approach).
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presuppositionless, or at any rate not dependent upon any specific substantive scientific 
claim for their validity.5 Since methodology was regarded as not being dependent upon 
substantive science, traditional philosophers also claimed that these rules and principles 
of theory appraisal served as the neutral set of criteria for judging change and progress 
in science. In short, methodology was the basic tool of scientific rationality, and 
traditionalists believed that once they had hit upon the correct characterization of the 
criteria of scientific merit, these criteria were valid for all times— past, present, and future.
Kuhn, Feyerabend, and the rebels, however, claim that the methods of science, the 
content of scientific beliefs, and scientific theories are fully intertwined with science’s 
historical development. Scientific methodology (according to the revolutionaries) is fully 
liable to radical change as science develops:
Successive paradigms tell us different things about the population of the universe 
and about that population’s behaviour. They differ, that is, about such questions 
as the existence of subatomic particles, the materiality of light, and the 
conservation of heat and energy. These are substantive differences between 
successive paradigms ... But paradigms differ in more than substance, for they are 
directed not only to nature but also back upon the science that produced them. 
They are the source o f the methods, problem-field, and standards of solution 
accepted by any mature scientific community at any given time. ...[N]ew 
paradigms necessitates a redefinition of the corresponding science. ... And as the 
problems change, so ... does the standard that distinguishes a real scientific 
solution from a mere metaphysical speculation ... . (Kuhn, 1962, p. 103)
Kuhn is not merely committed to the claim that methodology is heavily informed and 
influenced by substantive science. He also explicitly claims that radical change extends
5A closer analysis of this point is given in section 2 of chapter 3 above.
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to the core principles of scientific theory appraisal:
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition 
of normal science can emerge is far from a cumulative process, one achieved by 
an articulation or extension of the old paradigm. Rather it is a reconstruction of 
the field from new fundamentals, a construction that changes some of the field’s 
most elementary theoretical generalizations as well as many of its paradigm 
methods and application ... When the transition is complete, the profession will 
have changed its view of the field, its methods, and its goals. (Kuhn, 1962, pp.84- 
85)
Indeed in Kuhn’s view, "the case for cumulative development of sciences*s problems and 
standards is even harder to make than the case for cumulation of theories". (Kuhn, 1962,
p.108.)
Kuhn’s revolutionary image relies heavily on the role of paradigms in scientific 
change. Unfortunately, Kuhn is entirely unclear and imprecise in his use of paradigm. 
Margaret Masterman (1970), for instance, identified twenty-one different uses of the term 
in Kuhn’s Structure o f Scientific Revolutions. The concept is in fact so vague and 
imprecise that Dudley Shapere accused Kuhn of using the term "to cover anything and 
everything that allows the scientist to do anything." (Shapere, 1984, pp.50-51)
Nonetheless, it is possible to identify some of the term’s core uses. One core use 
of the term (perhaps the central use of "paradigm") is that in which it is a model which 
defines the world (or a whole sweep of reality) for a community of scientists:
[By paradigm] ... I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of actual 
scientific practice— examples which include law, theory, application, and 
instrumentation together— provide models from which spring particular coherent 
traditions of scientific research. These are the traditions which the historian
13
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describes under such rubrics as ’Ptolemaic astronomy’ (or ’Copemican’), 
’Aristotelian dynamics* (or ’Newtonian’), ’corpuscular optics’ (or ’wave optics’), 
and so on ... Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to 
the same rules and standards of scientific practice. ... [A paradigm is therefore] 
a fundamental unit that cannot be fully reduced to logically atomic components 
which might function in its stead .... (Kuhn, 1962, pp. 10-11, my emphasis)
In this "world view" use of the term, a paradigm is the constellation of a group’s 
commitments. Although it is almost impossible to specify all the elements of these 
constellations of commitments, proponents of the same paradigm must (at least) share 
ontological and methodological commitments. As Kuhn puts it:
[A paradigm is a] strong network of commitments-- conceptual, theoretical, 
instrumental, and methodological... it provides rules which tell the practitioner of 
a mature speciality what both the world and his science are like ... .(Kuhn, 1962, 
p.42)
One major reason why Kuhn has been charged with relativism is the pervasive role 
given to paradigms in his account of scientific change.6 According to Kuhn:
.. paradigms provide scientists not only with a map but also with some directions 
essential for map-making. In learning a paradigm the scientist acquires theory, 
method, and standards together... in an inextricable mixture. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 109)
In fact, Kuhn further claims that:
^ h ere  are various other sources of relativism in Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions. For example 
his views concerning incommensurability, his attack on the notion of theory-independent facts, and his claim that 
theory changes are "conversion experiences", have all led various philosophers to accuse him of relativism.
14
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... the proponent of competing paradigms practice their trades in different worlds. 
... [Even though] both are looking at the same world, and what they look at has 
not changed ... in some areas they see different things, and they see them in 
different relations one to another. ... [This] is why, before they can hope to 
communicate, one group or the other must experience the conversion we have 
been calling a paradigm shift Just because it is a transition between 
incommensurables, the transition between competing paradigms cannot be made 
a step at a time, forced by logic and neutral experience, (kuhn, 1962, p. 150)
If facts underdetermine theory; if the change from one paradigm to another requires the 
reconstruction of all the fundamentals (ontologies, methods, aims, instruments, etc,) of a 
field anew; and if scientists adhering to different paradigms live in different 
incommensurable worlds; then some high degree of relativism must loom in theory choice. 
For Kuhn seems to have rejected all the bases on which rational choice can be made. 
More particularly, i f  each paradigm contains within itself its own set o f rules o f theory 
appraisal, and there are no trans-paradigmatic methods, then the validity and rational 
acceptability o f scientific theories are relative to each paradigm.
Kuhn’s own explicit claims about theory choice seem to clinch the relativistic 
interpretation of his view of theory choice. He claims, for instance, that:
[Paradigm choice is] about techniques of persuasion, or about argument and 
counter-argument in a situation in which there can be no proof ... when asked 
about persuasion rather than proof, the question of the nature of scientific 
argument has no single or uniform answer. Individual scientists embrace a new 
paradigm for all sorts of reasons ... some of these reasons ... lie outside the 
apparent sphere of science entirely. Others must depend on idiosyncrasies of 
autobiography and personality. Even nationality or prior reputation of the innovator 
and his teachers can sometimes play a significant role ... Our concern will not then 
be with arguments that in fact convert one or another individual, but rather with 
the sort of community that always sooner or later re-forms a single group. (Kuhn, 
1962, pp. 152-153)
15
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Kuhn, in fact, specifically claims that when a "revolution" occurs there are no universal 
standards according to which the revolutionary theory is objectively superior to its older 
rival, and, therefore, according to which those who reject the new theory are objectively 
mistaken. Not only are there always scientists who "hold out" for the older theory, their 
actions and beliefs do not violate any general standards:
The transfer of allegiance from paradigm to paradigm is a conversion experience 
that cannot be forced. Lifelong resistance [to a new paradigm] ... is not a violation 
of scientific standards but an index to the nature of scientific research itself... the 
historian ... will not find a point at which resistance becomes illogical or 
unscientific. (Kuhn, 1962, p. 151)
Because of these claims, various philosophers have argued that theory choice, as explained 
by Kuhn in the Structure o f Scientific Revolutions (and in some later explications of the 
claims made in Structure) leads to relativism and irrationalism.7
Although Kuhn insists that "reports of this sort manifest total misunderstanding" 
(1977, p.321) of his view, it seems to be Kuhn himself who underestimated the import 
and implications of his account of theory choice.
The version of naturalism considered in this dissertation takes its motivation from 
Kuhn’s view of scientific change because proponents of this version of naturalism claim 
that Kuhn is (at least) correct in upholding the view that all epistemological principles of 
scientific theory appraisal are vulnerable to revision and radical change in the light of
7In particular, both Shapere and Laudan have accused Kuhn of relativism. Extensive charges of relativism 
against Kuhn can be found in Laudan’s Science and Values [1984], and Shapere’s Reason and the Search for 
Knowledge [1984].
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substantive changes in science.8 Agreeing with Kuhn, contemporary naturalists claim that 
radical changes in the development of science have not been restricted to substantive 
theories alone. All aspects of science, including its methods, are said to be subject to 
possible and actual radical change.
Alan Chalmers captures the full spirit of this version of naturalism in claiming
that:
We can expect methodologies to alter in the light of new discoveries, including 
practical discoveries, and for this reason the notion of a universal, ahistorical 
account of method that can serve as the standard, not only for present but for all 
future knowledge, is an absurdity ... There is no universal method. There are no 
universal standards. (Chalmers, 1986, pp. 25-26)
Dudley Shapere expresses similar sentiments in claiming that:
There are no brute facts which confront us and force our theory choices in certain 
obligatory directions; there is no "given" which does not involve observation. Nor 
is there a single scientific method which is applied unambiguously across all 
science, past present or future. The extraction or testing of theories and hypothesis 
is far more complicated than can be captured by rules of any formal logic. ... 
According to the view o f science which I shall present, ... considerations guiding 
the development o f science, fa r  from being an a priori and essential characteristic 
present in science from its inception, has itself been a product o f that development. 
(Shapere, 1987, p.2, my emphasis)
8The delineation of the lineage of naturalism need not take its upshot from Kuhn. Undoubtedly, some 
version or the other of this sort of naturalism had been espoused in philosophy before the writings of Kuhn. 
Hence various sources of the contemporary naturalistic turn in philosophy of science could be identified. For 
instance, Philip Kitcher in his "The Naturalist Return" [1992] traces another lineage of naturalism as far back 
as Ernst Haeckel of the late nineteenth century. I emphasize Kuhn because the two philosophers I examine in 
detail in this thesis, Laudan and Shapere, developed their views as alternatives to Kuhn’s radical views of 
scientific change.
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And Larry Laudan describes his own position as follows:
by way of underscoring th[e] parallel between epistemic rules and scientific 
theories, I have argued that the rules guiding theory choice in the natural 
sciences have changed and evolved in response to new information in the 
same ways in which scientific theories have shifted in the face o f new 
evidence;
...the historicists are right [in claiming] that the aims (and methods) of 
science have changed through time, although some of their claims about 
how these changes occur (especially Kuhn’s) are wide of the mark.
the naturalist, if true to his conviction that science and philosophy are cut 
from the identical cloth, holds that the same mechanisms which guide the 
change of aims among scientists can guide the epistemologist’s selection 
of epistemic virtues. (Laudan, 1990c, pp.46-47, my emphasis.)
Shapere and Laudan, therefore, both explicitly uphold the view that methodological 
principles for the appraisal and validation of scientific theories are subject to radical 
revision and rejection in the light of changes in substantive science.
We need to be very precise about the claim of the naturalists. Their claim is not 
merely that methodology is informed by substantive science. Their claim is not merely that 
there has been methodological progress (i.e. that we have come to acquire, discover, or 
invent new rules and principles of evaluation as a result of changes in our substantive 
beliefs about the world). Rather their claim is the strong Kuhnian one that the validity and 
adequacy of all methodological rules and principles rests on claims about the empirical 
world. Contemporary naturalism is fully committed to a complete denial of a priori 
assessment of methodologies. Moreover the naturalists I consider claim to overcome the 
problem of relativism with which Kuhn is saddled. The full claim is therefore that
18
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methodology can be fully empirical, and be subject to radical change, without sacrificing 
the rationality of science. I will refer to their version of naturalism as methodological 
naturalism.
3. THE NO-INVARIANT-METHODOLOGY THESIS
Methodological naturalism has been characterized as an epistemological thesis which 
claims that the validity and credibility of scientific methods ultimately depend upon 
science’s substantive claims about the world. More specifically, anyone who upholds the 
following inter-related claims will be regarded as a methodological naturalist:
(a) The Historical Claim: As a matter of historical fact, radical changes in science 
have not been confined to the level of accepted general theories. Just as 
substantive science has changed and developed in response to new information and 
evidence, so have the basic rules and methods which guide theory appraisal 
changed in response to new information about the world.
(b) The Philosophical Claim: Even if (at least) some methodological principles have 
remained (relatively) stable throughout the history of science, in principle, there 
is no good ground for upholding an ahistorical, (invariant) attitude to scientific 
method. All aspects o f science are in principle subject to radical change and 
evolution in the light o f new information about the world. Methodological rules are
19
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subject to possible radical change because they are judged and evaluated in the 
light of substantive scientific beliefs (beliefs which are themselves subject to 
change and modification).
The philosophical claim is the most important aspect of the no-invariant- 
methodology thesis. This is because even if we can identify some methodological 
principles that have been present throughout the history of science, the naturalist would 
still insist that, as a purely philosophical point, no methodological rule need be ahistorical; 
there are no rules that are in principle immune to change as science develops. The 
historical claim therefore provides collateral support to the naturalist* s philosophical 
claim.
One main stimulus of the no-invariant-methodology thesis is the naturalist’s 
conviction that there is a striking mismatch between the methods postulated by 
philosophers (e.g falsificationism, inductivism, predictivism, etc.) and scientists* actual 
theory choices. Scientists, (the naturalist claims) have often accepted theories which are 
not sanctioned by philosophical views of scientific methodology. Thus both Shapere and 
Laudan criticize positivistic philosophers on the ground that although their accounts of 
scientific change are formally objective and rational (in a way that the Kuhnian view is 
not), these accounts do not fit science as historically practised.
This is why Shapere claims that one of "the most important weaknesses of the 
Logical Empiricist program" is that:
... in its concentration on technical problems of logic, the logical empiricist
20
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tradition has tended to lose contact with science, and [its] discussions have often 
been accused of irrelevancy to real science.... for in their involvement with logical 
details (often without more than cursory discussion of any application to science 
at all), in their claim to be talking only about thoroughly developed scientific 
theories (if there are any such), and in their failure (or refusal) to attend at all to 
questions about the historical development of actual science, logical empiricists 
have certainly laid themselves open to the criticism of being, despite their 
professed empiricism, too rationalistic in failing to keep an attentive eye on the 
facts which constitute the subject matter of the philosophy of science. (Shapere, 
1984, p.61)
In the same spirit, Laudan also claims that:
The historicists are surely right in thinking that existing methodologies often fail 
to pick out the theories which the scientific elite have chosen. Thus, Newton’s 
physics was accepted long before it was known to have made any successful 
surprising prediction, thereby violating the rules of Popperian methodology. 
Galilean physics was accepted in preference to Aristotle’s, despite the fact that 
Aristotle’s physics was much more general than Galileo’s, thereby violating 
Popper’s and Lakatos’ injunction that successor theories should be more general 
than their predecessors. (Laudan, 1987a, p.21.)
Having convinced themselves that all attempts at formulating ahistorical methodological 
principles have failed in the sense that such ahistorical methodologies do not square with 
scientific practice, the naturalist goes on to advocate that we abandon all claims 
concerning the apriority and invariance of methodological principles. Instead we should 
adopt a fully empirical approach to methodology in which the actual rules and principles 
that present (and past) scientists use are taken as guides to the formulation of our 
scientific methodologies. These empirically constructed methodologies would also be 
tested and evaluated by empirical evidence.
The naturalist does not take methodology to be empirical in the sense of "reducible
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to the phenomena" or "immediately apprehended matters of fact". The claim is merely that 
methodologies should be as empirical as the natural sciences in the sense that their 
adequacy should be intricately bound to substantive science.
Laudan in particular advocates an inductivist approach in which the methodologist 
gathers empirical evidence about which rules and principles scientists have successfully 
applied in the past. The methodologist would then recommend only those methods which 
have been most effective (in the past) for advancing scientists’ cognitive goals.
Naturalists also claim to overcome the pitfalls of both traditionalists and 
revolutionaries. They claim to break the impasse between: (i) the formally objective and 
rational, but historically inadequate, views of the traditionalist, and, (ii) the historically 
relevant, but relativistic, accounts of the Kuhnians. Methodological naturalism is thus 
taken to be the best of both worlds: a view of scientific methodology in which all 
epistemological rules of theory appraisal are in principle subject to radical revision and 
abandonment, but in which relativism and irrationalism of theory-choice (and of method- 
choice) are avoided.
But is methodological naturalism a viable alternative theory of scientific method? 
Can the ahistorical and the invariant be cast out of methodology without thereby 
embracing relativism-- or without ending with an irrational (or non-rational) account of 
scientific change? In chapters 2 and 3 , 1 subject the philosophical claims of the Shapere 
and Laudan respectively to critical assessment. In assessing these two influential account 
of methodological naturalism, I indicate how naturalism is correct in emphasizing the 
relevance of substantive science to methodology. There has been progress in scientific 
methodology, and naturalists are right in emphasizing the importance of substantive
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science for theory appraisal. Nevertheless, I will argue that naturalist’s are mistaken in 
claiming that all aspects of scientific methodology are subject to possible radical change. 
One can appreciate and accept the point that methodology must be informed by 
substantive science without denying that methodology is invariant. My main contention 
will be that if naturalism is so strong that methodology is itself an empirical discipline 
which can only be justified by the substantive claims of the science it validates, we end 
up with relativism.9
In chapter 4, I examine in detail one of Laudan’s main examples of radical 
methodological change— namely the alleged change in early 19th century from Newtonian 
inductivism to the method of hypothesis. I argue in this chapter that a proper analysis of 
this historical episode does not support Laudan’s claim of radical methodological change.
g
It is important to state very clearly that I am not interested in those versions of naturalism that give up the 
rationality and objectivity of science. I am only interested in evaluating the adequacy of two versions of 
methodological naturalism that also claim to be objectively rational. My main question therefore is: can the 
rationality of science be upheld if the no-invariant-methodology thesis is fully accepted?
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CHAPTER 2
Shape re’s Bootstrappism
1. THE CHARACTER OF SCIENTIFIC CHANGE
In this chapter, I examine Dudley Shapere’s version of the no-invariant-methodology 
thesis. In particular, I critically evaluate his arguments in support of the claim that 
methodological change can be allowed without thereby embracing relativism (or without 
ending with an irrational account of scientific change).
Shapere’s view of scientific change starts with the basic idea that "science builds 
on what it has learned" (Shapere, 1982, p.485) in the sense that its established theories, 
laws and assertions (i.e. established science) guide the articulation and construction of 
new theories; they guide practical action, and also constrain possible conjectures. 
According to Shapere, the "process of building consists not only in adding to our 
substantive knowledge, but also in increasing our ability to leam about nature (1982, 
p.485)
Shapere quite explicitly claims that the process of building on what we have learnt 
indicates how all aspects of science, including its methods and rules o f reasoning, are 
subject to possible radical change:
It is truly all aspects of science, not only what are considered its substantive
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beliefs about nature, but also its methods and aims, that are subject to change in 
ways that have continued to surprise us. The problems we face in our inquiry 
about nature, and the methods with which we attempt to deal with those problems, 
co-evolve with our beliefs about nature.... A cycle of mutual adjustment of beliefs 
and methods has thus become a characteristic feature of the scientific enterprise. 
... Nor is the process ... limited to the gradual integration of methodology into the 
rest of science. What counts as a reason, too, has become a function of scientific 
belief— belief which itself has been attained by a process of reasoning. (Shapere, 
1987a, p.5)
Shapere’s claim is not merely that scientific methodology evolves or is modifiable in the 
process of learning more about the world. On Shapere’s view there is radical 
methodological change just as there is radical substantive and theoretical change:
... it is important to realize that radical changes in the fabric of science have not 
been restricted to alterations of our substantive beliefs about how things are. They 
have also extended to the methods and rules o f reasoning by which we arrive at 
those beliefs, and the aims we have in seeking them. (Shapere, 1987a, p.4, my 
emphasis)
The full claim is thus that there is nothing unalterable or sacrosanct in science.
Shapere indeed refers to any thesis in which certain characteristics of science (be
they methods; or rules of logic; or even claims about the nature of the world, e.g. 
principle of uniformity of nature) are immune to abandonment (or change) as upholding 
an "Inviolability" or "Presuppositionist" thesis. He identifies four main versions of this 
thesis-- each of which he rejects:
(1) The view that there are certain claims about the way the world is which 
must be accepted before any empirical inquiry is possible, or before further 
beliefs (well-founded beliefs) can be acquired, which claims, being 
presuppositions of the knowledge acquiring process, cannot be revised or
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rejected in the light of any result or process.
(2) The view that there is a method, ’the scientific method’, by application of 
which knowledge or well-grounded belief about the world is obtained, but 
which, once discovered (by whatever means), is in principle not subject to 
alteration in the light of any belief arrived at by its means.
(3) The view that there are rules of reasoning- rules, for example, of 
deductive or inductive logic— which are applied in scientific reasoning, but 
which can never be changed because of any scientific results.
(4) The view that certain concepts are employed in or in talking about science 
which are not open to abandonment, modification, or replacement in the 
light of new knowledge or (well-founded) beliefs.
I will refer to all such views indiscriminately as ’presuppositionist* 
views of science, though the four sorts of views I have mentioned tend to 
hold further that the alleged presuppositions are a priori (or at least 
formal), and that they constitute invariant characteristics of science ... . 
(Shapere, 1984, pp. 205-206)
Agreeing with Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others, he maintains that it is the study of the 
historical development of science that shows how change has gone deeper than mere
changes of theory:
A torrent of historical studies have indicated more and more convincingly that 
changes over the development of science have gone deeper than mere change of 
theory. The changes seemed to extend also to what was counted as evidence, as 
observation, as factual; to criteria of adequacy of explanations of that evidence, or 
those observations or facts, and even to what counted as explanation; and to 
method, which seemed not to be a single thing after all, but a multiplicity varying 
from period to period and subject to subject. (Shapere, 1987b, p .l)
As already indicated, the problem confronting any view such as Shapere’s is that 
it threatens inevitably to entail relativism. For although there are various forms of 
relativism, the central claim of all relativists is that there are no independently valid
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criteria for determining rational choice (or for supplying justification) over and above 
those specified by a given view-point (or culture, or paradigm). Thus, a particular system 
of belief X  is better than another system of belief Y only in the sense that X  judges itself 
better from within its own included criteria. In issues of justification, according to the 
relativist, there is no external or independent set of criteria to which we can appeal in 
deciding between alternative systems.1 Is Shapere not committed to some version or the 
other of relativism? If the methods, standards, rules of reasoning, and, indeed everything 
else in science, is subject to (possible) radical change, then in two competing theories (or 
more general contexts of scientific research, such as research traditions or paradigms), the 
principles for the correct appraisal of theories may differ radically. When they do differ, 
how can choice between them be rationally made? If competing theories differ in their 
methods and rules of reasoning, in virtue of what do we compare them? If each scientific 
tradition includes within itself its own standards of evaluation, in what sense can theory 
choice, especially in situations of competing theories (such as .Darwinism vs. Lamarck’s 
alternative) or in situations of competing research traditions (such as theories of evolution 
vs. Creationism), be regarded as objective? In particular, how can the principles and 
standards for the correct appraisal of scientific theories themselves evolve rationally?
Shapere is fully aware of the threat of relativism. He in fact charges Kuhn and 
Kuhnians with the espousal of relativistic views, and he himself explicitly rejects 
relativism. As Shapere sees it, the problem with the Kuhnian model of scientific change 
is not due to the fact that it allows change in science to go deeper than change of theory. 
Rather the problem stems from the manner in which scientific research is said to be
‘a  detailed analysis of the problem of relativism is given in section 4 above.
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governed by some "broader" and more fundamental "interpretative frameworks" called 
paradigms. The acknowledgement of the existence of (corrigible) fundamental 
interpretative frameworks in science in itself need not lead to relativism. But Kuhn’s 
particular account of paradigms as fundamental interpretative frameworks for analysing 
change does lead to relativism.2 In Kuhn’s view, paradigms guide the construction of 
evidence, facts, observation, and theory; they also determine methodological rules, and 
they lay down the principles of scientific theory appraisal in each field of science. But as 
these paradigms differ fundamentally from tradition to tradition, or from group to group, 
(competing paradigms are in fact regarded as incommensurable), and proponents of 
different (incommensurable) paradigms employ different methods and adjudicating 
principles, Kuhn is unable to give any rational account of scientific change:
In emphasizing the determinative role of background paradigms, and [in] ... 
attacking the notion o f ... any ... independent factors or standards whatever, Kuhn 
appears to have denied the possibility of reasonable judgement, on objective 
grounds, in paradigm choice; there can be no good reason for accepting a new 
paradigm, for the very notion of a good reason has been made paradigm- 
dependent. ... Objectivity and progress, the pride of traditional interpretations of 
science, have both been abandoned. (Shapere, 1984, p.51)
Shapere thus recognizes the point that if facts, methods, and the correct standards of 
scientific theory appraisal all depend on paradigms, (or on any such fundamental 
interpretative framework— e.g. research programmes, or research traditions), and
2I am not suggesting that this is the only count on which Shapere charges Kuhn of relativism. In Reason and 
the Search for Knowledge [1984] (and elsewhere) Shapere discusses at length other sources of relativism in 
Kuhn’s view of scientific change. However, the central charge of relativism stems from the role of paradigms 
in scientific change; and this form of Kuhnian relativism is the one most closely related to the role and status 
of methodology in scientific change.
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paradigms vary radically from. epoch to epoch, then there can be no independent 
constraints standing above individual paradigms on the basis of which rational choices can 
be made between conflicting paradigms. Nevertheless, Shapere still insists that:
Science ... develops through a give-and-take interaction between the methods with 
which it approaches nature and what it learns about nature ... . Included in that 
interactive development are ... the subject-matter, the problem-structure, the 
standards, and the goals of science: in all these aspects, science is subject to 
change. (Shapere, 1984, p.xxxiii)
Shapere’s task, therefore, is to show that a view of scientific change can be 
developed in which nothing is sacrosanct or inviolable, but which, unlike Kuhn’s view, 
fails to entail relativism. Shapere is quite explicit about this. He asks:
... can an account of the knowledge-seeking and knowledge-acquiring enterprise 
be given which, while not relying on any form of Inviolability thesis, will not also 
collapse into relativism? ... Is it possible to understand science ... as able to 
proceed rationally without presupposing criteria of what counts as "rational”, 
criteria which could be arrived at in the course of seeking knowledge, but which 
must be assumed in order to engage in that enterprise at all, or at least 
successfully? (Shapere, 1984, p. xxi)
-Shapere answers these questions in the affirmative. His answer to these questions lies in 
his conception of scientific reason. This account of scientific reason (and of scientific 
rationality) in turn relies on the role of background knowledge in the development of 
science.
To clarify Shapere’s view of scientific reasoning and his view that background 
knowledge plays an important role in the further development of science, I start by
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describing his view of the nature of scientific change in the next section. Particular 
attention will be given to Shapere’s emphasis on the role of the history of science. In 
section 3 I go on to assess the adequacy of Shapere’s claim that the important role of 
background knowledge indicates how radical change has extended to all aspects of 
science. Finally, in sections 4 and 5 I examine the issue of whether Shapere’s version of 
the no-invariant-methodology thesis truly succeeds in avoiding relativism.
2. SCIENCE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT 
According to Shapere, there are two main lessons to be learnt from the historical 
development of science— especially its development within the last 150 years. These 
lessons are stated in the form of two principles which he calls: (a) the "Principle of 
Rejection of Anticipations of Nature"; and (b), the "Principle of Scientific 
Internalization". Shapere states the first principle as follows:
The results of scientific investigation could not have been anticipated by common 
sense, by the suggestions of everyday experience, or by pure reason. (Shapere, 
1987a, p.l)
The significance of this principle is in the point that our contemporary image of science 
departs very radically from our common sense everyday beliefs. On the basis of common 
sense everyday beliefs, (or of pure reason alone), Shapere insists that no one could have 
anticipated complex theories such as the quantum theory, the general theory of relativity, 
and evolutionary Darwinism. Consider specifically the contemporary views of evolution
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and genetics. These views involve very complex claims about fundamental similarities 
(and differences) between various species of organism; assumptions about some tacit non- 
cognitive form of co-operation amongst individual organisms in their struggle for survival; 
claims about sexual selection and heredity; etc— which depart very radically from the 
dictates of everyday common sense beliefs.
Contemporary conceptions of space-time and matter provide another good 
illustration of the principle of rejection of anticipations of nature. The fusion of the 
concepts of space and time into that of space-time contradicts our common sense beliefs 
(and earlier physics). And with the advent of the general theory of relativity, matter and 
space-time became causally connected in ways that were not conceived even at the time 
of Newton.
We need to be very precise about Shapere’s emphasis on this principle. For there 
are two readings one could give to the "principle of rejection of anticipations of nature". 
On tho first reading, since the principle states that the results of scientific investigation 
could not have been anticipated by common sense, by everyday experience, or by "pure 
reason", the principle can be read in such a way that it is merely a principle for ruling out 
certain types of ideas in science. This interpretation commits anyone who upholds the 
principle to the claim that no new idea in science can be counted as a revolutionary 
innovative development. The principle would thus amount to the position that all 
developments in science have recognizable precedents.
Some of the acknowledged important revolutions in the history of science can 
(naively) be interpreted along the suggestion of this inteipretation. The central thesis of 
the Copernican revolution is the idea that the earth is a planet— like Mars and Mercury—
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which revolves round the sun. But this central thesis itself was not radically new in the 
sense that it had no recognizable antecedent in the history of ideas. The Greek 
philosopher, Aristarchus, for instance, upheld this basic thesis long before Copernicus. 
Also the central thesis of Darwin’s theory of evolution- the thesis that species evolve 
from simpler organisms into complex ones— had long been around before the Darwinian 
revolution. Interpreting the principle of rejection of anticipations of nature in this manner 
would commit Shapere to the view that all revolutions in science are of the Copemican 
and Darwinian type. That is, according to this interpretation, Shapere would be committed 
to the view that all important theories and ideas in the development of science have 
recognizable antecedents in history.
There is however no justification whatsoever for foisting this interpretation on 
Shapere.3 Because while this interpretation limits the horizon of science, (i.e. on this naive 
interpretation, the principle becomes a principle for ruling out those ideas which lack 
precursors), Shapere in fact advances the principle to stress the point that science 
transcends common sense everyday experience, and pure reason, in previously unimagined 
ways. (And there is no reason to suppose that it will not continue to do so.) The correct 
interpretation of the principle is that in which it emphasizes the point that, on the bases 
of common sense or pure reason, we should not try to anticipate the complexities to be 
found within nature. For instance, the principle urges that we should not anticipate 
whether science will, or will not, have a grand unified theory of the four main forces in
^This first interpretation of the principle is untenable. For it is only by an incredible stretching of the 
imagination that one can identify precursors of all innovative ideas in science. I draw attention to this reading 
of the principle simply to ensure that we have a good grasp of why Shapere attaches some importance to the 
principle of rejection of anticipations of nature.
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nature (the strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravitational forces) on the basis of pure 
reason. Rather, questions such as this must be resolved by a deeper understanding of 
nature. The best interpretation of this principle is thus that in which it emphasizes the 
development of science as a give-and-take procedure in which cognitive beings interact 
with nature, and in which we learn how to learn in the process of learning: "The principle 
[is not] a means of ruling out certain types of ideas, rather [it is] a principle [for] opening 
the door to unforeseen possibilities." (Shapere, 1987b, p.l)
Although this principle emphasizes the point that science departs radically from 
our everyday common sense beliefs, (and pure reason), /f does not tell us how science has 
managed to go beyond the confines and dictates o f common sense. Furthermore, the 
principle does not tell us why the departure of science from the confines of common sense 
is justified; nor does it tell us whether those current views of science which depart so 
radically from common sense imagination can be regarded as true (or adequate) depictions 
of nature and reality.
Because of the limitations and negative message of the principle of rejection of 
anticipations of nature, Shapere insists that we need to supplement this principle with 
another principle which "furnishes profound insight into... the knowledge-acquiring aspect 
of scientific enterprise". (Shapere, 1987a, p.3, my emphasis) Shapere states the second 
principle as follows:
Every aspect of our beliefs ought, whenever possible, to be formulated, and to be 
brought into relation to well-founded beliefs, in such a way that it will be possible 
to test that aspect. (Shapere, 1987a, p.3-4)
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Shapere calls this the Principle o f Scientific Internalization. The principle of 
internalization complements the principle of rejection of anticipations of nature because 
while the latter principle rejects certain modes of knowledge-acquiring (i.e. it urges us not 
to anticipate the nature of the world on the basis of pure reason or common sense) the 
former principle outlines the process by which the range of ideas within science ought to 
be expanded. Specifically, the principle entails that:
The sorts of considerations that have led us [and that should always lead us] to 
alter our beliefs about nature, at least when those considerations are ones we call 
’rational’ or ’based on evidence’, have themselves been scientific ones. (Shapere, 
1987a, pp.3-4)
And in contrast with the negative message of the principle of rejection of anticipations of 
nature, Shapere insists that:
It is a normative principle; and its value, its necessity, as a policy, a guiding 
principle, of science is something that has itself been learned through the scientific 
process, through a record of achievement that led to its adoption”. (Shapere, 
1987a, p.4)
Again, the historical development of science plays a crucial role in identifying and 
lending detail to this second principle. A close look at the history of science indicates that 
scientific research is always conducted on the basis of some presumed facts, laws, and 
theories. This common body of laws, fact, and theories are presumed because the scientist 
conducts her research by taking their truth, validity, or adequacy for granted. The solar 
physicist, for instance, carries out research on stars or nuclear fusion by taking for granted
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things such as: Einstein’s equation E=mc2; that natural phenomena is governed by four 
main types of forces or interactions known as the strong force, the electromagnetic force, 
the weak force, and, the gravitational force; the theory of stellar evolution; and various 
other laws and theories. Shapere refers to the presumed set of facts, theories, and beliefs 
that guide research in any field of inquiry as the background knowledge of that field of 
inquiry.4
The fact that the principle of internalization now governs scientific activity and the 
fact that this principle had to be learned can, according to Shapere, be illustrated by a 
comparison of the Milesian science of the 6th century B.C with the science of 17th 
century Europe. Shapere describes the Milesian approach to the study of nature as 
"holistic" and that of 17th century Europe as "piecemeal".
The major contrast between these two approaches lies in the fact that the Milesians 
did not focus on problems generated by specific fields of endeavour. Indeed, it seems that 
the Milesians did not conceive of inquiry about nature (and the universe) in terms of 
distinct subject-matters (such as gasses; the physical composition of plants and animals; 
chemical reactions; magnetism; etc). The Milesians simply regarded all aspects of 
existence, all forms of change, and all aspects of nature, as their subject of inquiry. 
Consequently, all aspects of nature were regarded as relevant and important to their 
explanations of phenomena. But by the 16th and 17th centuries, a different approach to 
the study of nature had gradually become predominant. This is the approach of examining 
specific and individual subject-matters in isolation from others. Rather than trying to
4Of course, Shapere does not claim that any sort of belief or assertion can operate as background knowledge! 
In Shapere’s view, only those beliefs that arc successful, free from specific and compelling doubts, and which 
are relevant to a piece of inquiry can function as background knowledge in a scientific domain. I give a detailed 
analysis of these requirements in section 4.
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understand nature and the universe as a whole, (as the Milesians did), various aspects of 
nature (such as bodies, salts, stars, and gases), were investigated in isolation from each 
other. The newer approach "replaced [the] older holistic approach, stemming from 
Milesian philosophy of trying to explain the nature of change or of substance in general. 
The specific subject-matters for study in this new approach may be referred to as domains 
o f investigation". (Shapere, 1987a, p.3)
But what are domains of investigation or inquiry? In Shapere’s view, domains are 
characterized: (a) by certain "items of information" (i.e. facts, accepted theories, and laws) 
which, (b) are associated in such a way that there is some deep unity between them, and 
(c) these unified associations generate problems that scientists try to solve in their research 
activities. That is, a domain of research is a unified body of information which forms an 
object of scientific investigation. For example, astrophysics is a domain of scientific 
inquiry because it is made up of a body o f information (iinformation such as Einstein’s 
equation E=mc2; that there are four main forces in nature; that there was a big bang; that 
there are elementary particles; that there is stellar evolution, etc.) which generate the 
problems scientist try to solve in their research.
Shapere is not claiming that any association of items of information can be 
regarded as a domain of inquiry! Only those associations which exhibit the following 
characteristics are acceptable:
(1) The association is based on some [genuine, unitary] relationship between
the items.
(2) There is something problematic about the body so related.
(3) The problem is an important one.
(4) Science is "ready" to deal with the problem. (Shapere, 1984, p.279)
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Shapere also adds the following caveats:
... we will find that, in science, such bodies of information have other 
characteristics besides these four. [And] we will find that, although it is generally 
desirable for (4) to be satisfied (to an appropriate degree) in order that an area 
count as fully scientific nevertheless areas which satisfy conditions having to 
do with (1), and (2), and (3) are often counted as "scientific" ... even if they fail 
to satisfy (4). Similar qualifications will be found necessary in regard to (3). 
(Shapere, 1984, p.280)
Shapere’s characterization of domains highlights the point that scientific research 
does not proceed merely in terms of theories. In the actual practice of science, research 
is always conducted on the basis of some assumed sets of beliefs, facts, laws and theories 
which form the sort of unity we imply when we identify contexts of scientific 
investigations like "chemistry", "astrophysics", "evolution science", "optics", etc.. 
Although these sets of beliefs cannot be regarded as theories (theories are merely some 
of the items of information that make up domains), the items of information within these 
units constitute a coherent field of study. Shapere’s concept of "domains" is an attempt 
to characterize such units. But not any old unit of items o f information will count as a 
scientific domain. Only those associations of background knowledge that are unified in 
the sense that they yield genuine problems for scientific research art domains.
Shapere regards the classification of science into various domains of inquiry as a 
result of the process of learning from nature. We had to learn how to classify science into 
distinct domains, and any current classification is always subject to change and 
modification as we learn more about the world. Early classifications, for instance, were 
based on considerations such as sensory similarities, pragmatic functions and use, a
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substance’s place of discovery, etc. For example, metals were classified on the basis of 
their obvious sensory appearances, as were salts and crystals. But as we learned more 
about nature, these initial classifications were rejected; domains which were previously 
regarded as distinct were unified, and new domains identified. This is because previously 
accepted bases of classifications were rejected, perceived similarities (and differences) 
between items classified as members of the same domain were seen to be superficial; 
hence new basis for the classification and separation of subject-matters into domains were 
laid.
The unification Of the phenomena of electricity and magnetism into that of 
electromagnetism provides one clear example of how changes occur in the boundaries of 
domains of inquiry. In the early history of electricity and magnetism, the two sets of 
phenomena were regarded as different. William Gilbert, for instance, having discovered 
that when various metals were rubbed together they attract light bodies, identified various 
differences between electricity and magnetism on the basis of sensory qualities:
Between the magnetic and electric forces Gilbert remarked many distinctions. The 
loadstone requires no stimulus of friction such as is needed to stir glass and 
sulphur into activity. The loadstone attracts only magnetisable substances, whereas 
electrified bodies attract everything. The magnetic attraction between two bodies 
is not affected by interposing a sheet of paper or linen cloth, or by immersing the 
bodies in water, whereas the electric attraction is readily destroyed by screens. 
Lastly, the magnetic force tends to arrange bodies in definite orientations; while 
the electric force merely tends to heap them together in shapeless clusters. (E.T. 
Whittaker, 1951, quoted in Shapere 1984, p.274)
But by the 19th century, various questions about the phenomena of electricity were raised. 
How is electricity conducted? Is it produced in inanimate objects alone? Answers to such
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questions suggested fundamental similarities between electricity and magnetism. Various 
scientists including Franklin and Faraday investigated the similarities between electricity 
and magnetism. And with the advent of Maxwell’s theory of electromagnetism, the two 
subject-matters became unified as one domain of inquiry. Whittaker describes an occasion 
in which similarities between the two phenomena is observed as follows:
The suspicion [that there were fundamental similarities between the two 
phenomena] was based in part on some curious effects produced by lightning, of 
a kind which may be illustrated by a paper published in the Philosophical 
Transactions in 1735. A tradesman of Wakefield, we are told, "having put up a 
great number of knifes and forks in a large box, and having placed the box in the 
corner of a large room, there happen’d in July, 1731, a sudden storm of thunder, 
lightning, etc., by which the comer of the room was damaged, the box split, and 
a good many knifes and forks melted, the sheaths being untouched. The owner 
emptying the box upon a counter where some Nails lay, the Persons who took up 
the knifes, that lay upon the Nails, observed that the Knifes took up the Nails. 
(Whittaker, 1951, quoted in Shapere 1984, p.274-275)
The contrast between 17th century natural philosophy and 20th century science 
provides another good example of Shapere’s claim that domains of inquiry alter and 
change as a result of the growth of knowledge. During the 17th century, there was no
clear cut distinction between philosophy, theology, physics, astronomy, and mysticism. All 
these fields of inquiry fell within the scope of natural philosophy. Thus, Kepler who is 
well known for his explanation of nature in terms of precise and fundamental 
mathematical laws, also inquired into the relationships between "harmonies" in planetary 
motions and musical harmony. He also delved into questions such as the effects of the 
angle of two planets during a person’s birth on that person’s future. Newton also regarded 
theological considerations as part and parcel of scientific inquiry. Indeed, it is often
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claimed that Newton devoted at least as much of his time and energy to inquiry in 
alchemy and mysticism as to science as now understood.
Shapere further insists that the classification of science into distinct domains of 
inquiry lays important requirements on theory-choice and explanation. For in emphasizing 
the point that the boundaries of domains alter as science develops, he also claims that the 
sorts of constraints that are imposed on the questions we ask, what is relevant to inquiry, 
the character of an adequate explanation, etc, also change:
... the vfery adoption of the piecemeal approach to inquiry - the laying-out of the 
boundaries of specific areas of investigation - automatically produced a standard 
against which theories could be assessed. Whatever else might be required of an 
explanation of a particular body of presumed information (domain), that 
explanation or theory could be successful only to the extent that it took account 
of the characteristics of the items of that domain. (Shapere, 1987b, p.3)
Shapere’s point is that the development of the piecemeal approach to inquiry (i.e. research 
on the basis of distinction domains) has given rise to the requirement that scientific 
theories and explanations be regarded as good or bad, (successful, adequate, or 
inadequate), on the basis of how well they can account for the problems of their domain: 
"the methods we consider appropriate for arriving at well-grounded beliefs about the 
world have come more and more to be shaped by those very beliefs, and have evolved 
with the evolution of knowledge". (Shapere, 1982, p. 178) Hence this "viewpoint maintains 
that method not only determines the course of science, but is itself shaped by the 
knowledge attained in that enterprise." (Shapere, 1982, p. 181)
The foregoing is the second main lesson from the history of science — the lesson 
emphasized by Shapere’s Principle o f Scientific Internalization. According to this
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principle all aspects of science are altered and shaped by changes in substantive beliefs.
To fully appreciate the full content of Shapere’s principle of scientific 
internalization, I will examine in some detail two of Shapere’s main examples of 
internalization -- the solar neutrino experiment, and the 18th century revolution in 
chemistry.
In the solar neutrino experiment, astrophysicists claim to "directly observe" the 
production of neutrinos in the central region of the sun:5
... neutrinos originate in the very hot stellar core, in a volume less than a millionth 
of the total solar volume. This core region is so well shielded by the surrounding 
layers that neutrinos present the only way of directly observing it. (Weekes 1969, 
quoted in Shapere, 1982, p.489)
There is no way known other than by neutrinos to see into a stellar interior.
(Clayton, 1968, quoted in Shapere, 1982, p.486)
How is the astrophysicist’s supposed to directly observe (or see) the central region 
of the sun? According to established theory, the centre of the sun lies at the core of 
400,000 miles of dense matter. Theoretical astrophysics further maintains that deep in the 
core of stars like the sun is a thermonuclear furnace, whose exceedingly high temperatures 
of at least one million degrees Kelvin, force the nuclei of hydrogen atoms to fuse into 
helium. The main initial nuclear reaction (according to theory) is the conversion of
sSo far I have used various examples from the history of science (a) to explicate Shapere’s emphasis on the 
role of background knowledge in scientific change; and, (b) to explain the concept of scientific domains. In the 
remainder of this section, I will focus on two further examples of Shapere (the solar neutrino experiment, and 
the theories of material substances in chemistry). In my consideration of these two further examples, I shift the 
focus of attention from the concept of domains to the process o f internalization itself.
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hydrogen into helium. This is the so-called proton-proton sequence of reactions. This main 
sequence of reactions leads to another chain of reactions6 which culminates in the 
production of the radioactive isotope Boron 8 (8B). When this radioactive isotope decays, 
it releases neutrinos which are highly energetic. Travelling at the speed of light, neutrinos 
are believed to bombard every square centimetre of the earth at the rate of 70 billion per 
second. The solar neutrino experiment was set up in an attempt to detect the neutrinos that 
accepted theory entails are produced and transmitted into space.
Two of the most important items of information within background knowledge to . 
the solar neutrino experiment concern neutrinos themselves: (1) Neutrinos are believed to 
be massless (or almost so). But according to modem particle physics, a massless particle 
cannot change its form; that is, it cannot interact with any other particle. All it can do is 
to absorb or emit energy. And because of this lack of interaction, neutrinos are also 
believed, (2) to obey the "weak interaction theory". This theory entails that neutrinos can 
pass unimpeded through almost everything they encounter en route from the sun’s core. 
That is, the nature of neutrinos are not altered in the process of getting to the surface of 
the earth.
The neutrino detector used in the experiment is a 400,000-litre tank of the cleaning 
fluid perchloroethylene. The tank is buried 4,850 feet into a mine to prevent particles that 
can produce effects similar to those of neutrinos from interfering with the results of the 
experiment. Scientists calculated that neutrinos should have enough energy to trigger of 
a chain of reactions in the tank of perchloroethylene. The expected reaction was the
6Actually, the proton-proton sequence of reactions gives rise to three alternate sub-chains of reactions. The
possibility of the occurrence of any one of these sub-chains is calculated by probability. Only one of sub-chain
can lead to the production of neutrinos.
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changing of chlorine atoms in the tank into isotopes of argon. The atoms of the argon 
were then to be counted on a proportional counter.
But surely, the questions must be asked: in what sense can the astrophysicist 
legitimately claim to observe (directly) the central region of the sun?:
Is the scientist using the term "observation” and its cognates in ways which are at 
best only tenuously related to the philosophers usage, and perhaps to ordinary 
usage as well, so that the scientist’s way of speaking is misleading, at least to the 
non-scientist and perhaps even to the scientist himself? Or are the philosopher and 
the astrophysicist interested in entirely different and unrelated problems, which are 
reflected in their different usages of the term, so that they are talking completely 
past one another even though their usages are, from their respective points of 
view, equally legitimate? (Shapere, 1982, p.486)
One obvious response seems to be that the astrophysicist infer her claims about 
the internal constitution of the sun on the basis of her currently best theories! For she, in 
fact, does not, and cannot, see (in the normal usage of perceiving) the events and 
processes occurring at the centre of the sun. At best, (one might insist), what the 
astrophysicists actually see is the occurrence of certain reactions in the tank. Or perhaps, 
she is merely observing clicks that are registered on the proportional counter that counts 
atoms in the tank. Whatever else the astrophysicist might be seeing (we might insist) it 
is not the core region of the sun. For the claims are made on the basis of a study of the 
processes occurring in tanks.
But the objections to the astrophysicist’s claims do not end here. Because even if 
we concede (just for the sake of argument) that the astrophysicist "sees" (in a very loose 
sense) the core region of the sun, surely, the "seeing" cannot be direct. For the detection 
of neutrinos in the experiment is based on very complex inferences. After all, the claim
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can be made only i f  theories such as that of stellar evolution, an assumption of the age 
of the sun, etc, are made. Any conclusion arrived at on the basis of these assumptions 
must be inferential.
Shapere warns that we should not be too hasty in charging the astrophysicist of 
using the terms "observation", "direct", and "seeing" loosely. This is because there is an 
important contrast to be drawn between the information carried by neutrinos and the 
electromagnetic information we receive via light-photons. Unlike neutrinos, light-photons 
do not obey the weak interaction theory. Although neutrinos and photons are believed to 
be produced by the same nuclear fusion process, unlike neutrinos which pass unimpeded 
through almost everything they encounter, photons take a very long circuitous path to the 
stellar surface. En route from the core, photons collide with the atoms of hydrogen and 
helium gas that populate the radiative zone (the zone in which nuclear fusion takes place) 
of the sun. Energy is lost with every collision, and photons also change direction 
randomly with every collision. Hence, photons (the carriers of electromagnetic, 
information) take something within the range of 100,000 to 1,000,000 years to reach the 
sun’s surface. During this very long period, they would have been absorbed, scattered and 
re-radiated so drastically that although they were initially produced as high-frequency, 
short-wave gamma rays, they are received as low-frequency, long wave visible light. 
Because neutrinos do not undergo any such drastic alteration en route from the sun they 
"are at one and the same time the most reliable and the most reluctant of messengers". 
(Fowler 1967, quoted in Shapere, 1982, p.491)
Shapere claims that it is this contrast that provides the key to a proper 
understanding of the astrophysicist claim:
44
Shapere’s bootstrappism
The key to understanding the astrophysicist’s use of ’direct observation’ and 
related terms in his talk about neutrinos coming from the center of the sun is to 
be found in the contrast between the information so received and that based on the 
alternative available source of information about the solar core, the reception of 
electromagnetic information (light photons). (Shapere, 1982, pp.490-491)
In his contrast between the information received via neutrinos from that received via 
photons, Shapere identifies three aspects of the "observation situation" in the solar 
neutrino experiment, viz; the release of neutrinos by the source; the transmission of 
neutrinos; and the reception of neutrinos by the detector. (Shapere calls these three aspects 
of the observational situation the theory of the source, the theory of transmission, and the 
theory of the receptor, respectively.)
Consider first the release of neutrinos from the sun. (I.e. the theory of the source.) 
Without background information such as the general theory of relativity; the equation 
E=mc2; the claim of modem physics that the universe is governed by four main forces -- 
the strong, weak, electromagnetic, and gravitational forces; the theory of stellar evolution; 
etc., the experiment would have been inconceivable. It is because all these theories, laws, 
and equations, function as claims which are taken for granted in astrophysics that 
astrophysicists are able to conjecture the emission of neutrinos from the sun.
In the theory of transmission, background knowledge plays a crucial role as well. 
For the key to the astrophysicist’s claim lies in the claim that neutrinos hardly interact 
with other particles. More specifically, because of the weak interaction theory, information 
about the stellar core received via neutrinos becomes analogous to information about the 
stellar surface received via photons. This is because the journey of photons to receptors 
on earth can be divided into two parts. The first is the long circuitous one from the core
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to the surface. This is the journey that can take up to 1,000,000 years. But once photons 
break onto the surface, the journey to receptors on earth take just about 8 minutes. Also, 
between the sun’s surface and the earth, photons do not (except very infrequently) 
undergo any collisions which alter their character. Consequently, information about the 
surface of the sun brought via photons (information which is captured or detected by 
receptors such as telescopes, cameras, etc.) are regarded as authentic. Information recorded 
by telescopes, etc., are regarded as reliable because physics tells us that there is no 
significant interference with light-photons between the sun’s surface and the recording of 
that information. In the same manner, since current theory specifies that there is hardly 
any interference with the information carried by neutrinos en route to the receptor from 
the core, information so received is as reliable as information about the stellar surface 
carried via photons.
Background knowledge also plays a crucial role in the theory of the receptor. 
Without the theoretical background of general relativity, the chemistry of chemical 
composition, etc., it would have been impossible to specify the sort of detector to 
construct; where to locate the detector; and how to interpret the information received.
The important point therefore is that the considerations which generate, guide and 
determine the results of the experiment involve a great deal of background knowledge. 
This background knowledge includes high level theories, laws, equations, and practical 
know-how such as how to clean out the chlorine tank. Without this body of background 
knowledge, no one would have thought of doing this particular experiment; and no one, 
having thought of it, could do it perfectly. Hence, the theoretical claims operate as 
substantive parts of scientific knowledge in the sense that they make specific claims about
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the nature and constitution of stars. But these theoretical claims also perform 
methodological (i.e. heuristic) functions in the sense that they dictate the sorts of 
experiments that astrophysicists ought to perform, they constrain the sorts of conjectures 
that are allowable in the further development of astrophysics, and they also lay down 
constraints on the sorts of instruments to construct in solar physics.
More particularly, it also seems that, what counts as an observation, and the rules 
for interpreting observations are dependent on substantive scientific claims (which are 
subject to possible radical change). This explains Shapere claims that the experiment 
shows:
... three major ways in which the concept of observation has become integrated 
into the fabric of scientific beliefs. First, the status of observation as the primary 
means of testing beliefs and obtaining knowledge ... . Second, the interpretation 
of what counts as an observation has come more and more to depend on the 
content of the very scientific beliefs to which it itself has led. ... And third, the 
exact ways in which observation plays its evidential roles— of confirmation and 
disconfirmation, verification and falsification have been shaped by the content of 
beliefs about the world whose warrant have themselves come from observation. 
... The problems we face in our inquiries about nature, and the methods with 
which we attempt to deal with those problems, co-evolve with our beliefs about 
nature. ... The methods we employ lead us to new beliefs, which in turn lead us 
to modify those very methods, sometimes replacing them with new ones. The 
result is a growing integration of method with belief. ... it is a process of the 
internalization of methodology into the rest of science. (Shapere 1987a, p.5)
The role of background information is crucial. For, given that modem science 
entails the occurrence of processes and events to which the human senses have no access, 
science has built on what it knows by extending our ability to "observe" in previously 
unimagined ways. Consider the electromagnetic spectrum. According to modem science, 
the electromagnetic spectrum ranges from very short-wave high-frequency gamma rays,
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to very long-wave low-frequency radio waves. The total range of wavelengths between 
the two ends of the spectrum is about 1022. But the human eye is capable of receiving 
only a negligible sector of this very wide spectrum. Because of this background of 
assumptions, "the eye ... comes to be regarded as a particular sort of electromagnetic 
receptor, capable of "detecting" electromagnetic waves of the "blue" to "red" wavelengths, 
there being other sorts of receptors capable of detecting other ranges of the spectrum. This 
generalized notion o f a receptor or detector thus includes the eye as one type". (Shapere, 
1982, p.505) And with the advancement of science, various detectors which are capable 
of receiving other wavelengths within the spectrum were constructed.
Moreover Shapere insists that from an epistemological point of view, there is no 
justification for regarding the eye (or the human senses) as more reliable than these other 
sorts of receptors or detectors. First, the human senses are not infallible. Indeed, one of 
the traditional problems of epistemology is the problem of perception. And although 
everyone agrees that the human senses are sometimes unreliable, some philosophers have 
been hasty to argue that the human senses are not trustworthy. (Some have in fact argued 
that the possibility of perceptual error make our senses completely unreliable!) But more 
importantly, it makes no sense whatsoever to regard the human senses as alternatives to 
these other receptors. For as the human senses are incapable of detecting those 
wavelengths received by these receptors, how can the senses be better receptors of 
information they are unable to detect?
What is observable, what counts as an observation, and what is directly observed 
are not established on the basis of sense perception. Rather, observability is established 
if there are adequate receptors which are capable of receiving certain kinds of
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information. And the human senses which constitute just one type of receptors are not as 
efficient and reliable as other types of receptors. The concept of observation in modem 
physical science has been extended and generalized on the basis of science’s well-founded 
beliefs:
[A] generalization of the notion of a "receptor" is made in the light of the 
existence of these further sorts of interaction: an "appropriate receptor" can now 
be understood in terms of the instrument which is able to detect the presence of 
such an interaction ... . Thus the extension of knowledge has led to a natural 
extension of what counts as observational: the very fact that information received 
by the eye becomes subsumed under a more general type of information leads to 
the treatment of the eye as a particular type of receptor of that information. Further 
discovery that that type of information (electromagnetic) is only one of four types 
of information leads to a further generalization. (Shapere, 1982, pp.505-506)
Of course Shapere is not claiming that sense perception has no significant role to play in 
this generalized conception of observation! After all, whatever is observed or recorded by 
any non-human receptor (i.e. those that are not recorded by the human senses) still has 
to be transformed into humanly accessible form. For instance, before the information 
recorded in the solar neutrino experiment can be of any use, it must be transformed into 
audible clicks, photographs, or computer print-outs. Human perception still has an 
important role to play in this naturalized view of observation. But this point in no way 
undermines the significance of Shapere’s central thesis. Because what Shapere’s thesis 
amount to is the claim that: as a result of developments in our scientific beliefs about the 
nature of the world, a distinction has been made between the perceptual and the 
epistemological aspects of observation. From an epistemological point of view, an 
observation need not be perceptual or directly accessible to the human senses. Humans
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need not be present when useful information is recorded by adequate receptors. And as 
the human senses are in fact incapable of directly receiving these sort of information, 
observation is no longer equated with perception. Hence although the astrophysicist does 
not perceive the central region of the sun, she is nonetheless justified in her claim to be 
observing processes occurring in the sun. She is also justified in claiming that the 
observation is direct. This is because the measures of directness are no longer the senses. 
The directness of observation is determined by the sorts of interference that can affect 
information in-between the source of that information and its reception.
Another example of the Principle of Internalization Shapere considers is associated 
with the 18th century revolution in chemistry— the revolution in which Lavoisier and 
others brought about profound changes in the understanding of chemical substances. 
According to Shapere, a distinction can be drawn between two general approaches to the 
study of material substances; the Perfectionist approach, and the Compositionalist 
approach. The former approach was embedded in the pre-modem idea that material 
substances are like plants and animals which grow to maturity. This view is essentially 
the one adopted by alchemists in their research. For the alchemist, there is only one kind 
of element, "earth". All substances exist in various degrees of actualization or perfection 
of the element "earth". A substance was regarded as imperfect not because it was an 
admixture of other substances (i.e. not because it was a compound). Rather, substances 
are imperfect because they exist in a potential form of the most perfect stage of matter. 
The most perfect stage of matter (i.e. the highest degree of "actualization" of the element 
"earth"), was taken to be gold.
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Within the perfectionist tradition, substances were usually described and named on 
the basis of their obvious sensory properties. (Naming was, however, sometimes based on 
considerations such as place of discovery, and the uses of the substance in question.) The 
naming of substances on the basis of their apparent sensory properties had profound 
implications on alchemical research. For instance, as colours were also ordered in a 
hierarchy from gold as the highest to blue as the lowest (or most imperfect) colour, 
bringing a substance to perfection involved processes such as: bringing the substance in 
question to a state of "formlessness" (i.e. the process of bleaching, which was also 
described as the process of "killing" the form of substances), and the process of "tinting" 
the now "formless" substance to a more perfect colour.
But by the latter part of the 18th century, various substantive developments led 
to modifications in the study of matter. For instance, previously unknown substances (and 
types of substances) were discovered. A distinction between two types of alkalis (sodium 
and potassium) was also recognized. And as a result of these developments and 
discoveries, the study of material substances became more sophisticated. In particular, 
researchers began to realize that a classification of substances on the basis of their obvious 
sensory properties was inadequate. The chemist, Guyton de Morveau, for instance, 
remarked that:
No doubt it was still possible to remember the improper names of some thirty salts 
and to retain them in the memory by re-reading them and hearing them; but today 
chemistry is familiar with eighteen acids ... it has newly discovered two earths and 
several semi-metals; if we are to examine with care the action of so many 
substances on each other ... it becomes essential to adopt a nomenclature to 
indicate the result without confusion. (Quoted in Shapere, 1977, p.289)
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The inadequacies of the perfectionist approach in the naming of material 
substances, the discovery of various hitherto unknown substances, and the recognition of 
(deep) chemical similarities between substances (as opposed to sensory ones such as 
colour) soon led to the belief that a better knowledge of substances can be gained through 
the study of their constituents. In short, there was a gradual change from the perfectionist 
approach to the compositionalist one. The compositionalist approach is based on the idea 
that "material substances can be understood in terms of their constituents, the arrangement 
of those constituents, and that ... such understanding is what we should aim at in our 
laboratory dealing with material substances". (Shapere, 1984, p.327)
The change from the perfectionist aims to compositionalist ones exhibit. 
internalization in the sense that the shift is a result of developments and discoveries in 
substantive claims about the nature of material substances.7 Just as the substantive 
discoveries in chemistry supplied the basis for the adoption Of the compositionalist aims, 
so did the general Greek philosophical tradition supply the basis for the perfectionist 
approach.
Shapere adds the further point that the transition from the perfectionist approach 
to the compositionalist one was very gradual. Various episodes in the history of chemistry 
contributed to the overthrow of the perfectionist approach. For instance, Stahl’s theory of 
acidity, which had very close ties with the alchemic idea of phlogiston and negative
’indeed the rejected perfectionist approach had itself developed within the general context of the Greek 
philosophical tradition. Early Greek philosophers had recognized and distinguished three states of matter, viz., 
the solid, liquid, and the gaseous. Corresponding to these three states of matter were the three elements earth, 
water, and air. And with fire as a fourth element, the existence of all forms of terrestrial matter was explained 
by the Greeks. Thus Shapere insists that: "as many alchemical theorists were quick to see, the idea of 
"perfecting" ... metals was readily conceivable within this "framework", and specific processes for bringing about 
such perfection could be given a theoretical basis in its terms." (Shapere, 1977, p.286)
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weight, contributed to the development of the compositionalist approach. This is because 
Stahl’s account of acidity and combustion laid the grounds for Lavoisier’s theory of 
chemistry. It was in his rejection of Stahl’s theory that Lavoisier made very significant 
contributions to the understanding of substances in terms of their constituents (or 
compositions).
On Shapere’s view therefore* although the change involved a fundamental shift in 
the aims of the study of material substances, "a continuity can be discerned between the 
earlier and the new nomenclature, [and] it is misleading to say simply that what was 
involved was either a new way of talking about "the same things", or a "radically new" 
way of talking which completely reconceived what the things are" (Shapere, 1977, p.290). 
This is why questions such as: how could compositionalist theories, procedures, or 
explanations, have been accepted i f  the alchemic goals were truly accepted?, do not arise 
in Shapere’s explanation of the change. The transition, according to Shapere’s account, 
was too gradual for questions such as this to be of any significance. It is only when we 
look at the change from its two "ends" (i.e the fully blown perfectionist approach and the 
fully blown compositionalist approach) that the change appears so radical. If we are 
interested in giving a rational explanation of the change, Shapere would insist that we 
concentrate on the gradual developmental process of the change; and not on the two end 
products.
Nonetheless, this process -- no matter how gradual -- does eventually produce a 
radical change. And radical change not just in substantive claims, but also in the criteria 
of theory appraisal and evaluation:
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In the light of this process of internalization, it is easy to see why and how 
scientific change is so pervasive. In the course of inquiry, domains come more and 
more to be formulated in the light of background beliefs . . . .  But the background 
beliefs which lead to such changes in domain structure and conception also lead 
to alterations ... in other parts of the fabric of science.... The problems associated 
with particular domains become altered, as do the lines between recognized 
’’scientific" problems and questions that are classed as "non-scientific". ... New 
background information, or old information formerly considered irrelevant, is 
found to be relevant to a particular domain. Old methods are rejected or 
reinterpreted, new ones introduced; new standards of possibility and acceptability 
arise. (Shapere, 1987b, p.7)
We need to be very precise about what the Principle of Scientific Internalization 
entails. Shapere’s view of internalization is not restricted to the integration of observation 
and methodology:
... the process of internalization [is not] limited to the integration of methodology 
[and observation] into the rest of science. What counts as a reason, too, has 
become a function of scientific belief... the distinction between the scientifically 
relevant and the scientifically irrelevant is [also] one that has had to evolve ... . 
The problems that count as scientific, too, alter with the development of science. 
Questions once considered scientifically legitimate - how to bring matter to 
perfection; the final causes of things - have been abandoned .... Questions earlier 
dismissed as being improper subjects for scientific investigation - the origin of life, 
the origin of stars, the chemical composition of stars,... have become scientifically 
tractable problems. They have, in other words, become internalized into the 
scientific process. Even such lofty concepts as "truth" and "existence" have been 
refashioned, or are being refashioned, in the light of what we have come to believe 
in science. ... The ... achievement [of internalization thus] serves an important 
function in the knowledge-seeking enterprise. By bringing methodology, 
reasoning-pattems, goals and so forth into intimate connection with more overtly 
substantive claims, it makes it possible to subject all aspects of science to test. But 
the need to bring all aspects of scientific inquiry, even the methods, goals, 
reasoning-pattems, and standards of explanation, to test, is precisely what I 
describe as the second lesson of modem science. That is why I have called that 
lesson the Principle of Internalization. (Shapere, 1987a, pp.5-6)
On Shapere’s view, therefore, it is because scientific inquiry is always conducted
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on the basis of well-founded claims- i.e established laws, theories, facts and assertions 
which have acquired the status of background knowledge— that all aspects of science are 
(in principle as well as in practice) subject to radical change. Background knowledge 
provides guidance in deciding what is relevant to investigation, on how to cany out 
investigation in science, and on how to understand the results of scientific investigation. 
Just like Kuhn, Shapere maintains that the development of science is governed by some 
assumed web of substantive claims and beliefs about the world. This background of 
beliefs, because they are taken for granted, provide the framework within which all 
aspects o f science are interpreted and evaluated. On the basis of new beliefs, theories, 
equations, and laws (or modifications to old ones), we arrive at new methods and rules 
of theory appraisal:
The methods we employ lead us to new beliefs which in turn lead us to modify 
those very methods, sometimes replacing them with new ones. The result is a 
growing integration of method with belief. A cycle of mutual adjustment of beliefs 
and methods has thus become a characteristic feature of the scientific enterprise. 
(Shapere, 1987a, p.5)
3. TWO SENSES OF METHODOLOGY
A good deal of confusion has been wrought in recent philosophy of science, and 
especially in discussions of naturalized methodology, by a failure to distinguish between 
two importantly different senses of the term "methodology", viz: a narrow (i.e. formal) 
sense of methodology and a broad (i.e. substantive) sense. (See, e.g., Worrall [1988] and 
Doppelt [1990].) These two senses of the term correspond to the uses of traditional
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philosophers like Carnap, Hempel, Popper and Reichenbach, on the one hand, and that of 
Kuhn, Toulmin and Feyerabend, on the other hand.8 In the use of traditional philosophers, 
methodology is made up of those (more or less) formal principles which (they supposed) 
invariably govern theory appraisal in science. These principles are those which enabled 
traditionalists to deliver the judgement that one theory is, in view of the available 
empirical evidence, verified to a certain degree or at least better supported than its rivals. 
Furthermore, for these traditional philosophers, there was no question of there being 
different sets of methodological principles which are correct for different scientists (and 
philosophers) at different periods in history. Copemicanism was better than its Ptolemaic 
alternative for exactly the same sort of reasons that Newtonian mechanics is better than 
Aristotelian mechanics; and it is in turn because of the same sort of reason that 
Einsteinian mechanics is better than Newtonian mechanics.
Thus when traditional philosophers discussed methodology, their concern was with 
the logic o f scientific inquiry in the sense that they were concerned with the basic 
principles and standards for the correct evaluation, comparison, and justification of 
scientific theories. It is because methodology in this narrow sense was concerned with 
principles and standards that were taken to be applicable to all aspects of scientific inquiry 
that the validity or credibility of such principles did not depend on any substantive claims 
about the world.
Of course, philosophers have hotly disagreed about how correctly and exactly to
‘it should be noted that most of these philosophers do not explicitly distinguish between the narrow and 
broad senses of methodology. Most traditional philosophers simply assumed the narrow sense of the term in their 
writings, while revolutionaries such as Kuhn created a lot of confusion by: (1) adopting the broader usage, and 
(2) advancing their usage as an alternative to the earlier narrower usage. But as I shall argue in the remainder 
of this section, the two senses of the term methodology are better regarded as complementary.
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characterize these formal principles. But when it comes to questions of how well specific 
theories stand up to empirical evidence, (especially for theories that have been around for 
a while), despite their differences, traditionalists more or less arrive at the same ranking 
of theories: Copemicanism over Ptolemaic astronomy; quantum mechanics over 
Newtonian mechanics; Darwin’s account of natural selection over Lamarck’s alternative, 
etc.
Indeed, agreement goes beyond the ranking of theories in terms of how well they 
stand up to empirical test; traditional philosophers were also agreed on intuitive points 
such as the importance of subjecting scientific theories to rigorous testing, and that 
predictive success is an important criterion of scientific merit. Disagreement comes in at 
the more abstract level of giving a precise characterization of the principles which make 
up the logic of science.
But as Kuhn, Shapere, and others have argued, traditional philosophers did not 
assign due importance to one very important aspect of scientific research. This is that 
scientific research is always conducted from within a background of theoretical, 
metaphysical and factual assumptions. Whenever these assumptions are made in scientific 
research, they perform a dual function: on the one hand, they function as substantive 
claims which make specific assertions about the nature of the world (e.g. light is a wave­
like disturbance in a medium; phlogiston is emitted into air in combustion; events in 
nature are deterministic). On the other hand, these assumptions also perform heuristic 
roles in the further development of science. They perform a heuristic role in the sense 
that: (i) they lay down certain requirements about what sorts of explanations, conjectures 
and theories are admissible within a domain of inquiry (e.g. any new theory of light must
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explain the wave-like properties of light if it is to be accepted); and (ii) they also specify 
the kinds of modification that are acceptable within their domain of inquiry (e.g. -a s  long 
as the principle of determinism is accepted— any explanation in fluid mechanics, say, must 
not rely on indeterministic assumptions). Theoretical, metaphysical, and factual 
assumptions, therefore, also function in a natural way as positive and negative heuristic 
principles which guide the further development of science.
As we have seen, the solar neutrino experiment illustrates how science is always 
conducted from within a background of theoretical and factual assumptions. Without this 
body of background knowledge, no one would have thought of doing this particular 
experiment. Consequently, although these theoretical claims operate as substantive parts 
of scientific knowledge in the sense that they make specific claims about the nature and 
constitution of stars, they also perform heuristic functions in the sense that they guide the 
further development of astrophysical research. In particular, they constrain the sorts of 
conjectures that are allowable in the furtherance of astrophysics, and they lay down 
constraints on the sorts of instruments to construct.
One could describe these heuristic roles of scientific assumptions as 
methodological. Indeed, this is one main sense in which Kuhn and his followers use the 
term. Kuhn and the Kuhnians did not regarded methodology as simply the logic o f 
science. (Indeed, some Kuhnians seem to imply that there is no narrow sense of 
methodology— that there is no logic of science.) Methodology for them includes, highly 
substantive principles and, positive and negative heuristic principles which guide scientific 
research (and the construction of new theories).
Shapere’s view is similar to that of the Kuhnians in this respect. For not only does
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Shapere deny the inviolability and invariance of any methodological rule, he also claims 
that all methodological rules are informed by the theoretical, metaphysical, and 
substantive beliefs of science:
... the problems we face in our inquires about nature, and the methods with which 
we attempt to deal with these problems, co-evolve with our beliefs about nature 
... The methods we employ lead us to new beliefs, which in turn lead us to modify 
those very methods, sometimes replacing them with new ones. The result has been 
a growing integration o f method with belief. A cycle o f mutual adjustment o f  
beliefs and methods has thus become a characteristic o f the scientific enterprise; 
it is a process o f internalization o f methodology into the rest o f science. (Shapere, 
1987b, p.5, my emphasis)
Shapere, in fact, also claims that:
... shifts of aims, problems, methods, and vocabulary are linked to substantive 
beliefs about the world; aims, methods, and so forth in science are as much subject 
to discovery and evolution as the facts and theories with which science deals. 
(Shapere, 1984, p. 214)
As already indicated, I agree with Shapere that the important role of background 
knowledge was largely overlooked by pre-Kuhnian philosophers. We need an analysis of 
the development of science which pays due attention to the important heuristic roles 
played by substantive scientific beliefs. Nevertheless the questions can be asked: does the 
role of background knowledge in scientific change genuinely support the no-invariant- 
methodology thesis? Do the heuristic roles of substantive beliefs genuinely support the 
view that all methodological rules are subject to possible radical change? To provide an 
answer to these questions, we need to take a closer look at the nature and function of
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background knowledge in the development of science.
As Shapere’s example of the solar neutrino experiment shows, only those 
assumptions which are taken for granted by scientists can operate as the (perhaps 
temporarily) "unquestioned truths" referred to as background knowledge.9 But we need to 
distinguish between various types of these unquestioned assumptions.
Suppose we start by accepting a claim as "part" of background knowledge if that 
claim operates at any rate for some time as an unquestioned assumption within a context 
of scientific research. Then, we can identify (at least) the following four types (or "parts") 
background knowledge:10
(a) Specific Theories.
(b) General Theories.
(c) Highly General Metaphysical Principles.
(d) Well-established empirical facts and observational laws.
Examples of specific theories would include Newton’s three laws; the version of the wave 
theory of light that held that light waves are longitudinal; the alternative transverse wave 
account of double reflection, etc. Theories of this kind are specific in the sense that there
9Of course Shapere does not claim that these assumptions can never be questioned! Rather, as I will explain 
fully in the next section, his claim is that these assumptions are not questioned as long as there is no specific 
reason to doubt them. Once specific doubts have been levied against them, they cease to function as background 
knowledge.
10The distinction between the ’parts’ of background knowledge modifies and builds on that developed by 
Worrall (1985). And, I am not claiming that these four "parts" of background knowledge exhaust the range of 
items within background knowledge! I concentrate on these four merely because they suffice for my analysis.
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are some higher level theories or more general frameworks within which they are 
developed. For instance, the general theory that light is some sort of disturbance which 
spreads out in a wave-like fashion in an all-pervading medium is One under which various 
specific theories, such as Fresnel’s transverse wave account of light, and the earlier 
longitudinal version of the wave theory of light, arc subsumed. The general corpuscular 
theory of light, or the general theory of evolution are also examples of general theories.
Of course there are various sorts of differences in the kinds of specific theories 
(and of general theories) that operate as "background knowledge" in science. For instance, 
some specific theories (and some general theories) which form the background knowledge 
of a domain X  will be theories which have been "imported" from related domains; while 
others will be theories from within the domain in question itself. For instance, the claim 
that the sun is made up of three layers- the photosphere (i.e. the core), the chromosphere 
(i.e. the "sphere of colour"), and the corona (i.e. the outermost, gaseous layer)— is a 
specific claim which functions as background knowledge within astrophysics. This 
entrenched claim is from within the domain of astrophysics itself. The equation of 
Einstein’s theory of relativity (E=mc2) is taken for granted not merely in kinematics, but 
in various aspects of modem science- e.g in chemistry and astrophysics. In these 
sciences, the equation functions as a well entrenched aspect of background knowledge 
which is imported from kinematics.
When specific and general theories are accepted in science, they perform 
methodological roles in the sense that they constrain the sorts of explanations and 
conjectures that are (temporarily) allowable in scientific research. It is, however, also a 
fact that the history of science is littered with the ruins of such theories; radical changes
6 1
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in science have occurred at the level of both specific and general theories. It follows from 
this that methodological constraints attached to such theories are subject to radical 
historical change. This is because the heuristic (methodological) functions of substantive 
beliefs cease with the rejection of their corresponding beliefs. For instance, when the 
corpuscular theory of light was finally rejected and firmly replaced by the wave theory, 
scientists obviously stopped explaining optical phenomena in terms of light corpuscles.
Changes in substantive claims (and the corresponding changes in methodological 
heuristics) occur, however, in a rather definite, if complex, manner. For when scientists 
are confronted with refutations of specific theories that had previously been successful, 
they generally look for a different specific theory of the same general kind. Refutation of 
his initial longitudinal wave theory led Fresnel, for instance, to reject that specific theory 
in favour of another specific theory of the same general kind namely, the transverse wave 
theory. It is only after various attempts to produce specific theories of the same general 
kind have failed that scientists tend to challenge their more general theories.
Another aspect of background knowledge which is still more general than what I 
have called general theories is made up of metaphysical assumptions and principles. 
Examples include principles such as those of determinism and mechanism; the 
perfectionist and compositionalist theories of material substances, and various conservation 
and symmetry assumptions. These principles are more general in the sense that they are 
assumptions which cut across different general theories, "paradigms” or "research 
programmes". For instance, the assumption that optics involved only mechanistic and 
deterministic processes is an assumption that formed part of the background knowledge 
of both corpuscularians and wave theoreticians.
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As metaphysical assumptions are normally still more firmly established in 
background knowledge than specific theories and general theories, they often provide 
justification for the acceptance (or rejection) of less general theories. When empirical 
difficulties arise in a domain of inquiry, scientists normally hold on to the general 
metaphysical principles as frameworks from which alternative general theories are to be 
found. (Of course, this need not be a conscious process.) Highly general assumptions tend 
to be replaced only after repeated failures to find general theories of the same 
metaphysical kind. This suggests that the more specific or less general the theory, the 
higher its intuitive likelihood of being replaced in situations of "crises''.
Consider, for instance, the changes that occurred in general theories about the 
nature of light. Although there have been very radical changes in optical theory from the 
corpuscular theory, through the wave theory to the electromagnetic theory, (but with the 
exception of the photon theory), the general metaphysical assumptions that optics involved 
mechanical and deterministic processes remained constant. And as long as these 
assumptions were made, they provided part of the justification for change in theory.
The three aspects of background knowledge discussed so far all show that 
methodology (broadly conceived) has changed along with the substantive developments 
of science. But one aspect of scientific knowledge which has been essentially cumulative 
is its empirical aspect. A cursory look at the history of modem science will reveal that 
our empirical knowledge has grown enormously as science develops. Consider again the 
history of modem optics. Although there have been very radical changes at the purely 
theoretical level, there has been no such change at the empirical level. The corpuscular 
theory held that light consists of tiny particles, and the theory led to some important
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empirical consequences in optics. For instance, the theory’s accounts of simple reflection 
and refraction were correct. The theory was, however, later rejected in favour of the wave 
theory which held, not that light is made up of material particles, but rather of periodic 
wave-like motions through a medium called the luminiferous aether. There was thus a 
very radical change at the theoretical level. Fresnel’s luminiferous aether was later 
rejected in favour of Maxwell’s electromagnetic field. And Maxwell’s theory itself was 
still later replaced by the photon theory.
But the story is quite different at the empirical level. The corpuscular theory was 
able to give correct empirical accounts of simple reflection and refraction, and the wave 
theory was able to account for these and more by giving adequate explanations of 
diffraction, interference, and polarization. The electromagnetic and photon theories were 
also able to add to the empirical successes of their predecessors.
Shapere’s analysis of the solar neutrino experiment of course commits him to the 
view that radical discontinuity extends right down to the observational and empirical level 
of science. And he in fact explicitly rejects the "continuity at the empirical level" view:
There can by now be no reasonable doubt of the pervasive role of presupposition, 
of interpretation, in science and scientific change. There are no brute facts which 
confront us and force our theory choices in certain obligatory directions, there is 
no "given" which does not include interpretation. (Shapere, 1987b, p.2)
But it seems to me that Shapere’s view of radical empirical discontinuity rests on 
an ambiguity between a wider and a narrower sense of the term "fact". "Facts" are usually 
taken to be the bases for the testing of scientific theories. But in the testing of their latest 
theories, scientists generally take for granted other theories which they have already
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regarded as true or certain. In the solar neutrino experiment, the astrophysicist takes for 
granted the theory of the big bang and the theory of stellar evolution. And since these 
theories function as part of the material against which the claim that neutrinos exist is 
tested, they are taken for granted as "facts” (if "facts" are taken in the wider sense). But 
these "facts" are obviously different from facts like "the dial in the proportional counter 
is pointing at the mark *2*".
The distinction between the narrow and the broad usages of fact have been 
described as "scientific" and "crude" facts by Poincard [1958]. Scientific facts are 
statements which are taken to express true descriptions of reality, but which involve the 
use of other theoretical assumptions. But statements which do not depend upon the 
assumption of any high level theoretical assumptions express crude facts.11
If the term "fact" is used in its wide and rather attenuated sense, then obviously, 
radical discontinuities extend right down to the levels of "facts". Various scientific facts 
which were once regarded as true descriptions of reality (e.g. phlogiston, ether, caloric) 
are now regarded as false. But if facts are taken to be low-level descriptions of reality 
(crude facts), then we have one part of background knowledge to which the sort of radical 
change Shapere envisages do not extend. In turn, the methodological rules that are 
informed by these aspects of science are more resistant to change. (Indeed, as I shall 
argue shortly, a methodological principle that is invariant in scientific change is associated
“Obviously, the term "theory” could also be used loosely. If so used, then one could claim (as Shapere does) 
that "there are no brute facts". In this lose usage of "theory" claims such as "the computer screen before me is 
green and black" would employ "theoretical assumptions" about myself, the computer, an external world in which 
the computer is located, etc. But surely there is a significant difference between statements like: "neutrinos exist", 
"atoms exist"; and those like: "my computer screen is black and green", "the lady in front is six feet tall”. The 
first set of statements are those which I regard as expressing scientific facts, and those in the second set express 
crude facts.
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with the empirical aspect of scientific knowledge.)
Indeed there are some facts which are (strictly speaking) scientific facts, but which 
Shapere’s radical discontinuity thesis do not touch. For instance, we regard Newton’s 
theory of gravity as being tested by factual descriptions of planetary positions. But 
obviously, descriptions of planetary positions are not crude facts. The real crude facts arc 
expressed in statements such as "a characteristic spot of light is spotted in. the sky at 
locations uvw when the telescope is inclined at angle xyz." "Facts" such as those of 
planetary positions arc clearly interpreted facts. But there is no doubt that because these 
sort of interpreted facts involve very low-level theoretical assumptions (unlike the claim 
"scientist observe the production of neutrinos in the sun"), they arc also not subject to the 
sorts of radical changes Shapere envisages.
My general point then is this. There are two broad classes of background 
knowledge: the theoretical class which is made up of specific theories, general theories, 
and highly general metaphysical principles; and the factual class. Included within the 
factual class are crude facts, and descriptive statements which require very low-level 
"theoretical" assumptions. If .we take.methodology in its broad sense, it does not follow 
that all methodological rules are up Tor grabs, in scientific change. For , although those 
methodological stipulations which are informed by the theoretical parts of background 
knowledge will cease to perform their heuristic functions once their associated theoretical 
considerations are overthrown, those methodological constraints that are informed by the 
non-theoretical aspects of background knowledge would be more resistant to radical
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change.12 From the alleged fact that background beliefs play an important role in scientific 
methodology, it does not follow that all methodological rules and principles are subject 
to possible radical change. This is because there is an important difference between those 
methodological principles that arc informed by the theoretical aspects of background 
knowledge (e.g. "look for mechanistic and deterministic optical theories") and those that 
are related to the empirical and observational aspects of background knowledge (e.g. "any 
new theory of light must successfully explain phenomena such as polarization, diffraction, 
etc., which are some of the empirical successes of the photon theory of light). The rules 
which are informed by the factual aspects of background knowledge will, to say the least, 
be more resistant to change than those that are upshot of the theoretical aspects of 
background knowledge.
But those rules which are informed by the empirical and factual levels of science 
are in fact instances of a more general, and truly narrow, methodological rule. For 
instance, the rule that any new theory of light must successfully explain optical 
phenomena such as polarization and diffraction is in fact, a particular instance of a more 
general rule. This more general methodological rule has ultimately to do with the 
empirical and observational aspects of science, and it can be formulated as follows: any 
new scientific theory must (eventually) explain all the empirical successes o f its extant 
rival. Another narrow methodological rule which is related to the empirical and
12Shapere need not claim that as a matter of historical fact, there has been no stable methodological principle 
over the developments of science. Indeed, Shapere makes no such claim; and my point is quite different from 
the mere factual claim that some non-thcorctical methodological principles have remained stable over the 
historical development of science. Rather my point is simply that we should resist the move from substantive 
to seriously corrigible. Even if we accept (just for the sake of argument) that all methodological rules are 
inextricably linked to background knowledge, we should not be misled into thinking that this is a sure mark of 
corrigibility.
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observational aspects of background knowledge is the stipulation that: genuine predictive 
success is a special mark o f merit for a scientific theory. The difference between these 
sort of rules and those related to the more theoretical claims is that the validity and 
justification of the rules of empirical support do not depend on the specification (and 
acceptance) of any specific substantive claim about the world.
The main result of my analysis of the different parts of background knowledge is 
therefore the following: those methodological rules which are informed by the theoretical 
and metaphysical aspects of background knowledge correspond to the principles of broad 
methodology. While those rules that are related to the empirical and observational aspects 
of scientific knowledge correspond to the principles of narrow methodology.
Moreover, all the changes that have occurred in broad methodology can be shown 
to have occurred in an effort to meet the requirements of the more formal and genuinely 
invariant standards of narrow methodology. Accepted beliefs (i.e. metaphysical 
assumptions, specific and general theories, and the empirical/observational claims) that 
operate as background knowledge at any stage in the development of science form a 
hierarchical structure in the sense that when confronted with difficulties, the more general 
claims provide the rationale for change in the less general claims. But just as tbese beliefs 
form a hierarchy, so do their associated heuristic principles. The more general a 
theoretical claim, the more resistant to change its associated methodological rule. And 
underlying all the changes that have occurred in broad methodology (the traditionalist 
would claim) is a set of some more restricted, more formal, methodological principles. 
Hence, (the traditionalist would argue) changes that have occurred in broad methodology 
have all occurred in light of these more formal methods. Scientists change their more
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substantive methods in an attempt to satisfy their more formal methodological 
requirements. If a (broad) methodological principle lays down the requirement that 
physical theories should be mechanistic, but a new theory, which is more predictively 
successful than the accepted theory flouts this principle, then, since the assumption of 
mechanism is highly theoretical anyway, the new theory can be accepted because it 
satisfies the more basic requirement of predictive success.
The traditionalist would, therefore, give an at least equally adequate account of all 
the (broad) methodological changes Shapere cites by responding that those heuristic 
principles which are tied to substantive scientific beliefs have the force they seem to have 
because they are themselves constrained by the more formal, invariant, standards of 
appraisal— namely fixed (or narrow) methodology. Methodological rules and principles 
which are deemed more formal and invariant would be regarded as providing the arbiter 
and rationale for changes in those more substantive rules.
Of course, these more restricted methodological norms are also linked with 
substantive science in the sense that they are the principles which rank theories in the 
light of empirical and predictive success. Hence in applying the norms of fixed (i.e. 
narrow) methodology, we have to examine substantive science to find out which theory 
is best supported by the evidence. But we should not confuse the fact that the application -  ^ 
of a principle requires examining substantive science with the question of whether the 
rationale or adequacy of these principles themselves rely on substantive science.
All the cases that Shapere point to as ones in which "methods" were radically 
altered can, at least as revealingly, (indeed, I believe, more revealingly), be analyzed as 
cases in which substantive ideas were modified because o f new evidence in accordance
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with fixed and underlying methodological principles. Take the solar neutrino experiment. 
According to theory, the source of the heat and light of stars (such as the sun) is the 
conversion of its mass into energy according to the formula E=mc2 of Einstein’s theory 
of relativity. This conversion takes place at the core of stars. Theory also asserts that some 
of the total energy produced takes the form of neutrinos; and that any square centimetre 
of the earth exposed to the sun is bombarded by as many as 70 billion neutrinos per 
second. But because neutrinos are believed to lack electric charge, are either massless or 
almost without mass, and they (according to theory) hardly interact with any other 
particle, they should pass unimpeded between the sun’s core, the earth and beyond.
This is an interesting and possibly testable prediction of theory. However, in order 
to test it in practice, we need some "auxiliary" theories that tell us what it takes to capture 
a neutrino. On the basis of these auxiliary theories, the experiment was set up to confirm 
(or disconfirm) this theory. If scientists succeed in trapping neutrinos, and the rate of 
capture is consistent with the predictions of theory; then theoretical claims about the 
source of stellar radiation would be predictively successful. Although the wide range of 
experimental techniques and heuristics of the experiments wouldn’t have been conceivable 
without background knowledge, the role of background knowledge in the experiment 
satisfies the more fundamental principle that a theory is acceptable only if it is 
predictively and empirically successful.
Shapere can therefore be criticized for overlooking the point that associated with 
the observational and empirical aspects of science is a more foundational, more invariant, 
set of methodological standards.
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4. METHODOLOGICAL RELATIVISM 
In the previous section, I argued that a distinction can be made between a narrow and a 
broad sense of scientific methodology. I also argued that Shapere adopts the broader 
usage of methodology and that he has not successfully defended his version of the no- 
invariant-methodology thesis with respect to narrow methodology. For the traditionalist 
could still successfully maintain that methodology, narrowly conceived, has remained 
invariant. Furthermore, the traditionalist can plausibly maintain that all the changes that 
have undoubtedly occurred in broad methodology have all been constrained by the 
principles of narrow methodology. In this section, I go on the assess Shapere’s attempt 
to overcome the problem of relativism. My claim will be that in so far as Shapere avoids 
relativism, it is because he implicitly relies on some invariants.
But first, we need a precise characterization of the relativist’s position. Ian Jarvie 
characterizes the general relativist position as follows:
Relativism is the position that all assessments are assessments relative to some 
standard or other, and standards derive from cultures. The attempt to assess 
without regard to cultural context and, particularly, the attempt to assess cognitive 
statements on some transcendental scale of truth, is futile. No assessment can 
escape the web of culture and hence all assessment is culturally relative. (Jarvie, 
1983, p.44)
Although this characterization refers to cultures and cultural contexts, for our purposes 
in this thesis, we can substitute theories or historical epoch for cultures. Hence, the 
version of relativism we will be concerned with is that in which no assessment can escape
Shapere’s bootslrappism
the web o f theory (or history), and hence all assessment is relative to theory (or history).
This version of relativism is a thesis about the cognitive status of justifications. It 
is not a thesis which merely aims to document the fact that there are substantive 
variations, disagreements and differences in what different theories (or research 
programmes) claim about the world. If a theory T, (or a research programme R,), upholds 
M, (where M is a set of methodological rules), and another theory T2 (or research 
programme R J upholds NT (where M ’ is a rival set of methodological rules that is 
inconsistent with M), and these rival rules are all correct according to the internal criteria 
of these rival theories (or research programmes), then there is no question of pronouncing 
the rules of any of these theories (or research programmes) wrong. There are no 
overarching criteria of rational assessment There are no possible evaluations beyond those 
from within a specific theoretical unit (or research programme).
As we are particularly interested in the rational assessment of methodological rules 
and principle, let us describe this version of relativism as methodological relativism (MR 
for short). Hence MR will be the thesis that the rational adequacy of any methodological 
rule (or principle) depends only upon the standards of its corresponding theoretical unit 
(or research programme).
I shall argue that Shapere is in a dilemma. My argument will be that if there are 
no invariant characteristics of scientific reasoning, Shapere’s view collapses into 
methodological relativism. However, if Shapere avoids relativism as he explicitly claims, 
he avoids it only because he is implicitly committed to some invariant characteristics of 
scientific reasoning. Moreover, I shall identify those aspects of Shapere’s theoiy of 
scientific rationality which seem to be invariant. If Shapere would allow change in those
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aspects of his theory I shall identify, he would be a methodological relativist. I begin by 
analysing Shapere’s theory of scientific rationality.
According to Shapere, although all aspects of science are in principle subject to 
revision and alteration, relativism is avoided insofar as change and alteration is effected 
by the best background beliefs of the domain in which change occurs:
Insofar as science is able to proceed in the light of its best beliefs, its arguments 
and alterations are rational ... [and] the relativism into which Kuhn’s view 
collapsed is ... escaped, even while all aspects of science are left open, in 
principle, to revision or rejection. (Shapere, 1984, p. xxv)
But which beliefs are to count as science’s best beliefs'? In Shapere’s view, the best beliefs 
of any domain are a subset of that domain’s background knowledge. Specifically, they 
are those background beliefs which are "successful" and "free from specific and 
compelling doubts":
... science need not appeal to a transcendent and irrevocable principle of rationality 
in order to account for the occurrence of rationality and progress within scientific 
change. For what better standards or criteria could we employ-- at least when we 
are able- than those beliefs ... that have proved successful and have not been 
confronted with specific doubt; or at least specific doubt which has either not been 
removed, or else which has been shown to be not compelling enough to worry 
about? In the attempt to find some basis for considering certain things to be 
observable, or for distinguishing between those hypotheses to consider and those 
not to consider, and so forth, what else should one expect to use and build on, 
whenever possible, if not such beliefs? No further sorts of reasons are available 
to us, and none further are required, in order to account for the rationality and 
progress of the scientific enterprise. (Shapere, 1984, p.270)
In short, rationality depends on using "successful" beliefs that are "free from specific and
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compelling doubts" as the source of reasons for holding other (theoretical) beliefs. So, for 
example, part of the reason for believing that the solar neutrino experiment yields a direct 
observation of the solar core is the successful theory of the big bang. There was no 
"specific reason to doubt" that this is true of neutrinos at the time of the experiment 
concerned. But what does Shapere mean by "success" and "freedom from specific and 
compelling doubts? The idea of success is intricately bound to the concept of "domain". 
As explained in section 1 below, a "domain" of inquiry is a body of related information, 
facts, beliefs, and theories, concerning which there are problems for scientific research. 
Examples of domains would include astrophysics, organic chemistry, fluid mechanics, etc. 
A theory (or belief) is "successful" if it accounts for the facts of its domains, or if it 
provides adequate solutions to the problems of its domain:
Whatever else might be required of an explanation o f a particular body of 
presumed information (domain), the explanation or theory could be successful only 
to the extent that it took account of the characteristics of the items of that domain. 
(Shapere, 1987b, p.3)
But before "successful" theories can function as a rationale of development (i.e. as a basis 
for developing "new hypotheses, new problems, new methods, new standards, and even 
new goals for [science]", (Shapere, 1984, p.xxv), the conditions of "relevance" and 
"freedom from specific doubts" must also be satisfied. That is, only those claims within 
background knowledge that are: (i) "successful", (ii) "relevant" to a domain of inquiry in 
question, and (iii) are "free from specific and compelling doubts" can function as 
standards of scientific admissibility.
The relevancy condition states that "in any argument concerning a subject-matter,
14
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those considerations will be relevant as reasons that have to do with that subject-matter" 
(Shapere, 1984, p.263).
The condition of "freedom from doubt" is this; unless there is a particular reason 
to doubt a theory, (or to reject a line of action), the mere general sceptical doubt that that 
theory might be wrong, (or that that line of action might be inappropriate), should not be 
the sole reason for rejecting that theory, (or for inaction).
Shapere distinguishes between "universal doubts" and "specific doubts". He claims 
that: "in the knowledge-seeking enterprise, universal doubt, doubt that applies 
indiscriminately to any belief whatever, is irrelevant; only doubts specific to a particular 
belief constitute reasons for doubting that belief." (Shapere, 1984, p.237)
Shapere is surely correct in maintaining that mere universal doubt plays no 
significant role in the development of science. For if we have learnt anything from the 
history of science, we surely have learnt that even our currently best theories may turn 
out to be, strictly speaking, false. Scientific theories are never rejected because of the 
mere possibility of doubt.
But specific doubts are raised against particular beliefs. They are not doubts which 
arise because of the mere possibility that a belief might be wrong. They are doubts which 
arise because there is something specifically problematic about a belief or theory. For 
example, the results of the solar neutrino experiment have provided specific reasons to 
doubt current astrophysical theory. This is because the experiment in fact did not confirm 
the predictions of theory. Shapere puts the "failure" of the experiment as follows: "... there 
are subtleties about the notion of "observation" in this case because the expected neutrinos 
from the sun have not been observed. (The actual capture rate is consistent with no
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neutrino having been received from the source.)" (Shapere, 1982, p.513, fn.14) But surely 
the point is also that the experiment, strictly speaking, disconfirmed astrophysical theory. 
The prediction of theory is that about 70 billion neutrinos per second should bombard 
each square centimetre of the earth exposed to the sun. But the experiment was able to 
detect just one neutrino about every three daysl
As was to be expected, various hypotheses have been put forward to account for 
the missing neutrinos. In 1969, for instance, Soviet scientists explained the deficit as due 
to particle metamorphosis. The claim of these scientists is that electron neutrinos could 
be transformed into muon neutrinos, and vice versa, before the electron neutrinos 
produced in the sun reach the earth. But, as the Homestake neutrino detector was devised 
to trap electron neutrinos, it merely succeeded in detecting those electron neutrinos that 
were not transformed into muon neutrinos. And in 1988, scientists in the Soviet Union 
completed another neutrino detector for the capture of muon neutrinos. The new detector 
is located at a place named "Neutrino Village" somewhere in the Caucasus mountain 
range of Georgia. But even if this new detector succeeds in trapping muon neutrinos, 
independent evidence would still be needed to support the theory that electron neutrinos 
can be transformed into muon neutrinos en route from the sun. One such independent 
support comes from Hans Bethe’s calculations in 1986. These calculations support the 
claim that two-third of electron neutrinos produced in the sun’s photosphere could be 
transformed into muon neutrinos within half-a-second (or less) of their production in the 
sun.
The neutrino deficit clearly illustrates Shapere’s distinction between specific and 
universal doubts. The deficit raises specific and compelling doubts against astrophysical
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claims. As John Bacall, one of the two major physicists who devised the experiment, puts 
it, the deficit indicates that "there is something wrong either with the sun or with the 
neutrino— or with what we think we know about them".
The use of successful, relevant, and doubt free beliefs in effecting change also 
illustrates a procedure Shapere describes as the "chain-of-reasoning connections" approach 
to scientific reasoning:
Methods, rules of reasoning, criteria (e.g., of what can count as an explanation) 
go hand-in-hand with the beliefs arrived at by their employment, and are on 
occasion altered in the light of the knowledge or beliefs arrived at by their means. 
Constraints on scientific reasoning develop, being sometimes tightened and 
sometimes broadened, as science proceeds. And thus, although at one stage of 
science, what (for example) counts as a legitimate scientific theory or problem or 
explanation or consideration might differ, even radically, from what counts as such 
at another stage, there is often a chain of developments connecting the two 
different set of criteria, a chain through which a "rational evolution" can be traced 
between the two. We can then recognize that, given the knowledge and criteria 
available at a particular time, certain beliefs about possibilities and truth were 
reasonable, even though alteration and improvement were later possible, with the 
emergence of new knowledge and new criteria. (Shapere, 1984, p.212)
Shapere’s idea of chains of development connecting radically different sets of standards 
relies on a special use of presuppositions because a domain’s best beliefs alsofunction 
as "presuppositions". Those aspects of background knowledge that are successful and free 
from doubt also function as presuppositions on the basis of which scientific theories can 
be evaluated.
The presuppositions of traditionalists are founded upon the idea of an invariant 
method or logic (and on the reliance of science on observational facts) whose truth or 
validity is accepted, and on the basis of which science can be explained and evaluated as
77
Shapere’s bootslrappism
rational. But unlike the traditionalist, Shapere claims that his presuppositions are subject 
to (possible) radical change:
>
... the objectivity and rationality of science, far from demanding freedom from any 
"presuppositions" whatever, actually depends ... on the employment in science of 
"presuppositions", though only on ones which satisfy certain constraints. The 
employment of presuppositions is not only consistent with the rationality and 
objectivity of science; if (but only if) the presuppositions are of the right sort, their 
employment is necessary in order for science to be rational and objective ... . 
(Shapere, 1985, p.639)
We should then carefully distinguish between two types of presuppositions; the absolute 
presuppositions of the traditionalist, and Shapere’s relative presuppositions. The 
presuppositions of the traditionalists are unalterable and ahistorical. The results and the 
contents of scientific inquiry could not lead to modifications in these presuppositions as 
they are themselves constitutive of the criteria for assessing substantive science; they are 
. the unjudged judges which supply science its rationality and objectivity. But the types of 
presuppositions Shapere (explicitly) allows into his model are part and parcel of the 
substantive content of science. They are those parts of background knowledge which (a) 
have proved successful, (b) concerning which there is no specific reason for doubt, and 
— (c) which are relevant to the specific domain in which they are to function as 
presuppositions.
What guarantees the rationality of science, despite change in presuppositions and 
methods, is therefore the manner in which such changes are brought about. Changes in 
criteria of merit are not "conversion experience" like the gestalt switches of Kuhn. 
Changes are brought about when there are specific reasons for doubting the adequacy of
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rules or methods. For example, when a new set of criteria is better able to account for the 
success of the theories of a domain. Moreover, the judgement that a rule is "adequate" and 
that a theory has "greater success" than another is made only in the light of criteria within 
the domain in question. On Shapere’s view, there is no criterion which is valid across 
domains.
The problem of how the basic principles (rules, and standards) of scientific 
reasoning can themselves evolve rationally is therefore (allegedly) solved by the following 
procedure. First, we find out whether there is some developmental connection between the 
different criteria of scientific appraisal such that one can be said to be a rational 
descendant of the other. When there is a developmental connection and change occurs 
because the old set of criteria is no longer acceptable (e.g. when there is specific reason 
to doubt the applicability of a rule or method) then, there is a chain-of-reasoning 
connection between radically different sets of standards; and, according to Shapere, 
rationality is preserved.
For instance, changes in the goals of inquiry may alter the nature of the beliefs and 
explanations that are required in a domain of inquiry. And as criteria of merit are 
inseparable from the content of science, there will also be change in the rules of merit. 
One example of such change given by Shapere is the following:.......................
The chemical revolution of the eighteenth century ... carried with it a change in 
conception of the goal of matter-study, from ... the idea of bringing matter to 
perfection to the idea of understanding matter in terms of its constituents. That 
change of goal brought with it changes in conceptions of what it is for a view of 
matter to be "successful". Standards of success are among our beliefs, and there 
are a variety of ways in which they can change without the assumption of a 
transcendent, unchanging criterion of success. (Shapere, 1984, pp.269-279)
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This explains why Shapere claims to avoid the sort of relativism into which Kuhn falls. 
For whenever there is radical change in criteria of merit, on Shapere’s view, there are 
always good reasons fo r  such change. Moreover, not any sort of consideration can provide 
the reasons and rationale for change. Only considerations such as the failure of a 
previously accepted criterion (i.e. the criterion’s failure at meeting its own set 
requirements— hence, a specific reason to doubt that criterion), supply the rationale for 
change. This also explains why the concept of reason is said to be that of "bootstrap 
conceptualization":
... the concept of "reason" is a "bootstrap" process of finding - in effect, 
hypothesizing - that certain considerations can be counted as reasons, using those 
hypothesized reasons as bases for finding further relevance-relations in the light 
of which the original "reasons" can be critically evaluated, and so forth. Thus at 
any given stage, what counts as a reason presupposes prior "reasons", and 
specifically, reasons for doubt. But such presupposition does not imply that the 
prior "reasons" cannot be criticized and rejected as reasons. (Shapere, 1984, p.272)
Old methods are rejected and new ones introduced, and new standards of scientific 
acceptability laid down, all in the light of the body of background beliefs on which a 
domain of inquiry relies at any given stage in the history of science. Rationality is 
established, not because any rule or principle is sacrosanct, but because there are always, 
scientific reasons for changing or rejecting any one rule or principle.
Suppose we grant Shapere the claim that no individual component of background 
knowledge is invariant. Would it follow that there are absolutely no invariant 
characteristics o f scientific rationality? On the contrary, it seems that Shapere has actually 
succeeded in identifying exactly such invariant characteristics. Namely, the principle
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underlying his "chain-of-reasoning connections" approach, and the principles underlying 
the conditions of "success", "relevance", and "freedom from specific and compelling 
doubts".
The process of chain-of-reasoning connections functions as an invariant attribute 
of scientific reasoning in the sense that it is a process of justification which must be 
employed i f  change is to be rational. That is, on Shapere’s view, the acceptance of a new 
set of methodological standards in favour of an old one is rational only if we can trace 
a chain-of-reasoning connection between the two sets of standards. This is precisely the 
aspect of Shapere’s view of scientific change that is different from that of the Kuhnians. 
For although Shapere and the Kuhnians both maintain that all methodological constraints 
are subject to possible radical change, the Kuhnians claim: (i) that such changes are not 
rationally effected (they are like gestalt switches which occur all at once), and (ii) that 
social, non-scientific considerations must come in to augment choice. Shapere denies these 
two claims. On his view, scientific considerations are themselves sufficient to guide theory 
choice, and radical change is rational if it is governed by the process of reasoning- 
connections. Shapere thus seemingly avoids relativism only because he also committed to 
the view that even in cases of apparent radical methodological change, there are 
connections that explains the change, as in fact a chain-of-reasoning.
Furthermore, on Shapere’s account of scientific reasoning, although the 
considerations which form the bases for the acceptance and rejection of theories, rules, 
and methods are said to come from background knowledge, the warrants of rational 
change (or that which make choices rational) are not included within background 
knowledge. These warrants are those Shapere refers to as the conditions of "relevance",
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"success", and "freedom from specific and compelling doubts". These conditions function 
as invariant attributes of scientific reasoning in the sense that although background beliefs 
may change, before change can be regarded as rational, choice must be constrained by a 
process in which these conditions operate. Even on Shapere’s model of scientific change, 
change, (and in particular, change in substantive methodology), is rational only i f  we can 
identify a chain-of-reasoning connection which leads to newly accepted methodologies. 
So even if Shapere’s view does not make any specific methodological rule invariant, 
changes in methodological commitments are nonetheless constrained by processes which 
are themselves not substantive background knowledge beliefs. Moreover, since we must 
always identify such a process if change is to be rational, the principle underlying the 
process itself functions as an invariant in Shapere’s account
Shapere does emphasize the point that the use of the chain-of-reasoning approach 
to scientific reasoning, and the conditions of relevance, success, and freedom from doubt, 
were learnt from the actual practice of science itself. They are not a priori stipulations he 
foists upon science. This is why he claims to adopt an empiricist and naturalist view of 
scientific reasoning:
[Methodology] does not exist and function on a level above and independent of 
the substantive content of scientific beliefs; it is integrally linked to that content, 
and i t s ... conclusions must rest on the results of the very science with which it is 
concerned. This view of the philosophy of science and its relations to science has 
certain affinities with what is called a "naturalistic" approach to the theory of 
knowledge, as advocated by Quine and others. [It agrees with Quine and others] 
that an understanding o f our knowledge-seeking and knowledge-acquiring 
processes, and o f the validation o f the results o f those processes, must rest on the
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results o f science itse lf... . (Shapere, 1987a, p.24, my emphasis)13
But there are two sorts of issues which needs to be carefully distinguished: those 
concerning the source and origins of methodological principles and standards, and, those 
concerning the validity (justification) and warrant of these rules. Someone who adopts a 
traditionalist approach to scientific rationality only needs to uphold an invariant attitude 
in issues of validation. A traditionalist could therefore claim that methodological 
principles and standards may be contingent in the sense that they are not products of 
innate introspection or transcendental deductions (hence, a traditionalist may be empiricist 
in issues of source or origin). But in issues of validation and justification, the 
traditionalist would insist that irrespective of how principles are arrived at, they need to 
be invariantly valid if relativism is to be avoided. One can be empiricist in questions 
concerning how we come to acquire methodological rules (i.e. the source of 
methodological rules), while being non-naturalist about the validation and justification of 
methodological strictures.
For example, a philosopher who studies the history of science may become aware 
of the fact that scientists have tended to accept theories that are predictively successful. 
The philosopher may then proceed to provide philosophical arguments which exhibit the 
rationality of this tendency by incorporating it into a principle he calls the predictivist rule 
of theory appraisal. In such a situation, the source of the rule (as far as this philosopher
,3The similarity of Shapere’s view to Quine’s is merely in the claim that the testing of methodologies must 
rest on the substantive content and results of science; hence, Shapere’s naturalism is not psychologistic, i.e. it 
is not an attempt at the reduction of epistemology (or methodology) into psychology. This is why Shapere claims 
that H... psychological considerations play no role as reasons for raising problems, employing specific methods, 
or accepting or rejecting specific beliefs in actual science ...". (Shapere, 1987a, p.25)
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is concerned) is history (and consequently the philosopher did not develop the principle 
on the basis of ’’pure reason"). But this does not imply that the principle is contingently 
valid. The validity and adequacy of the principle would depend upon the sort of argument 
the philosopher advances in support of the predictivist thesis, and not merely on the fact 
the principle was adopted in practice by historical figures.
Shapere explicitly commits himself to the naturalist view in both issues of source 
and validation. Concerning the source of methodological rules, he says:
It is important to realize that [the] results [of this view] are contingent: there is no 
way in which their development could have been shown in advance, by a priori 
or transcendental arguments, to be a (or the) necessary outcome of inquiry. 
(Shapere, 1987a, p. 15)
And concerning the validation of methodological standards he claims that "the validation 
of the results of those processes, must rest on the results of science itself'. (Shapere, 
1987a, p.24)
But it is the naturalistic approach to the validation of methodological standards that 
poses the difficulty for Shapere’s view. For in his explication of how radical change can 
be rational, Shapere claims that change is rational i f  and only i f  we can identify an 
objective process of reasoning connections from old methods (and theories) to the new 
ones. (Of course, not any sort of reasoning connections will do; only those connections 
that are traceable in light of relevance considerations, considerations of successful and 
compelling doubt, etc, are admissible if change is to be rational). But can change in 
science (radical and non-radical change) occur rationally if we cannot identify a chain-of- 
connections between old methods, new methods and the considerations (or grounds) for
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choice? Can scientific change be rational if we cannot identify reasoning connections 
between background information and choices? Can the basic idea of science developing 
in terms of reasonable connections between beliefs ever be (rationally) abandoned in 
science? Can scientists ever (rationally) reject the basic idea of chain-of-reasoning 
connections? If one answers any of these questions in the negative, one would in fact be 
claiming that there are no logical connections between scientific choices and the basis of 
these choices. Hence, if Shapere makes any such claim, he would end up with an extreme 
form of relativism.
The problem then is that, if we concentrate on issues of validation and justification 
(rather than those of source or origin), Shapere avoids MR if and only i f  the principles 
underlying the chain-of-reasoning connections approach (and those governing the 
conditions o f freedom, relevance, and success) remain sacrosanct. inviolable or invariant 
characteristics o f scientific reasoning. For if we do not operate with a principle like: 
"accept only those methodological choices that are the product of chains-of-reasoning 
connections", (and, consequently, "accept only those theories and rules that are brought 
about by parameters such as ’relevance* and ’coherence*"), scientific change would lack 
any rationale or rational justification.
Shapere has been smuggling all along! He cannot deliver the judgement that the 
acceptance of a new theory or method is objectively better than its rival unless he 
implicitly takes these core characteristics of scientific method to be invariant. 
Consequently, he has not succeeded in fulfilling his self-assigned task of giving "... an 
account of the knowledge seeking and knowledge acquiring enterprise ... which, while not 
relying on any form of Inviolability thesis, will not also collapse into relativism ... ."
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(Shapere, 1984, p. xxi)
5. THE WEAKNESS OF BOOTSTRAPPISM
In Shapere’s view, a domain of investigation is a unified body of information which 
provides a basis for scientific research. This characterization of domains allows for 
situations in which rival theories belong to different domains because theories (even if the 
belong to different domains) can be regarded as rivals as long as they advance 
inconsistent (or competing) explanations of the same phenomenon. In this section, I will 
argue that Shapere’s theory of rationality runs into serious problems when applied to 
situations in which competing theories belong to radically different domains of inquiry. 
I use one such example to bring out my point. Specifically, I will concentrate on the 
debate between evolutionist and creationist accounts of the origin of the world.14
Not all creationists refuse to make use of evidence, or deny that explanations 
which are to count as good reasons for choice must be relevant to the domain of inquiry 
in question. Nor do they reject the claim that good reasons must be successful, relevant, 
and free from specific and compelling doubts. In short, scientific creationists neither deny 
the use of background beliefs, nor deny that a chain-of-reasoning connection must always 
be traceable between choices. However, scientific creationists are not scientific in the
I4There arc various types of crcationisms. But for present purposes, we can simply divide them into two 
broad types: simple creationism (e.g. Jehovah witnesses) and scientific creationism. The main difference is that 
scientific creationists are willing to examine the claims and arguments of evolutionists in the light of scientific 
evidence (e.g. fossil records); hence they do not simply dismiss scientific theories of evolution. Indeed some 
scientific creationists claim to be evolutionists as well! As long as we bear in mind that no single scientific 
creationist would accept all the claims I attribute to scientific creationism, these nuances need not detain us here. 
This is legitimate as my point can equally well be made with any hypothetical situation in which all the 
conditions laid down by Shapere are met, but in which rational choice cannot be delivered between competing 
theories which belong to different domains.
86
Shapere’s bootstrappism
sense that they adhere to the basic methods of the natural scientists. Rather they explicitly 
denounce the methods used throughout the natural sciences as applicable for use in 
creation science:
Far from simply debating the scientific evidence, it appears that creationist and 
evolutionist groups structure their perceptions of reality in very different ways, 
based on very different cognitive principles and on different assumptions about the 
rules of knowing. (Eve, 1991, p.6)
The problem is that scientific creationists do not want the validity or justification 
of their theories to be evaluated in light of methods and principles which bear any 
similarity to those of the natural sciences. Their own preferred method is described as the 
method of "Common Sense Realism". Common sense realism is said to be an 
"epistemological philosophy ... [which claims] that our ordinary common sense 
perceptions do provide a direct and reliable guide to how the world works." (Eve, 1991, 
p. 14) This method makes use of the "notion of divine or other supernatural involvement 
in the origins of the universe or humanity" (Eve, 1991, p.3); and the method also validates 
the drawing of conclusions "on the basis of inferences from the internal evidence in the 
Bible". (Eve, 1991, p. 15, my emphasis)
The disagreement between scientific creationists and Darwinists cannot therefore 
be settled by identifying chains-of-reasoning connection, nor by explaining change in 
terms of beliefs which are successful, relevant to each domain of inquiry, and which are 
free from specific doubts. This is because the disagreement is a much more fundamental 
one. It is a disagreement about what is to be regarded as the background beliefs, facts, 
evidence, and, the rules of reasoning for use in inquiry about the origin of life. This is
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why creationists insist that: "For scientific creationists, the correct interpretation of 
scientific evidence is actually consistent with Genesis." (Eve, 1991, p.50, my emphasis)
Given these differences, we can now ask the question: Isn’t Shapere’s 
bootstrappism committed to the (highly contentious) conclusion that Darwinism and 
Creationism are equally valid views of the origin of the world? For if Creationism is fully 
able to satisfy the requirements of its internal set of criteria, we can not rationally 
adjudicate the dispute between these rival theories. Unless there are some characteristics 
of scientific methodology which are invariant, and the validity of such methods can be 
established irrespective of a specific domain of inquiry, we would not be able to deliver 
the judgement that Darwinism gives an objectively better account of the origin of the 
world. We would therefore end with MR whenever we are concerned with rival theories 
such as Creationism and Darwinism. Identifying reasons of the sort mentioned by Shapere 
cannot dictate the choice of theory. For each theory satisfies its own included criteria of 
merit and success.
Identifying a chain-of-reasoning connection between choices and grounds for 
choice would also not settle the dispute. For both Creationists and Darwinists would give 
reasons in the straight-forward sense of arguments which support conclusions for their 
respective choices. Each would point to explanations which are successful, relevant to 
their respective domains, and free from specific and compelling doubts (again, all 
according to their respective internal measures).
Of course Shapere, (or any naturalist), could reply that a methodology need not 
deliver the verdict that Darwinism is better that Creationism. He could claim that a theory 
of scientific methodology and rationality need not deliver the judgement that Darwinism
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is objectively better than Creationism. But this would lead to an extreme form of 
relativism! Scientific Creationism and Darwinism are conflicting and competing accounts 
of the origin of species. If Shapere were to claim that a methodology need not deliver the 
judgement that Darwinism is objectively better than Creationism, we would be left with 
no methodological guidance on which of these two rival theories to accept in our 
explanations of the origin of species. The naturalist would in effect be committed to a 
position similar to that of Feyerabend’s in which anything goes!
If it were possible to identify some further essential and invariant characteristics 
of scientific explanations (e.g. genuine predictive success) such that these characteristics 
could be applied in situations such as this, then it would be possible to claim that the 
theories, beliefs, and explanations of the creationists are not scientifically cogent. But 
Shapere’s explicit claims prevents such a move. On Shapere’s view, there are no 
characteristics of scientific rationality and methodology over and above the tracing of a 
line of descent from theory to theory— or from method to method--, according to the 
internal criteria of the domain in question. The employment of the background beliefs of 
a domain, (as long as they are subject to the constraints of relevance, freedom from 
specific doubt, etc), is all that counts:
... what better standards or criteria could we employ ... than those beliefs ... that 
have proved successful and have not been confronted with specific doubts? ... No 
further sorts o f reasons are available to us, and none further are required, in 
order to account for the rationality and progress o f the scientific enterprise. 
(Shapere, 1984, p.270, my emphasis)
But as we have just seen, this account of scientific reasoning is not strong enough to
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dictate (rational) preference whenever competing theories belong to genuinely radically 
different domains of inquiry.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
1. A traditionalist would easily explain all the changes in substantive method that 
Shapere points to as being dictated by some more fundamental and invariant core of 
methodological principles. Hence, Shapere has not truly succeeded in naturalizing method 
when we consider narrow methodology.
2. Shapere has not succeeded in showing that the no-invariant-methodology thesis (or the 
no-inviolability thesis, as he prefers to call it), can be accepted without relativism. On the 
contrary, he seems to have succeeded in showing that there are some invariant and 
inviolable attributes of science. This is because Shapere’s view is implicitly committed 
to an invariant principle of scientific reasoning. Namely, that which underlies the chain-of- 
reasoning approach to scientific reasoning. Moreover, Shapere’s naturalized account of 
rational change is committed to some sacrosanct components (i.e. the conditions of 
"relevance", "success", and "freedom from specific and compelling doubts"). The only 
alternative to making these aspects of Shapere’s view invariant is an extreme form of 
relativism.
3. Irrespective of whether these specified aspects of Shapere’s view are invariant or not, 
any view of scientific methodology which relies only on these characteristics (without 
tacitly assuming any invariant characteristic) would be exceedingly weak. Such a view
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would not be able to dictate choice in situations where competing theories belong to 
domains of inquiry that are genuinely radically different. In such situations, a very high 
degree of irrationality and relativism is inevitable.
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CHAPTER 3
Laudati’s Normative Naturalism 
1. INTRODUCTION
Larry Laudan has developed in recent publications another version of the view that change 
in science extends beyond the factual-theoretical level to the level of accepted methods 
.and rules of appraisal. Like Shapere, Laudan characterizes his view as a version of 
"naturalism" in epistemology. And like Shapere, he explicitly holds that rules of scientific 
theory appraisal may change without surrendering to relativism. My aims in this chapter 
will be: (i) to outline carefully and in detail Laudan’s account of scientific change and to 
explain why he describes it as a version of "naturalism"; and (ii) to argue that Laudan’s 
account of naturalism ultimately fails to give an adequate account of scientific rationality.
2. THE RETICULATED MODEL OF SCIENTIFIC RATIONALITY
Laudan makes a distinction between three interrelated levels of scientific commitment, 
viz.; the factual-theoretical level, the methodological level, and the axiological level (i.e. 
the level of the ends, aims and goals of science). Theories of scientific change are 
characterized as "hierarchical", "holist", or "reticulated" on the basis of how these three 
levels of commitment function in scientific change. Laudan’s preferred model is the 
reticulated model. In this section, I will examine Laudan’s arguments in favour of the 
reticulated model, and in the next section, I delineate the connections between reticulation
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and normative naturalism.
According to Laudan, the hierarchical model arranges these three levels of scientific 
commitment in a hierarchy which moves from the factual-theoretical level, through that 
of methodology to that of axiology. The assumption is that methodology governs factual 
issues and that axiology in turn governs methodology. Rationality is achieved by settling 
factual disputes by reference to methodological rules and principles. (Factual issues are, 
of course, taken in the broad sense to include theoretical claims which form the basic 
ontology of scientific theories.) This is because when there is factual disagreement, (or 
disagreement on which theory is the best), agreement is achieved by reference to shared 
methodological commitments. Disputes at the methodological level, if they arise, are 
resolved by reference to the axiological level where shared goals and aims adjudicate 
methodological disagreement. This is possible because methodological rules are regarded 
as instruments or techniques for realizing cognitive goals or ends.1 Philosophers like 
Carnap, Hempel, and Popper are Laudan’s chief examples of hierarchical modellers.
The hierarchical modeller (according to Laudan) further assumes either that ax­
iological disagreements do not exist, (because scientists share the same cognitive goals), 
or that axiological disagreements are irresolvable, (when and if they do arise). Laudan’s 
view is not merely that hierarchical modellers overlooked or played down the fact that 
there are significant axiological disagreement. His full claims are: (1) that because 
hierarchical modellers genuinely believed that scientists share more or less the same set 
of cognitive goals, there are little or no axiological disagreements to resolve. However,
'A detailed exposition of Laudan’s instrumental construal of methodological rules is given in section 3 above.
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(2) if such disagreements were to arise, proponents of the hierarchical model also believed 
that such disagreements are irresolvable:
Influential voices within the philosophy of science have argued that differences in 
goals, particularly cognitive goals, are simply not open to rational resolution. Both 
Karl Popper and Hans Reichenbach, for instance, have said that the adoption (or 
change) of basic cognitive goal is a subjective and emotive matter which cannot 
be rationally negotiated. ... the hierarchical model of rationality ... leaves basic 
questions of values perched precariously at the top of the justificatory ladder. 
(Laudan, 1984, p.47)
Laudan insists that the hierarchical model breaks down when we consider the issue of the 
resolution of axiological disagreements. Because contrary to the claims of the hierarchical 
modeller, not only do axiological disagreements often arise in science, there are 
mechanisms for adjudicating such disputes— axiological disagreements are resolvable:
The history of science is rife with controversies between, for instance, realists and 
instrumentalists, reductionists and anti-reductionists, advocates and critics of sim­
plicity, proponents of teleology and advocates of purely efficient causality. At the 
bottom, all these debates have turned on divergent views about the attributes our 
theories should possess (and thus about the aim of scientific theorizing). The 
existence of such controversies, along with the fact that they often eventually issue 
in consensus, exposes the core weakness in the hierarchical model, for that model 
gives us no reason to anticipate the emergence of consensus in such circumstances, 
nor can it explain that consensus once it does materialize. (Laudan, 1984, p. 42)
Laudan suggests a mechanism for the rational adjudication of axiological disagree­
ment by placing the following constraints on scientific goals: (i) aims and goals must be 
htemally consistent (i.e. they must be free of contradictions); (ii) aims must not be 
'utopian or u n rea liza b le and (iii), aims must accord with "the values implicit in the
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communal practices and judgements we endorse". (Laudan, 1984, p. 50)
There are various problems with Laudan’s characterization of the hierarchical 
model. One concerns its historical accuracy. Did any of those philosophers mentioned by 
Laudan truly subscribe to the hierarchical model described by Laudan? As Worrall rightly 
observed, (Worrall, 1988), philosophers like Popper, Carnap and Hempel whom Laudan 
cite as proponents of the hierarchical model did not hold that there are any genuine 
methodological disagreements which can be resolved by appeal to the aims and goals of 
science. For these philosophers, if two or more scientists (or philosophers) disagree on 
which method to adopt, or if they disagree on whether a scientific inference is valid, one 
of them must be wrong. (Of course both might be wrong.) These philosophers never as­
sumed, as Laudan claims, that methodology is governed by axiology. The only type of 
lower-level disagreement they regarded as resolvable by a higher-level agreement was that 
of factual-theoretical disputes.
Laudan also insists that the hierarchical model lacks a mechanism for adjudicating 
axiological disputes. He proposes one such mechanism of his own on top of the internal 
consistency requirement, (which he concedes the hierarchical modeller has), he proposes 
"that one may argue against a goal on the grounds: (1) that it is utopian or unrealizable; 
or, (2) that it fails to accord with the values implicit in the communal practices and 
judgements we endorse." (Laudan, 1984, p. 50)
There are various problems with these requirements of Laudan’s. First, it is simply 
untrue that hierarchical modellers did not adopt one version or the other of the utopian 
or unrealizability criterion. It can easily be shown that this constraint has long being used 
by philosophers of science. For instance, the aim of science during the time of Francis
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Bacon and Rene Descartes was that of establishing and accumulating indubitable truths.2 
The accumulation o f indubitable truths view of science was however criticized by various 
philosophers on the grounds that: (1) the claims of science cannot be conclusively 
established, hence they cannot be absolutely certain; and, (2) the earlier claims of science 
are not always preserved in the current developments of science, nor will they all be 
preserved in the future developments of science (Watkins, 1987). But these two criticisms 
amount to saying that the Bacon-Descartes ideal of science be rejected because it is un­
realizable or too utopian! This was why philosophers like C.S. Peirce rejected the Bacon- 
Descartes ideal of science and adopted the approach-to-truth view of scientific progress. 
Hans Reichenbach also rejected the Bacon-Descartes ideal and opted for an inductivist 
view of science.
Moreover, Popper— one of the hierarchical modellers who, according to Laudan 
lacks a mechanism for adjudicating axiological disputes- rejected the inductivist aims and 
goals of science and opted for a deductivist view on. the ground that the truth of our 
scientific theories can never be demonstrated. But this also amounts to the claim that the 
inductivist view of science is utopian and unrealizable! The point then is that Laudan’s 
claim that philosophers like Popper pverlooked the virtues of adopting goals that are non- 
utopian or realizability is untrue.3 . , „ . _
2In his "A New View of Scientific Rationality" [1987], John Watkins describes this as the "Bacon-Descartes 
Ideal": "Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes ... believed that human understanding, properly regulated, can get to 
the very bottom of things, unlock Nature’s deepest secrets, grasp her ultimate essences. And they both believed 
that the knowledge to be acquired at this ultimate level could be certain or infallible" (p.64).
*1 am not suggesting that Popper’s anti-inductivism is acceptable! I merely use this to illustrate the point that 
there is nothing innovative about Laudan’s non-utopian or unrealizability criterion. Popper and various 
philosophers adopted some version or the'other of this criterion. Furthermore, as I will argue shortly, this 
criterion in fact does not have the sort of import Laudan believes it to have.
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But when Laudan criticizes an aim as utopian ("that is, we do not have the foggiest 
notion how to take any actions or adopt any strategies which would be apt to bring about 
the realization of the goal state in question", 1984, p.51), is he criticizing the aims 
scientists really have and exhibit in their work (whatever they may themselves think), or 
is he criticizing the aims they explicitly endorse?
Popper’s claim, for example, is that whatever they may have thought and said, 
scientists could not really have been aiming at inductively proved general truths. In other 
words, Popper’s claim is not that scientist 1 might have applied an inductivist 
methodology (because she had aim 1 — inductively proved truths) while scientist 2 applied
t
a falsificationist methodology, and scientist 2 then argued for his own aims by showing 
the unrealizability of aim 1. Popper’s claim is that because the aim is utopian, scientist 
1 never in fact applied inductivist methodology (because she couldn’t, there is no such 
thing as an inductive proof on Popper’s view) whatever scientist 1 might explicitly have
believed. _____
Laudan, however, creates some confusion in his own specific criticism of utopian 
aims. He, for instance, distinguishes "semantic utopianism" from "epistemic utopianism". 
At first, Laudan’s characterization of semantic utopianism seems to be about explicit aims:
Many scientists espouse values or goals that, under critical challenge, they cannot 
characterize in a succinct and cogent way. They may be imprecise, ambiguous, or 
both. (Laudan, 1984, p.52)
And concerning epistemic utopianism, he claims that:
It sometimes happens that an agent can give a perfectly clear definition of his goal
i
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state ... but that nonetheless its advocates cannot specify (and seem to be working 
with no implicit form of) a criterion for determining when the value is present or 
satisfied and when it is not. (Laudan, 1984, p.53)
But in criticizing aims which are semantically utopian, Laudan claims that:
It should be clear why the charge of semantic utopianism ... is a serious criticism 
of a goal, cognitive or otherwise. If someone purports to subscribe to an aim, but 
can neither describe it in the abstract nor identify it in concrete example, there is 
no objective way to ascertain when that aim has been realized and when it has 
not. ... (Indeed, it is difficult to see how radically ill-defined goals could play a 
genuine role in any theory o f action, whether rational or irrational, objective or 
subjective.) (Laudan, 1984, p.52, my emphasis)
But surely this criticism applies only to epistemic utopianism. Indeed, I would argue that 
semantic utopianism is not utopianism at all. An aim cannot be unrealizable simply 
because scientists cannot give any precise characterization of that aim. An aim should he 
characterized as unrealizable only if no set of actions can result in the achievement of 
such an aim. The problem of unrealizabilty is not that of whether the aim in question can 
be "characterize[d] in a cogent and succinct way". Rather, the problem is that no rational 
procedure can bring to fruition the stated objectives of such goals. If we concentrate on 
unrealizability in this epistemic sense, (and ignore the ambiguity semantic unrealizability 
creates), surely philosophers like Popper did not overlook the import of unrealizability 
criticisms (as Laudan would have us believe).
Laudan is of course fully aware of the implicit/explicit distinction. But unlike 
Popper who makes use of this distinction in criticising utopian aims, Laudan turns this 
distinction into a criticism in its own right by demanding that a scientist’s explicit aims
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be consistent with her implicit aims:
Often a scientist will find himself explicitly advocating certain cognitive aims, yet 
seemingly running counter to those aims in terms of the actual theory choices he 
makes in his daily work. Still worse, ... it sometimes happens that the dominant 
goals o[f] an entire community of scientists, as voiced in the explicit accounts they 
give of these matters, are discovered to be at odds with the goals that actually 
seem to inform that community’s choices and actions as scientists. Whenever a 
case can be made that a group of scientists is not practising what it preaches, there 
are prim a facie grounds for a change of either explicit or implicit values. The 
change may come, of course, in either area, or in both. (Laudan, 1984, p.55)
Laudan is of course correct to observe that a scientist (or a community of scientists) can 
be criticized if their implicit and explicit aims are at odds. The problem however is that, 
unlike Popper, Laudan is very unclear on the question of whether a scientist could 
implicitly employ an unrealizable aim. If a science is progressive and rational, Popper 
would insist that those scientists who propound the progressive theories within that 
science couldn’t really have adopted an aim which is unrealizable.
There is a further objection to Laudan’s characterization of the hierarchical model. 
Contrary to the impression Laudan gives, philosophers and scientists with very different 
accounts of the aims and goals of science generally agree on which theory is currently the 
best in a particular domain of science. We have both instrumentalists and realists of 
various sorts agreeing that Einstein’s theory is better, in many respects, than Newton’s; 
that Darwin’s theory of evolution is currently the best evolutionary theory around. This 
seems to suggest that we can resolve theoretical and methodological disagreements (if 
they arise) even when there is little or no (explicit) axiological consensus. If this is so, the 
lack of a mechanism for the resolution of axiological disputes may not be so problematic.
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Indeed the objection can be put more strongly: if rational consensus at the factual- 
theoretical and methodological levels can be achieved when there is sharp axiological 
dispute, then axiology plays little (if any) role in the resolution of theoretical and 
methodological disputes. And this is surely as it should be. Axiological disputes are more 
philosophical. And it is a commonly accepted feature of philosophical problems that they 
can hardly ever be definitely resolved. So why should we give any special weight to the 
fact that a model of scientific change lacks a mechanism for the resolution of axiological 
disputes?
Having rejected the hierarchical model, Laudan goes on to reject the holist alterna­
tive of Kuhn and Feyerabend. According to Laudan’s characterization of the holist’s 
position, there are disagreements at the level of axiology just as there are at the level of 
methodology and theory. The holist further maintains that radical change occurs at all 
levels of scientific commitment. The change occurs, however, simultaneously at all the 
three levels; it entails concurrent changes in factual-theoretical commitments, 
methodological appraisal principles, and in the aims and goals of science. A scientist 
never gives up a theory for another independently of changes in methodology and 
axiology. Change can only occur if she accepts one triad in favour of another.
Indeed the holist accommodates the idea of widespread disagreement and change 
in science. But s/he does so at the expense of rationality. For in the explanation of change, 
the holist leaves no arbiter to judge the transition between two successive sets of 
commitments (i.e. research traditions). Since the decision to abandon a set of three levels 
of commitment is at the same time the decision to accept a different triad, the holist 
model merely accommodates the idea of widespread disagreement; it cannot explain how
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scientific disagreements are rationally resolved. The holist account, therefore, collapses 
into relativism.4
Feyerabend, for instance, who is a holist promotes epistemological anarchism. The 
epistemological anarchist maintains that all knowledge claims are epistemologically on 
a par, and that because they are on a par, one can defend and "correctly” uphold any 
theory of knowledge. Kuhnians, on the other hand, claim that scientific paradigm-choice 
cannot be adequately justified because all previous rules of evaluation and justification are 
given up in paradigm change. Hence, for Kuhnians, irrational or non-rational factors play . 
important roles in scientific paradigm acceptance. This is precisely why Kuhn describes 
the acceptance of new paradigms as "conversion experiences".
Laudan puts his criticism of the holist model as follows:
... Kuhn can readily explain why many scientific debates are protracted and 
inconclusive affairs. If both sides are indeed "talking past one another", if they are 
judging their theories against different yardsticks, then it is no surprise that they 
continue to disagree.... Kuhn’s model correctly predicts that dissensus should be 
a common feature of scientific life. What [the holist model] cannot explain ... is 
how - short of sheer exhaustion or political manipulation - scientific disagreements 
are ever brought to closure. If rival scientists cannot understand one another’s 
point of view, if they have fundamentally different expectations about what counts 
as a "good" scientific theory, it seems utterly mysterious that those’ same scientists 
ever (let alone often) reach a point where they eventually agree about which 
paradigm is acceptable. (Laudan, 1984, pp. 16-17)
It is against this background that Laudan proposes his reticulated model. This 
model (according to Laudan) incorporates the virtues of both the hierarchical and holist
Taudan discusses this and related criticisms of the holist view in his Science and Values, 1984, p.68-87.
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models; but it overcomes their defects. Just like the holist model, it allows for widespread 
disagreement at all levels of scientific commitment, but unlike the holist model, it rejects 
the simultaneity of change. Like the hierarchical model, the reticulated model claims that 
methodological rules can justify theory-choice, and that axiology constrains methodology. 
But it rejects the one-way justificatory process of the hierarchical model. Rather, 
justification in the reticulated model is "unitraditionaT; that is, accepted theories may 
judge changes in aims and methodology just as methods could bring about changes in 
factual-theoretical claims and in the aims and goals of science. Change in Laudan’s 
"unitraditional change" is:
... a complex process of mutual justification ... among all three levels of scientific 
commitment. Justification flows upward as well as downward in the hierarchy 
linking aims, methods and factual claims. No longer should we regard any one of 
these levels as privileged or primary or more fundamental than others. Axiology, 
methodology and factual claims are inevitably intertwined in relations of mutual 
dependency. (Laudan, 1984, pp. 62-63)
To be more precise, where the holist envisages a revolutionary change in world-view from 
a set, of theory-methodology-axiology {T, & M, & A,} to another setj {T2 & M2 & A2), 
the reticulated modeller claims to avoid relativism by allowing for the modification of 
only one element at once. Hence, the change from:
{T, & M, & A,} may become a change to
{T2 & M, & A,) or to
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{Tj & M2 & A,} or to
{T, & M, & A2), ...
The holist model falls into relativism because it leaves no arbiter to effect the 
change from one research tradition to another, but Laudan claims that relativism can be 
avoided if only one element changes at once. Those levels of commitment that are left 
unchanged thereby provide the necessary arbiter for the changing element. But those el­
ements that are left unchanged are only temporarily so; they may also change at a latter 
date.
The distinguishing features of Laudan’s reticulated model can, therefore, be sum­
marized as follows:
(1) No aspect of scientific commitment need remain fixed over time.
(2) Change in science is a piecemeal - not simultaneous - process among the three 
levels of commitment.
(3) Justification in science is a relation of mutual dependency; methods may justify 
theories or vice versa; axiology may justify methods or vice versa; and axiology 
may justify theory or vice versa.
Before delineating the connection between reticulation and naturalism, it is
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important to point out that in spite of the concentration of Laudan’s model on cognitive 
values, or cognitive ends, or cognitive goals (as he interchangeably calls them), Laudan 
fails to give any adequate explanation of what these so-called values are. Laudan does 
give short examples of these values; for instance, he refers to them as:
such familiar cognitive goals as truth, simplicity and predictive fertility ... . 
(Laudan, 1984, p. 35)
and, in connection with scientific realism, he also says:
At the core, realism is a normative doctrine about what the aims or values of sci­
ence ought to be. Specifically, the realist maintains that the goal of science is to 
find ever truer theories about the natural world. (Laudan, 1984, p. 106)
But a footnote (in Laudan’s Science and Values) in which he distinguishes cognitive 
values from non-cognitive values gives the pretence away. In that footnote, we have 
Laudan’s most precise characterization of cognitive values. Unfortunately, the definition 
of cognitive values he gives in that footnote also fits a description of methodological 
standards:
The question of precisely how one distinguishes cognitive values or aims from 
noncognitive ones is quite complex. For purposes of my analysis here, we can 
adopt this rough-and-ready characterization: an attribute will count as a cognitive 
value or aim if  that attribute represents a property o f theories which we deem to 
be constitutive o f good science. (Laudan, 1984, pp. xi-xii, fn.2, my emphasis)
The problem is that Laudan’s rough-and-ready characterization turns all methodological
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rules, principles and standards into cognitive values! If I advocate the falsifiability 
criterion as a methodological rule, or the principle that good theories must not be ad hoc, 
(or any methodological rule whatsoever), I must of necessity regard the quality stipulated 
by that methodological rule as a virtue which good scientific theories must exhibit or 
comply with. But by Laudan’s own rough-and-ready characterization, such virtues are 
cognitive values! Hence, Laudan’s rough-and-ready characterization does not adequately 
distinguish cognitive ends from methodological standards.
But if methodological rules are indistinguishable from cognitive values, the tale 
of the three levels of scientific commitment becomes implausible. It would seem more 
legitimate to postulate two levels of scientific commitment (the factual-theoretical level 
and the level of principles of appraisal) and not three levels as Laudan maintains.
3. FROM RETICULATION TO NORMATIVE NATURALISM
Laudan’s normative naturalism is a view about the status and justification of methodology 
in philosophy of science; it is a meta-methodology. Meta-methodology, according to Lau­
dan, is made up of two interdependent aspects: a theory of methodology, and a theory of 
axiology. The theory of methodology is concerned with the justification of methodological 
rules and standards as more or less likely to lead to the achievement of given cognitive 
ends, while axiology is concerned with the appraisal of cognitive ends themselves.
A methodology, for Laudan, is a set of rules. Examples of methodological rules, 
according to Laudan, are:
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(1) Propound only falsifiable theories.
(2) Avoid ad hoc modifications.
(3) Prefer theories which make successful predictions over theories which
merely explain what is already known.
(4) When experimenting on human subjects, use double-blinded experimental
techniques; etc. (Laudan, 1987a, p.23)
Although these rules are stated in the form of commands, or categorical impera­
tives, Laudan claims that since they are means for achieving specific cognitive ends, they 
are really hypothetical imperatives:
... methodological rules, when freed from the elliptical form in which they are of­
ten formulated, take the form of hypothetical imperatives whose antecedent is a 
statement about aims and goals, and whose consequent is the elliptical expression 
of the mandated action. (Laudan, 1987a, p. 24)
Hence, according to Laudan, the Popperian rule: "Avoid ad hoc modifications", is more 
properly-formulated as the rule:
If one wants to develop theories which are very risky, then one ought to avoid ad 
hoc hypotheses. (Laudan, 1987a, p.24)
Laudan’s naturalism is a consequence of his hypothetical interpretation of methodological 
rules. Since Laudan claims that methodological rules are best construed as hypothetical 
imperatives of the means/ends type, he infers that they are contingent claims about 
optimal ways to realize our ends, and that whichever method is the optimal way to realize 
our ends depends on the way the world is (and, what we believe is the optimal way itself 
depends on what we believe about the constitution of the world):
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Whether our methods, conceived as means, promote our cognitive aims, conceived 
as ends, is largely a contingent question. What strategy of inquiry will be 
successful depends entirely on what the world is like, and what we as prospective 
knowers are like. One cannot settle a priori whether certain methods of 
investigation will be successful instruments for exploring the world, since whether 
a certain method will be successful depends on what the world is like ... I do hold 
that the theory of methodology can be and should be as empirical as the natural 
sciences whose results it draws on. (That is precisely what I mean by a 
"reticulated" view of scientific rationality.) (Laudan, 1987b, p. 231)
According to Laudan, rational behaviour has to do with establishing the efficacy of action 
in relation to some cognitive aim. Establishing an action as the most effective way of 
bringing to realization a cognitive end, however, is an empirical affair. It is empirical in 
the sense that claiming that "Y is an effective way for realizing Z" is a conditional 
statement which asserts a contingent relationship between two "observable properties"; 
’doing T’ and ’realizing Z \ Whether Y will indeed be a successful instrument for 
establishing Z depends on what the world is like. This is why Laudan claims that meta­
methodology involves contingent linkages between cognitive ends and means; it is 
instrumental and empirical (natural):
Crediting or discrediting a methodological rule requires us to ask ourselves 
whether the universe we inhabit is one in which our cognitive ends can in fact be 
furthered by following this rule rather than that. Such questions cannot be 
answered a priori; they are empirical matters. It follows that scientific 
methodology is itself an empirical discipline which cannot dispense with the very 
methods of inquiry whose validity it validates. Armchair methodology is as ill- 
founded as armchair chemistry or physics. (Laudan, 1984, pp. 39-40)
Unlike most versions of naturalism, Laudan’s claim to uphold philosophy of
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science’s traditional normative character; it is prescriptive. It advocates that one should 
adopt only those methods that best promote one’s ends, and it prescribes that only those 
ends that are non-utopian are admissible in science. (Moreover, as we shall see, Laudan 
prescribes a sort of straight "meta-level inductive" principle that says that the rational 
thing to do is to assume that those methods that have been successful in achieving a 
certain cognitive goal in the past will continue to do so in the future.) This is why he 
claims that his naturalism "... can both discharge [methodology’s] traditional normative 
role and nonetheless claim to be sensitive to empirical evidence." (Laudan, 1990c, p.44) 
We can identify the components of Laudan’s normative naturalism as follows:
* an instrumental conception of rationality;
* a construal of methodological rules as hypothetical imperatives of the
means/ends type;
* a naturalist (empirical) approach to the testing of methodologies in
philosophy of science; and
■ * a prescriptivist (and inductivist) philosophy in which we are urged to
continue adopting those means which have hitherto been successful in 
bringing to fruition their associated ends.
I shall consider three problems confronting Laudan’s normative naturalism. I shall 
start by outlining two surface problems, the narrowness problem, and the credibility 
problem, and then move on to the major problem, which is the problem of relativism.
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1. The narrowness problem: Gerald Doppelt [1990] criticizes Laudan of espousing a 
very narrow naturalism. Doppelt describes this as "a self-imposed limitation" of Laudan’s 
naturalism, and he claims that:
[Laudan’s] naturalistic approach to methodological choice ignores the central role 
of logical and conceptual anomalies in determining which methodological 
standards scientists accept. (Doppelt, 1990, p. 15)
But surely, Laudan’s naturalism is not narrow in the sense that it concentrates on 
empirical considerations alone to the detriment of conceptual ones. In one of his books, 
Progress and its Problems, Laudan actually distinguishes conceptual problems from 
empirical problems, and he explicitly claims that conceptual problems are as important 
as empirical ones.
In fact, in one of his early expositions of normative naturalism, Laudan writes that:
I am not claiming that the theory of methodology is a wholly empirical activity, 
any more than I would claim that theoretical physics was a wholly empirical 
activity. Both make extensive use of conceptual analysis as well as empirical 
results. But I do claim that methodology can be and should be as empirical as the 
natural sciences whose results it draws on. (Laudan, 1987b, p.231)
In my evaluation of Laudan’s naturalism, I shall criticize the specific ways in which he 
makes use of empirical evidence. My criticisms should, however not be confused with that 
of Doppelt. Unlike Doppelt who argues that normative naturalism overlooks the important 
role of the conceptual, my examination of Laudan’s naturalism shall concern the extent 
and usefulness of evidence of the means/ends type.
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2. The credibility problem: Laudan’s naturalist approach to methodological rules 
depends on the conviction that an empirical approach to a theory of methodology will 
reveal that there are hypothetical connections between scientific methods and cognitive 
ends. But no methodological means is unique to any particular aim. Instrumentalists and 
realists alike both accept rules like predictive success, they both reject ad hoc 
modification, etc. But if the same means can be associated with conflicting or 
contradictory cognitive ends, or conflicting (or contradictory) means be associated with 
the same cognitive ends, then an hypothetical construal of rules may be unable to yield 
a meta-methodological verdict on the adequacy of the principles of scientific theory 
appraisal.
This problem can be illustrated by considering two different interpretations of the 
predictivist rule of theory appraisal. Since Laudan maintains that all methodological rules 
are hypothetical imperatives of the means/ends type, we can have the following-conflicting 
interpretations of the predictivist rule by the realist and an instrumentalist:
(a) The Realist: If you want theories which are true and which give genuine 
descriptions of reality, then, accept only theories that have successfully mad& —  - 
surprising predictions.
(b) The Instrumentalist: If we want theories which are empirically adequate, which 
are codification of the directly observable; but which are neither true nor false 
descriptions of the world, then accept only theories that have successfully made
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surprising predictions.
Whatever evidence is regarded as an empirical justification of (a) by a realist will also 
serve as a corroboration of (b) for the instrumentalist. Hence, it is impossible to adjudicate 
between these two conflicting rules by empirical connections of the means/ends type as 
Laudan maintains.
The problem is that stating the predictivist thesis in an hypothetical form is 
unnecessary. The cognitive ends which serve as the antecedents of (a) and (b) add nothing 
whatsoever to the credibility of the predictivist methodological rule. The predictivist rule 
can stand on its own as the following methodological rule:
(c) Before any theory can be regarded as empirically well-founded and as making any 
positive contribution to the growth of scientific knowledge, it must make 
successful surprising predictions.
Rules such as (c) do not derive their credibility from associations with any specific 
set of cognitive ends.5 It is a rule whose credibility can be argued for independently of 
any specific-cognitive end or aim* Rules such as (c) are those which I regard as more 
foundational than those which can only be stated hypothetically in connection with 
specific aims. Other examples of such rules are: reject inconsistent theories; avoid ad hoc
sThis is not to say that they are "analytic” or "a priori”. The point is that exhibiting the validity of such rules 
do not require the specification of any particular claim about the natural world. Rather they rest on more general 
metaphysical and epistemological assumptions which stand or fall with the nature of this world.
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modifications; prefer simple theories to complex ones. These rules do not owe their 
credibility to the specification of any particular or specific cognitive end. Evidence of 
means/ends connections, and stating them hypothetically is largely irrelevant to their cred­
ibility. They are rules which assert standards of scientific theory appraisal, the validity of 
which is independent of interpreting them hypothetically.
The objection is not that these more foundational rules cannot legitimately be 
added to cognitive ends to form hypothetical imperatives. On the contrary, they can be 
added to most, if not all, cognitive ends to form hypothetical imperatives precisely 
because they contain within themselves their own credentials. The objection is that adding 
them to specific cognitive ends in no way increases their credibility. This is why they are 
foundational; if we accept them as credible, they must serve as the basis on which any 
theory of scientific methodology is overlaid.
The fundamental point is that we need to distinguish between instrumental and in­
trinsicproperties (or attributes) of methodological rules. Not all methodological require­
ments express instrumental virtues in the sense that we need to specify some cognitive 
end upon which the acceptability of their virtues depend. Some methodological 
requirements (such as avoid inconsistent claims) express virtues which do not require the 
specification of any specific empirical condition; hence, they are foundational.
There is one obvious solution to what I have described as the credibility problem. 
The solution is to specify an aim (or a set of aims) as the optimum aim of science which 
all scientists and philosophers adopt. Such an aim would have to be invariant and valid 
for all times. Most realists, for instance, accept truth as the optimum aim of science. Truth 
is therefore regarded by realists as a cognitive goal which all theories, past, present and
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future, must exhibit. This move is however not open to Laudan. In Laudan’s view, there 
are no invariants, everything in science is fully subject to radical change:
[This view] is thoroughly Heraclitean: theories change, methods change, and 
central cognitive values shift ... all these ingredients are potentially in flux ... 
nothing can be taken as a permanent fixture on the scientific scene ... .(Laudan, 
1984, p.64)
3. The problem of relativism: Irrespective of the two surface problems below, (the 
narrowness problem and the credibility problem), the further question can be asked: does 
Laudan’s normative naturalism provide an adequate response to the challenge of 
relativism?
As explained in a previous chapter, the problem of relativism confronting any no-
invariant-methodologist is this: if the basic principles of rationality are themselves subject 
< .
to change, against what are we supposed to objectively evaluate our theories? If there are 
no invariant standards for determining the adequacy of our scientific claims, what counts 
as a good reason for holding a scientific claim or belief will vary from research tradition 
to research tradition as standards of rationality change. Can scientific beliefs have any 
r plausible claim to objective correctness if each tradition legislates for itself its own 
standards of acceptability?
The first main point to note is that the relativist’s challenge can be made at two 
different levels. At one level, (let’s call this relativism^ the challenge is merely that of 
whether methodological and epistemic standards have any plausible rationale or any 
putative reasons in their support. At this level, relativism is the claim that beliefs and
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choices lack any rationale or justification. Beliefs and choices are arbitrarily chosen and 
adopted without any real argument in their support.
The relativist’s challenge can, however, also be posed at a more fundamental level. 
At this fundamental level (relativism^, relativism is not merely the thesis that choices, 
beliefs, and methods lack any putative reasons in their support. Rather the thesis is that 
there are no justifications which are valid across traditions; that the only sort o f 
"justifications" we can give is that our present methods turn out better when judged from  
within specific standpoint, specific theories, or specific research traditions. Ian Jarvie 
gives a very precise characterization of this sort of relativist thesis as follows:
Relativism is the position that all assessments are assessments relative to some 
standard or other, and standards derive from cultures. The attempt to assess 
without regard to cultural context and, particularly, the attempt to assess cognitive 
statements on some transcendental scale of truth, is futile. No assessment can 
escape the web of culture and hence all assessment is culturally relative. (Jarvie, 
1983, p.44)
At this level, relativism implies that the methods adopted by a theory T  are valid (i.e. 
justified) for that theory only in the light of that theory’s included criteria of merit, and 
those methods adopted by a rival theory T  are valid (or justified) for the rival theory only 
when viewed from within its own internal set of criteria. The relativist, at this level, thinks 
that our present point of view is right in adjudging our present methods correct
Does Laudan’s Normative Naturalism provide an adequate response to the more 
fundamental relativist challenge? In the following sections of this chapter, my main aim 
is to show how Laudan’s normative naturalism fails to overcome the more fundamental 
challenge of the relativist’s. 1 also highlight some other key problems with Laudan’s
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normative naturalism.
4. ARE METHODOLOGIES ADEQUATELY JUSTIFIED 
INSTRUMENTALLY ?
Laudan’s instrumental justification of methodologies involves two steps:
« .•
(1) A construal of methodological rules as hypothetical imperatives which link 
cognitive ends to effective means for their realization.
(2) The assumption of a warranting or evidencing principle which can be invoked as 
a principle of empirical support when adjudicating between competing methods of 
science. Laudan formulates this.principle (R,) as follows:
If actions of a particular sort, m, have consistently promoted certain cognitive 
ends, e, in the past, and rival actions, n, have failed to do so, then assume that fu­
ture actions following the rule "if your aim is e, you ought to do m" are more 
likely to promote those ends than actions based on the rule "if your aim is e, you 
ought to do n. (Laudan, 1987a, p. 25)
The assumption in step (2) tells us the type of evidence Laudan has in mind; it is histor­
ical evidence about the past efficacy of the postulated means in bringing to realization the 
ends at issue.
The two steps in Laudan’s instrumental justification are controversial. As we have 
seen, the claim that methodological rules are best construed as hypothetical imperatives
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is problematic.
The problem with the second step is the age old problem of induction. Step (2) 
obviously involves an inductive assumption. It requires us to use the past success-rate of 
means in effecting corresponding ends to justify the assumption that this will continue in 
the future. First, as Laudan is fully aware, not all theories of scientific method would 
accept this evidential principle. In some philosophies of science— namely, Popperian and 
neo-Popperian philosophies— inductive reasoning in whatever guise is not permissible. 
Hence, the assumption not a warranting or evidential principle which all methodologies 
accept.
As Laudan is of course fully aware of this fact, he merely claims that "it seems 
plausibly to hold that a broad consensus could be struck among philosophers of science 
about the appropriateness of (Rj)". (Laudan, 1987a, p.26)
Suppose we waive these objections against the two steps; does Laudan’s instru­
mental approach to justification provide an adequate justification of methodological rules 
in science? A close look at. the actual justifications Laudan give suggests that an in­
strumental justification of methodological rules is not adequate for scientific rationality. 
For instance, one of Laudan’s favourite examples of how methodological rules are 
justified instrumentally (and of methodological change in science) is the switch from 
single-blind techniques to double-blind ones in clinical trials. Until relatively recently, 
double-blind trials were not part of the "methodology" of clinical trials. This switch could 
be stated as the following prescriptive rule:
(i): Prefer double-blind clinical trials to single-blind ones.
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The first step in Laudan’s instrumental approach to justification requires that we reformu­
late this rule in its hypothetical form. Hence the rule becomes:
(i’): If you want to determine whether a drug genuinely has specified physiological ef­
fects, prefer double-blind clinical trials to single-blinded ones.
Laudan maintains that there are empirical considerations which show that double­
blind clinical trials are more efficacious in bringing to realization the stated cognitive end 
of (i’). These empirical considerations are: Scientists have come to realise that the reas­
suring act of receiving medications and medical attention often has curative effects on 
patients- even when they have been given pharmacologically inert drugs. This is the 
placebo effect. To control the placebo effect in the testing of drugs, controlled experi­
ments are performed on a group of patients. The group of patients on which the clinical 
trial is to be performed is sub-divided into two groups: the test group, and the control 
group. Patients in the test group are administered the drug under test, while patients in the 
control group receive a pharmacologically inert drug which looks like the true drug. But 
as patients in either group will not know to which group they belong (i.e. patients will not 
know whether they are receiving the real drug or the dummy drug) the problem of the 
placebo effect was regarded as eliminated. This is the single-blind test.
But as we learnt more about therapeutic effects, we came to realize that in single­
blind tests, researchers can, and often do, convey their own therapeutic expectations to the 
test patients; hence, the placebo effect could still recur in single-blind tests. Moreover, 
doctors’ expectations might affect their judgement as to whether a patient had benefited
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from a certain treatment. So it became preferable to perform clinical trials double-blind. 
In double-blind trials, neither the patients nor those who conduct the experiment know 
which patient receives the genuine drug, and which the dummy drug. As double-blind 
trials eliminate a possible source of error which single-blind tests do not eliminate, 
double-blind tests are more effective means for determining whether drugs genuinely have 
the therapeutic effects they are said to have.
Of course Laudan is correct in claiming that double-blind methods are better than 
single-blind ones. The question is whether it is mere instrumental efficacy that provides 
the rationale for adopting double-blind tests over single-blind tests in clinical trials. As 
Siegel points out (Siegel, 1990), if Laudan were right in claiming that it is merely 
instrumental efficacy (i.e. the efficacy of double-blind methods in finding out genuinely 
therapeutic effects) that justifies double-blind tests, then if cognitive ends changed,
double-blind methodology might seem less appropriate. Siegel gives a very good
hypothetical example in which we are to imagine:
(i) That science has advanced to the stage that we know the extent to which 
placebo effects which are due to experimenters* expectations are affecting 
clinical trials; and that this rate of effect is minimal.
(ii) Suppose further that the cost of performing double-blind trials is so high
that it substantially reduces the number of subjects to which the drug
would have been administered if the test had been single-blind.
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In this kind of situation, the choice between single and double-blind methods becomes a 
choice between:
a) Wasting resources on experiments which control for a real but very small error—
namely, placebo effects due to the transmission of the experimenter’s expectations 
to the subjects - and,
(b) Conducting single-blind experiments which do not eliminate this possible but
minimal (and unlikely) source of error, but which have the added advantage of a 
greater number of tests.
Scientists who favour the use of single-blind experiments in this hypothetical situa­
tion could choose to adopt a completely different methodological rule in which single­
blind tests are favoured over double-blind ones. Siegel states this alternative rule as 
follows:
If one wants to learn, to an acceptable degree of approximation, whether a drug 
or therapy is genuinely effective, and one wants to learn this of the largest number 
of drug/therapies one can, prefer single-blind to double-blind experiments. (Siegel, 
1990, p. 300)
The problem is that the two alternative rules- i.e rule (i’) and Siegel’s hypothetical 
rule below- are both equally justified by Laudan’s instrumentalist account of justification. 
For in both cases, empirical considerations can be presented to show that the proposed 
means are the most efficient ways to the realization of these different ends. Hence, if it
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were merely the instrumental efficacy of proposed means in bringing about adopted 
cognitive ends that counts in the justification of methodological rules, it would be 
impossible to choose between these two alternative rules. This is because given the 
different sets of goals the two rules adopt (one that of determining whether drugs 
genuinely have their supposed therapeutic effects; the other that of determining to a 
degree of approximation whether drugs are effective) and the different means they adopt 
(double-blind trials against single-blind trial), the two rules would be justified by Laudan’s 
approach. They would both be justified in the sense that scientists who adopt one set, and 
those who adopt the other set would be able to provide empirical evidence to show that 
the means they postulate is the best for bringing to realization their corresponding ends. 
Instrumental efficacy would be completely redundant in choosing between the two meth­
ods.
Of course, we all agree that double-blind experimental techniques are better than 
single-blind ones in clinical trials. The point, however, is that double-blind experimental 
techniques are better for purely epistemic, non-instrumental, reasons. This is because they 
eliminate a possible source of error which single-blind tests are unable to eliminate.
Even if we choose to adopt single-blind trials for pragmatic reasons, (as in Siegel’s 
hypothetical case) the epistemic justification of double-blind trials over single-blind ones 
would still hold. An adoption of single-blind trials over double-blind trials in this 
hypothetical situation does not show that single-blind techniques are categorically better 
th2n double-blind ones. Rather, it shows that in science, as well as in everyday life, there 
are times when the best line of action is not the most practical option to choose. But if 
methodologies are merely hypothetical imperatives, and if we adopt a purely instrumental
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conception of justification, it would be impossible to choose between these two rules if 
goals of inquiry differ.
The point is not that methodological rules cannot be "justified" instrumentally as 
Laudan maintains. Laudan is right in claiming that evidence which show the effectiveness 
of means in bringing ends to realization can, and often do, count in favour of 
methodological rules. My disagreement is about whether an instrumental justification of 
methodological rules is strong enough. More specifically, Laudan’s naturalist approach to 
the justification of methodologies will often lead to relativism of choice. In situations such 
as Siegel’s where different cognitive ends are favoured, Laudan’s naturalism does not, and 
cannot, yield the verdict that one method (double-blind trials) is better than another 
(single-blind trials). All it can say is that given their respective cognitive ends, scientists 
who adopt the different methods have a rationale in favour of their choices. But this lands 
naturalism into the sort of relativism it was devised to overcome. Because if cognitive 
goals are different, all naturalism can say is that a methodological means is justified only 
in light of its associated goals.
5. HOW INSTRUMENTAL IS RATIONALITY?
Laudan’s instrumental approach to the justification of methodological rules is based on 
his conviction that rationality is about goal-directed action. It is because he maintains that 
instrumental efficacy is a necessary condition for rationality in general that he also claims 
that scientific rationality is to be measured by the effectiveness of means in bringing ends 
to realization:
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Whatever else rationality is, it is agent- and context- specific. When we say that 
an agent acted rationally, we are asserting minimally that he acted in ways which 
he believed would promote his ends. Determining that an agent acted in a manner 
that he believed would promote his ends may or may not be sufficient to show the 
rationality of his actions; philosophers will quarrel about that matter. But few 
would deny that it is a necessary condition for ascribing rationality to an agent’s 
action that he believed it would promote his ends. (Laudan, 1987, p. 21, my 
emphasis)
Laudan’s view is however not merely that instrumental efficacy is a necessary condition 
for rationality. He is also committed to the view that actions and choices cannot be 
justified unless we can exhibit instrumental connections between means and ends:
... whenever we judge an agent’s rationality ... we must consider: what actions 
were taken; what the agent’s ends or aims were; the background beliefs which 
informed his judgments about the likely consequences of his possible actions. 
There is no viable conception of rationality which does not make these ingredients 
essential to, even exhaustive of, the assessment of an agent’s rationality. (Laudan, 
1987, p. 21, my emphasis)
... beyond demanding that our goals must reflect our beliefs about what is and is 
not possible, that our methods must stand in appropriate relations to our goals, and 
that our implicit and explicit values must be synchronized, there is little more that 
the theory of rationality can demand. (Laudan, 1984, p. 64, my emphasis).
We need to be clear about what Laudan’s full view is because the italicized phrases in 
thsse two quotations might suggest that Laudan is not fully committed to making 
instrumental efficacy exhaustive of rationality. In a reply to Harvey Siegel’s [1990] 
Liudan is very precise and clear about his full commitments:
... the only meta-epistemic* illustration selection criterion endorsed in Siegel’s paper
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is a straightforward illustration of how ends/means analysis provides the 
framework for the ... analysis of methodological rules. And how could it be 
otherwise? Justification is itself a relational notion. To say that ’x is justified in 
doing y* is always enthymatic for *x is justified relative to end(s) in doing y \  
There is no coherent sense of justification ... in the absence of the specification of 
the ends with respect to which an action is deemed justified or rational. That is the 
central premise of instrumental rationality and of normative naturalism. (Laudan, 
1990b, p.317)
Laudan’s full view therefore is that explaining an action or belief as rational does not 
simply depend on whether that action/belief is true or false; nor does rationality consist 
of purely epistemic considerations about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of 
proposed lines of action. What matters most in rationality is the relationship between 
means and ends (goals)
The foregoing suggest that, for Laudan, there is a special sense in which 
instrumentalism is sufficient for rationality. On this view, instrumentalism is not sufficient 
for rationality in the sense that all cases of means/ends connections are rational! Rather, 
instrumentalism is sufficient for rationality in the sense that we only need to examine the 
effectiveness of means in bringing ends to fruition to exhibit rationality:
... the giving of evidence, no more than the proffering of justifications, does not 
occur in a vacuum; it is always modulo some aim or other. ... Good reasons are 
instrumental reasons; there is no other sort. (Laudan, 1990b, p.320)
Laudan is of course correct in claiming that, in science and everyday life, there is 
an important sense in which to explain actions or beliefs as rational or irrational is to 
show the instrumental efficacy of adopted means in relation to stipulated ends. Newton- 
Smith (1981) has described this sense of rational as mini-rationality (or minirat for short).
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We can construct minirat explanations of scientists’ actions or beliefs in abandoning one 
scientific theory or research programme for another. Such rational explanations of 
scientific change would simply consist in evaluating particular scientist’s theory-choice 
in relation to their implicit goals of inquiry. But does minirat provide an adequate 
explanation of rationality in general, and of the rationality of scientific change in 
particular? Scientific rationality surely requires a lot more than minirat explanations.
First, we can have situations in which a purely instrumental approach to 
justification cannot dictate choice. Consider again the change from single-blind trials to 
double-blind ones. If scientists adopt different goals, instrumentalism cannot objectively 
rank double-blind techniques over single-blind ones. Hence, to overcome relativism of 
choice in such situations, we need to show that we rank double-blind trials over single­
blind trials, not because of instrumental efficacy, but because double-blind trials provide 
better evidence about the therapeutic effects of drugs, irrespective of individual goals.
Laudan could of course reply that in-the example of single-blind/double-blind 
methodology below, I am at least committed to the aim of having genuine evidence, or 
the aim of knowledge. I agree that "knowledge" or "genuine evidence" can be 
characterized as aims of goals. We should note however that these sorts of aims are more 
general or primary to science than aims like "control for placebo effect". "Knowledge", 
if it is to be characterized as an aim, is an aim which is constitutive of the scientific 
enterprise in general. Hence it is more primary to science than aims like "control for 
placebo" effect.
The problem however is that aims which are constitutive of the scientific enterprise
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in general are not the sorts of aims Laudan has in mind. In his criticism of Laudan’s 
naturalism, Jarrett Leplin [1990], for instance, takes Laudan to task on the issue of 
whether cognitive aims are subject to change. Leplin distinguishes the central or primary 
aims of science from its subordinate or secondary aims. And he argues that:
Despite the many examples readily adducible of what appear major changes in 
methods and goals, I believe it is easy to show that there must be relative stability 
at some level. For it must be possible for scientists of periods separated by 
axiological change to recognize one another as engaged in a common enterprise. 
... It is no doubt plausible in some contexts to regard different scientists as 
operating with different conceptions of knowledge, but at a deep enough level we 
must regard the concept of knowledge as stable to make sense of the reasoning by 
which epistemic disagreement is adjudicated in scientific debate. (Leplin, 1990, 
pp.25-26)
In his reply to Leplin, Laudan of course agrees that aims as general as "knowledge” have 
remained unchanged in science. Laudan, however, thinks that an aim such as this is too 
general, and that in any case, he is concerned with the more specific sorts of aims:
I would be last to dispute that scientists and natural philosophers through the ages 
would probably all have assented to the claim that the aim of science is 
"knowledge"; b u t... [i]s the knowledge science aspires to a knowledge of causes? 
In that case we see no agreement among either scientists or philosophers (Laudan, 
1990, p.49).
When Laudan claims that: "the giving of evidence, no more than the proffering of 
justifications, does not occur in a vacuum; it is always modulo some aim or other... good 
reasons are instrumental reasons; there is no other sort" (Laudan, 1990, p.320), he is in 
effect restricting himself to secondary aims. This is precisely why he can claim that his 
view "is thoroughly Heraclitean: theories change, methods change, an d ... cognitive values
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sh ift.... all these ingredients are potentially in flux ... nothing can be taken as a permeant 
fixture on the scientific scene" (Laudan, 1984, p.64).
My argument so far has been that if the claim that "instrumental efficacy is 
exhaustive of rationality" is taken to be the: "exhibiting the effectiveness of means must 
always be in relation to secondary aims" (and nothing more), then Laudan’s normative 
naturalism will sometimes lead to relativism of choice. Instrumental efficacy (of the type 
Laudan wants) cannot be exhaustive of rationality. But is instrumental efficacy in fact 
necessary for rationality?
Siegel [1990] raises the same question, and in a reply to Siegel, Laudan’s response 
clarifies a great deal of confusion. Siegel raises the question as follows:
It is true that ’rationality* is regularly used to denote instrumental efficacy. Still, 
is it clear that the last mentioned belief is a necessary condition for rational 
action? It can plausibly be thought n o t... . (Siegel, 1990, p.303)
Siegel cites two kind of cases against Laudan’s claim that instrumental efficacy is 
necessary for rationality. In the case 1, an agent mistakenly believes that her actions will 
promote her ends - even though all the evidence indicate that they do not. (Siegel gives 
one such example as follows: "a mother’s belief that frequent insistence upon her son’s 
regular attendance at Sunday dinner will promote her end, namely his regular attendance, 
in the face of massive evidence that her frequent insistence has the effect of making his 
attendance less frequent", [ Siegel, 1990, p.303])
Case 2: In the second case, an agent justifiably believes that her actions will 
promote her ends, but the adequacy of the ends themselves are questionable. (Siegel’s
126
Laudan’s normative naturalism
example of this second case is one in which a father who wants his daughter to become 
a professional pianist justifiable believes that getting her devoted completely to the piano 
will make her a good pianist. Siegel, however, questions the reasonableness or adequacy 
of the father’s goals on the grounds: (a) that they violate the daughter’s autonomy, and 
(b) that "there is ample psychological evidence that the life of a professional pianist is 
troubling in ways that other lifestyles are not". [Siegel 1990, p.303])
The two cases Siegel cites are problematic. Indeed they do not challenge Laudan’s 
view that instrumental efficacy is a necessary condition for rationality. Consider the first 
case in which Siegel shows that people sometimes believe, unjustifiably, that their actions 
promote their ends (when in fact these actions do not). Surely my belief that my personal 
actions promote my ends has no bearing on whether means must o f necessity be 
efficacious to ends before we can judge actions as rational. Laudan’s simple response to 
Siegel is that a necessary condition might be present even when that for which the 
condition is necessary is absent That is, we have one of the necessary conditions for 
rationality (i.e. the belief that actions promote my ends), but in which rationality does not 
obtain. (As I shall argue above when I consider Laudan’s analysis of aims that are 
acceptable and those that are not, the real problem is that Laudan inevitably augments 
instrumental rationality with non-instrumental, epistemic, considerations to avoid making 
cases like this examples of rational actions.)
Siegel’s second case is more problematic than the first case. To start with, one 
could argue that it is not immoral to subject people to psychological traumas. But even 
if we grant Siegel the claim that it is immoral for a parent to subject his child to 
unnecessary psychological traumas, surely there is the further question of whether an
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immoral action is irrational. But even if we set aside these issues, and accept that 
immoral actions are irrational, Siegel’s second case would be a case in which one 
necessary condition for rationality (namely, an agents believe that his means promotes his 
ends) is present while another necessary condition (the requirement that means truly be 
effective for their ends) is absent. Laudan is thus justified in claiming that Siegel’s:
... cases can have no bearing on the claim that a necessary condition for an 
action’s being rational is that the agent believes his action will promote his ends. 
... the logical structure of Siegel’s examples makes them irrelevant to assaying a 
claim about the necessary conditions for rational action. To impugn my thesis that 
an agent’s, belief that his actions will promote his ends is a necessary condition for 
those actions being rational, Siegel needs to adduce cases in which an action is 
clearly rational even when the agent did not believe that his actions would 
promote his ends. (Laudan, 1990b, p.319)
Can we supply any such example? Consider again the preference for double-blind 
experimental techniques over single-blind ones in clinical trials. In Siegel’s hypothetical 
situation, we are to imagine that science has advanced to the stage that we know the 
precise extent to which placebo effects due to experimenters* expectation can affect 
clinical trials. Unlike Siegel’s use of this example, let us suppose that the rate of effect 
is significant. Suppose further that the cost of conducting double-blind trials is 
considerably more expensive than that of conducting single-blind ones. (For instance, 
suppose that the cost of running 10 double-blind tests is the same as that of running 1000 
single-blind ones; and that, in any case, running 2 double-blind tests would completely 
usurp the funds of the research laboratory conducting the tests.)
In such a situation, a scientist who genuinely adopts truth as her goal of inquiry 
(i.e. who, in general, genuinely believes in determining whether drugs actually have their
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supposed pharmacological effects, and who, for example, genuinely wants to determine 
whether this new drug can cure cancer) could choose to adopt single-blind tests rather 
than double-blind ones. In such a situation, the scientist, given her aim, would be adopting 
a means which she knows is not the most effective one to the realization of her ends. But 
given the specifics of the situation, the scientist’s choice of single-blind trials over double­
blind ones is nonetheless rational.
Would this example be a case in which an action is rational even when the agent 
did not believe that his actions would promote his ends? I am sure that Laudan would 
have a good rejoinder to the example below. And, indeed, to any example which purports 
to be a case of rational action, but in which the agent did not believe that his actions 
would promote his ends, Laudan would simply claim that the example merely shows that 
the scientist had another implicit aim to which her actions can be associated to yield 
instrumental efficacy. The strategy of stating implicit aims, is quite handy; this is because 
any example in which one shows rationality, but no association of instrumental efficacy, 
would easily be explained away in this fashion by Laudan.
Nevertheless, my basic point can still be made independently of examples. The 
point is that an account of rationality in which instrumentality is taken to be the only ade­
quate mode of rational action or explanation ignores the important role of non­
instrumental, epistemic, considerations in rationality. Doppelt (1990) identifies the 
following three circumstances in which instrumental efficacy is insufficient for assessing 
the rationality of human conduct (and choices):
(1) [An] act A violates powerful social standards of conduct embedded in the 
judgements of [a person] P, as well as the community or group(s) in which
1 2 9
Laudan’s normative naturalism
P*s activity is embedded.
(2) P*s subjective ends E are so bizarre, idiosyncratic, incoherent, illegitimate, 
or misguided by reference to powerful social norms of conduct embedded 
in the judgements of P ’s community of peers, as to make P ’s action A 
seem senseless, incoherent, mad, or otherwise inappropriate.
(3) P ’s background of beliefs B is itself so inconsistent, irrational, 
idiosyncratic, or unstable relative to epistemic standards embedded in the 
judgements of P ’s community or peers, as to make P an irrational agent, 
no matter how effective A is, to the realization of E. (Doppelt, 1990, p.9)
The point is that we can have situations of instrumental efficacy (hence, mini-ra­
tionality) which violate any of the three (especially 2 and 3) circumstances below. 
Irrespective of whether the action or choice was instrumentally efficacious in bringing the 
actors* goal to fruition, we will still pronounce such actions and choices maxi-irrational.
The underlying problem is that Laudan also wants to make instrumental efficacy 
exhaustive of rationality:
... beyond demanding that our goals must reflect our beliefs about what is not 
possible, that our methods must stand in appropriate relations to our goals, and 
that our implicit and explicit values must be synchronized, there is little more that 
the theory of rationality can demand (Laudan, 1984, p.64)
He also claims that:
.. whenever we judge an agent’s rationality we must consider: what actions were 
taken; what the agents ends or aims were; the background beliefs which informed 
his actions. There is no viable conception of rationality which does not make these 
ingredients essential to, even exhaustive of the assessment of an agent’s rationality. 
(Laudan, 1987a, p.21)
If the consider the role and nature of axiology in science, it is, I think, clear that
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instrumental efficacy cannot be "exhaustive of the assessment of an agent’s rationality". 
Consider, for instance the rule of predesignation. According to Laudan, "this rule specifies 
that a hypothesis is tested only by the new predictions drawn from it, not by its ability 
post hoc to explain what was already known" (Laudan, 1984, p.36) Popper, Whewell, and 
Peirce are regarded as proponents of this rule, while Mill and Keynes reject the rule.
As Laudan himself observes, "all parties to the controversy would, I believe 
subscribe to the same cognitive aims. They seek theories which are true, general, simple 
and explanatory." (Laudan, 1984, p.36) So the issue is not simply that proponents and 
antagonists of the rule accept different cognitive values. But if there is axiological 
consensus, it should be possible, on Laudan’s view to perform a simple empirical test to 
resolve the dispute. For all we need do is to gather evidence to show whether an adoption 
of the rule of predesignation will yield "theories which are true, general, simple and 
explanatory".
Of course, no such evidence can be gathered. This is why Laudan is compelled to 
admit that this "150-year-old and on-going" dispute defies a means/ends solution. Laudan, 
however, tries to explain away the impossibility of establishing whether predesignation 
is an effective means to the goals of truth and simplicity by blaming it on the 
"complexity" of the relationship between methodological means and cognitive ends:
... no one has been able to show whether the rule of predesignation is the best, or 
even an appropriate, means for reaching those ends. That failure is entirely typical. 
There is no cognitive value and associated methodological rule which have been 
shown to stand in this one-to-one relation to each other. So far as we know, there 
may be equally viable methods for achieving all the cognitive goals usually 
associated with science. (Laudan, 1984, p.36)
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I think there is a better explanation for why the dispute over predesignation defies 
empirical solution: the dispute is not (and never was) about how effective predesignation 
is in bringing cognitive ends to realization. Empirical evidence has been unable to resolve 
the dispute not because the relationship between cognitive ends and means is too complex 
(as Laudan would have us believe); but because the dispute is in fact not an empirical one 
to start with.
Laudan, perhaps anticipating a point like this claims that we cannot exhibit the 
adequacy of methodological rules in complete isolation from a discussion of what is a real 
cognitive aim:
We have so far been assuming that all aims were on a par and that a methodol­
ogy’s task was simply to investigate, in an axiologically-neutral fashion, which 
means promote those aims. On this analysis, the construction of a methodology of 
science is the development of a set of methodological rules, conceived as hypo­
thetical imperatives, parasitic on a given set of cognitive or epistemic ends. Yet 
although this is an attractive conception of methodology, it scarcely addresses the 
full range of epistemic concerns germane to science. I suspect that we all believe 
that some cognitive ends are preferable to others. Methodology, narrowly 
conceived, is in no position to make those judgements, since it is restricted to the 
study of means and ends. We thus need to supplement methodology with an inves­
tigation into the legitimate ends of inquiry. That is, a theory of scientific progress 
needs an axiology of inquiry, whose function is to certify or de-certify certain 
proposed aims as legitimate. (Laudan, 1987a, p.29)
But what sort of considerations would make up these certifications or de-certifications? 
Laudan proposes two considerations: (i) that we should not adopt utopian goals, and (ii) 
that goals which fail to accord with the values implicit in the communal practices and 
judgements of science, (or those which fail to reconcile theory and practice), must be re­
jected.
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There are two sorts of problems with these considerations. First is the question of 
whether these considerations are strong enough to function as certification or de-certifica­
tion conditions in determining the appropriate aims of inquiry. Consider, for instance, the 
consideration that we should accept only those aims that are in accord with the values im­
plicit in communal practices and judgements of science. To adopt this as a certification 
rule is to presuppose that there is no disagreement about which values are truly implicit 
in science. But, of course, philosophers and scientist alike disagree about which values 
and aims are actually implicit in scientific practice! (They also hotly disagree about how 
to characterize those values that are explicitly adopted by scientists.) This is why we have 
realists, instrumentalists, pragmatists, etc, among both scientists and philosophers. Before 
this condition can function as a certification rule, we must first of all settle the issue of 
which aims are truly implicit in the communal practices of science (and questions about 
how to properly characterize explicit rules.) But this question is just as problematic as the 
question it is~supposed to help resolve!
Furthermore, even if we are able to identify and specify what these values are, 
there is the further question of whether these values are the ones we ought to promote. 
The mere fact that a value is actually the one adopted in scientific practice does not, in 
itself, imply that it is the one we ought to adopt. We would need some further argument 
in support of the adoption of such values or aims.
There is a more fundamental objection to Laudan’s no-utopians decertification 
condition. It is not at all obvious that there is any real problem with the adoption of 
utopian aims. Suppose one adopts an aim which one recognizes as utopian, but against 
which one rank theories in light of how best they strive to achieve this utopian aim.
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Although one would need to produce a criterion (or a set of criteria) against which theo­
ries can be measured to determine how close they bring us to this aim, the procedure itself 
is quite reasonable. Popper’s adoption of truth as the goal of science is somewhat similar 
to this. Truth, for Popper, is an ideally perfect property scientific theories ought to aim 
at. But the history of science teaches us that even our most successful theories may turn 
out to be, strictly speaking, false. Hence, Popper proposes verisimilitude as a measure 
against which the ’nearness* of scientific theories to truth can be measured. One can 
criticize the adequacy of the verisimilitude criterion, but the adoption of truth as an
- v
utopian aim of inquiry is quite rational.
The second sort of problem with Laudan’s certification or de-certification condi­
tions is about the manner in which Laudan argues for these conditions. What sorts of 
’reasons’ does Laudan give in support of these conditions? If Laudan is to be consistent 
in his claim that instrumental rationality is exhaustive of rationality, then the reasons he 
gives for accepting these certification conditions should be instrumental ones. But Laudan, 
in fact, gives epistemic, non-instrumental reasons in his advocacy for these considerations. 
For instance, he justifies the non-utopian condition as follows:
... it is at the very core of our conception of the rational and the reasonable that 
anything judged as satisfying that family of concepts must, in appropriate senses, 
be thought to be both possible and actionable. To adopt a goal with the feature 
that we can conceive of no action that would be apt to promote it, or a goal whose 
realization we could not recognize even if we had achieved it, is surely a mark of 
unreasonableness and irrationality. (Laudan, 1984, p. 5 1)6
'This shows that Laudan overlooks the possibility of using utopian aims as the limits towards which we 
strive, but which is fully recognized as unrealizable. That is, for Laudan, ideals as unrealizable ends have no role 
to play in epistemology and theory appraisal. There are, however, various examples of constructive uses of ideals 
in science. C S Peirce’s method of truth as the limit of inquiry is one good example.
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He also justifies the stipulation that scientists external and internal aims must cohere as 
follows:
On the pain of being charged with inconsistency ... the rational person, confronted 
with a conflict between the goals he proposes and the goals that appear to inform 
his actions, will attempt to bring the two into line with each other. (Laudan, 1984, 
p. 55)
Laudan has been smuggling after all! He initially claimed that to be rational, (and to give 
rational justifications in science), is to provide evidence which exhibit linkages between 
means and goals. This he calls a theory of methodology. He then concedes that instrumen­
tal justification lacks some important ingredients of rationality. What supplies the needed 
component to make the whole view adequate is called the theory of axiology. But the con­
straints axiology puts on methodology are not justified entirely instrumentally; they are 
justified epistemically. This is because in his justification of his two constraints on axiol­
ogy, he offers us considerations which are based on conceptual (not instrumental) analysis; 
considerations such as consistency (that explicit and implicit aims should cohere) are those 
brought into play in axiology. In short, rationality is a function of good, objective, time- 
independent reasons after all!
Of course Laudan rebuffs the charge of being non-naturalist about axiology. In his 
reply to a similar charge by Doppelt (1990), Laudan claims that:
Doppelt, having supposed that I thought methodology was purely empirical, 
compounds the interpretative crime by further imagining that I treat the aims of 
science as subject to only purely conceptual analysis.... It is true that I stress that 
inconsistent and incoherent aims ought to be rejected, but so should similarly af­
flicted rules and theories. But, I went to some lengths to argue in Science and Val­
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ues that the discovery of the non-realizability of certain aims ... is a powerful in­
strument driving the change of aims. By the same token, the most straightforward 
way of exhibiting the realizability of an aim is by showing that it has been 
realized, and that is a pretty straightforward empirical matter. (Laudan, 1990, p.51)
But this remark of Laudan’s in no way defuses the weight of the arguments I set out 
below. For the thrust of my point is that Laudan has being taking the adequacy and import 
of his realizability (or non-utopian) criterion too much for granted. Is this criterion 
straightforwardly administered as Laudan supposes? First, I challenged the use of the 
criterion itself. I argued that that an aim is utopian is not straightforwardly as bad as 
Laudan would have us believe. One may rationally adopt an utopian aim. Second, I 
argued that whether an aim has been realized or not is also not straightforwardly settled 
by empirical issues. Philosophers and scientists hotly disagree about whether a method has 
brought us to the realization of an aim. (Consider again the dispute concerning 
predesignation.) Even when scientists (and philosophers) do adopt the same means and 
goals, deciding whether their goals have been realized is not so easily resolved by 
empirical considerations. "Exhibiting the realizability of an aim" is not "a pretty straight­
forward empirical matter" as Laudan would have us believe.
This suggests that even if we grant Laudan the claim that methodological rules can 
be naturalistically criticized, (i.e that evidence about the efficacy of means in bringing 
about cognitive ends sometimes count in favour of methodological rules), it would not 
follow that philosophy of science itself has been naturalized. Even in Laudan’s own 
analysis, rational evaluation in science is not completely natural; it is above all an epis­
temic affair. This is why the constraints axiology puts on methodology are themselves not 
naturalistic; they consist mainly of conceptual, epistemic, non-instrumental analysis.
1 3 6
Laudan’s normative naturalism 
One defect of Laudan’s treatment of cognitive ends, therefore, is that it is a half­
hearted naturalism. For although Laudan claims to provide a naturalistic account of the 
rationality of cognitive aims, in fact he does not. In his so-called "naturalistic" analysis 
of cognitive ends, Laudan offers considerations which are based on conceptual analysis 
and epistemic considerations. Hence, when it comes down to it, Laudan cannot do away 
with the "traditional" approach which maintains that rationality is a function of epistemic, 
eternal, objective considerations. The major defect of Laudan’s normative naturalism 
however is that even this half-hearted naturalism provides no viable account of scientific 
rationality and progress.
I would like to distinguish between the criticism I am advancing when I claim that 
Laudan’s naturalism is a half-hearted one, and the one Gerald Doppelt [1990] advances 
when he claims that Laudan’s normative naturalism is narrowly empirical. When Doppelt 
criticizes Laudan’s naturalism for being too narrowly empirical, his argument is that in 
his treatment of methodological means, Laudan is interested only in purely empirical 
issues. But in treating axiology, Doppelt insists that Laudan makes use of purely 
conceptual considerations.
Of course Doppelt’s contrast between a purely empirical methodology and a purely 
conceptual axiology misrepresents Laudan’s view. Indeed, Laudan is very clear on the 
point that conceptual considerations play important roles in methodology as well:
I am not claiming that the theory of methodology is a wholly empirical activity, 
any more than I would that theoretical physics was a wholly empirical activity. 
Both make extensive use of conceptual analysis as well as empirical results. But 
I do hold that methodology can be and should be as empirical as the natural 
sciences whose results it draws on. (Laudan, 1987b, p.231)
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The problem I raise is not that of whether methodology is purely empirical. My concern 
is with whether axiology is as empirical as methodology in Laudan* s naturalism. What 
I have argued is that in his analysis of the adequacy of axiology, the only viable 
considerations Laudan gives are epistemic, non-instrumental ones. But Laudan himself 
concedes that a theory of methodology cannot do without a theory of axiology; "... the 
construction of a methodology of science is ... parasitic on a given set of cognitive ... 
ends". (Laudan, 1987b, p.29) If the constraints axiology places on methodology are all 
non-instrumental ones, (and I have shown below that they are) then to claim that "good 
reasons are instrumental reasons: there is no other sort" (Laudan, 1990, p.320) is half­
hearted.
6. WHY NORMATIVE NATURALISM FAILS TO PROVIDE A RATIONAL 
EXPLANATION OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
The question I address in this section is the following: does Laudan’s reticulational model 
of scientific rationality (and its associated normative naturalism) provide an adequate 
explanation of progress (and rationality) in science?
Although just like Popper and Lakatos, Laudan (1977) initially advocated the 
"rationalist" view of explanation in science, he (1984-to date) has made some emendations 
to the type of explanations he now seeks. As he puts it:
[Although] methodology has an important role to play in explaining some striking 
features about the history of science ... it has nothing to do with exhibiting or 
explicating the rationality of past science. What does require explanation is the fact 
that science has been so surprisingly successful at producing the epistemic goods. 
We take science seriously because it has promoted ends which we find cognitively 
important. More than that, it has become progressively more successful as time
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goes by. If you ask, "Successful according to whom?" or "Progressive according 
to what standards?" the answer, of course, is: successful by our lights; progressive 
according to our standards. Science in our time is better (by our lights of course) 
than it was 100 years ago, and the science of that time represented progress (again 
by our lights) compared with its state a century ago". (Laudan, 1987a, p. 28)
In fact, the article from which this quotation is taken is titled "Progress or Rationality? 
The prospects for Normative Naturalism." And in this article, there is a section titled: 
"Progress not Rationality".
But if the only judgement we can give is that ’our lights* adjudge themselves 
better, are we left with anything other than outright relativism? The problem is that of 
whether one can give any viable account of scientific progress without the assessment of 
past scientists* theory choices as rational or irrational. For even if one is not directly 
concerned with "exhibiting or explicating the rationality of past scientists" choices, the 
issue of rationality still arises. This is because the status and nature of our explanations 
of progress and success should exhibit how new theories and methods are accepted in 
favour of old ones on the basis of good reasons. An acceptance of the correct (or the 
better) theory (or method) for bad or irrational reasons would not constitute progress in 
science. That is, we need to show that explanations of what constitute progress and 
success are justified in the sense that they are based on good objective reasons. An 
explanation of progress which violates the dictates of reason, or which is subjective, 
would not be rationally acceptable; nor would it amount to scientific progress. Rational 
change is a prerequisite for judgements of progress. Hence, even if Laudan is not 
interested in explaining past choices of scientists as rational or irrational, the problem of 
rationality can still be raised in this sense.
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Laudan evidently believes that his position does not commit him to relativism. Just 
like the Kuhnians, Laudan allows radical change in all aspects of scientific commitment: 
facts, methods and theories. And as we have seen, Laudan criticizes Kuhn and the 
Kuhnians for their espousal of relativistic views. Doesn’t Laudan fall into the same kind 
of relativism if all we can say is that "science in our time is better (by our lights of 
course) than it was 100 years ago"? (Laudan, 1987, p.28) (A judgement which Kuhn 
would surely readily endorse.)
This claim of Laudan’s obviously commits him to the view that there are no 
standards of justification which transcend the boundaries of time-dependent "lights":
The argument is straightforward: to the extent that scientists of the past had aims 
and background beliefs different from ours, then the rationality of their actions 
cannot be appropriately determined by asking whether they adopted strategies 
intended to realize our aims. ... It would be appropriate to use our methods to 
assess the rationality of past scientists only if their cognitive utilities were identical 
to ours, and only if their background beliefs were substantially the same as ours. 
(Laudan 1987a, p.21)
But "lights" or standards of evaluation are not, descriptively speaking, uniform— even at 
a given period. People nowadays believe all sorts of strange things. The creationist, for 
instance, believes that no theory of the origin of the universe and its present inhabitants 
can be true or adequate unless it is consistent with the ’literal truth* of Genesis. They have 
produced lots of books which assert that the natural world was created by God, and they 
vehemently denounce Darwinism. According to the light (or research tradition) of the 
creationist, nature bespeaks God’s hand, and Darwinism is completely false. Given the 
aims of the creationist, (i.e. producing theories that are consistent with Genesis),
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Creationism is obviously better and preferable to Darwinism (according to the lights of 
the Creationist). If Laudan, just like Kuhn, claims that in theory appraisal, all we can do 
is evaluate in terms of standards within "our light", then surely he cannot deliver the 
judgement that Darwinism is objectively better than Creationism. If, on the other hand, 
Laudan allows us to say that "our lights" are in fact those of the scientific elite and that 
they are preferable to those of current pseudo-science, why does he rule out the possibility 
of assessing the choices of past scientists by our current standards?
The problem with Creationism vs. Darwinism can be generalized. If all we can do 
is to relativize evaluations and judgements of rationality to specific standards of 
evaluations, then when confronted with radically different standards that fully satisfy their 
own internal set of requirements, (irrespective of whether one set is no longer accepted 
by contemporary scientists), surely reticulation would be unable to assess whether one set 
of criteria is objectively superior to the other. Indeed, if assessment in terms of internal 
criteria isjdl.w e have, reticulation ought to be committed to the view that, as long as 
respective evaluations fully satisfy the internal requirements of their standards, then they 
are equally valid views of the world! Surely, this is an extreme form of relativism.
Laudan can of course avoid relativism if he can supply an answer to the question 
of why it would be objectively correct to prefer one of two rivai theories as the better 
theory. If the answer he would give is to work, it would have to make evaluations across 
lights. Indeed, some of Laudan’s considerations function as such. For instance, his 
requirement that aims be realizable, and the requirement that implicit and explicit aims 
cohere. The problem, however, is that these requirements are not relativised to any 
specific epoch; they are criteria of evaluation which cut across research programmes.
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Indeed it seems to me that it is precisely because these considerations are not 
localized to specific historical epochs (i.e. contrary to Laudan’s explicit claims, they 
function as invariant aspects of his naturalist account of scientific rationality and 
methodology) that Laudan’s normative naturalism gives the (false) impression of avoiding 
the sort of relativism into which Kuhn and the holists fall. In so far as he avoids 
relativism, it is because he is in fact committed to (despite what he says elsewhere) cross- 
epoch standards such as the criterion of realizability.
Suppose we were to accept Laudan’s version of the no-invariant-methodology 
thesis at its face value. This ought to imply that the non-utopian requirement, and the 
requirement that implicit and explicit aims cohere are both subject to (possible) change 
as well. But are they? A close attention to Laudan’s own criticism of the hierarchical 
model for instance suggests that Laudan takes the condition of realizability to be an 
invariant. Suppose that the hierarchical modeller were to reject precisely these 
requirements (e.g. she accepts unrealizable aims), and develop her own rival axiological 
and methodological requirements (e.g. if she adopts fully recognized utopian aims as the 
limit of inquiry which we ought to strive to attain, but which, in fact we can never attain). 
Suppose further that the hierarchical modeller was fully able to satisfy her internal set of 
requirements. Then unless Laudan makes these two requirements of his invariant, he 
would have to claim that as long as long as the hierarchical modellers choices meet her 
internal requirements, they are acceptable. This however lands Laudan straight into the 
relativism he hoped to avoid.
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7. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this chapter I examined Laudan’s instrumentalist version of the no-invariant-methodol- 
ogy thesis. According to this view, methodological rules are hypothetical imperatives of 
the means/ends type. Laudan further maintains that no aspect of science (means, ends, and 
methodological rules included) is in principle immune to (possible) radical change. Lau­
dan, therefore, adopts a very strong version of the no-invariant-methodology thesis.
First, I argued against Laudan’s hypothetical construal of methodological rules on 
the ground that some core rules and principles of scientific theory appraisal are better 
formulated epistemically as categorical imperatives. Furthermore, I argued that Laudan’s 
instrumentalist approach to the justification and validation of methodological rules is 
deeply flawed because, contrary to Laudan’s belief, such an approach inevitably leads to 
relativism.
I further argued that an instrumentalist account of scientific change cannot give 
any viable explanation of the growth and progress of scientific knowledge. Had Laudan 
distinguished between foundational and substantive methodological rules, it could have 
been possible to overcome the problem of relativism. But this option is not open to 
Laudan; he explicitly claims that all methodological rules are hypothetical and substantive 
in the sense that their credibility is dependent upon empirical claims about the nature of 
this world.
Finally, I argued that normative naturalism initially appears to give a rational 
explanation of change in science only in so far as some of its tools of evaluation are 
implicitly assumed to be invariant. I specifically identified two such tools: the requirement 
that aims be non-utopian, and the requirement that implicit and explicit aims cohere.
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Despite the impression Laudan likes to give, he has not escaped (because he cannot 
escape) the fundamental dilemma: either all methodological standards are subject to 
change and so there is no rational explanation of change, or at least some such standards 
are sacrosanct, "above the fray".
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CHAPTER 4
The 19th Century Revolution in Optics
1. LAUDAN ON THE METHODOLOGY OF LIGHT 
By the end of the third decade of the 19th century, a revolution in scientific opinion about 
the nature of light had (to all intents and purposes) been completed. The revolution 
involved a change from "the" Newtonian theory of light (also known as the particle, 
emission, projectile, or corpuscular theory), to "the" wave (or undulatory) theory of light.1 
The central assumptions of the corpuscular theory can be regarded as the following:
(a) that light is made up of tiny particles (called corpuscles) emitted from 
luminous objects; and
(b) that these particles obey the usual (Newtonian) laws of particle physics.
‘Of course in actual fact there was no such thing as the corpuscular theory of light, or the wave theory of 
light. Rather there were two series of theories which had various specific theories within them that shared the 
respective central assumptions to be outlined. These central assumptions should therefore be regarded as the "hard 
cores" of the respective series of theories. I adopt a somewhat monolithic construal of both series of theories 
simply because I am primarily interested in the methodological issues raised by the 19th century revolution in 
optics. I should add, however, that despite the variations in the specific versions of both series of theories, there 
is no doubt that it was a Newtonian corpuscular theory that was widely accepted in the 18th century; nor is there 
any doubt that some version or the other of the Young-Fresnel wave theory became dominant by the end of the 
1830s.
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And the central assumptions of the wave theory can be taken to be:
(a) that light is a kind of disturbance in an all-pervading elastic medium called 
the ether, and
(b) that differences in the colour of light depend on the frequency of vibrations 
excited by luminous objects in the ether.
The scientific revolution that occurred during the 19th century at least entailed a change 
from the central assumptions of the corpuscular theory to those of the Young-Fresnel 
wave theory.
But Laudan and several philosophers and historians of science have claimed that 
the revolution was accompanied by an underlying and deeper change in the 
methodological and epistemological requirements of science:
... the half century following publication of the Principia was marked by a 
growing antipathy to hypotheses and speculation. ... the refrains [were] ... 
speculative systems and hypotheses were otiose; scientific theories had to deal 
exclusively with entities that could be observed or measured. (Laudan, 1981b, 
p. 158)
There remain many philosophers of science and theorists of scientific change who, 
though granting that substantive theories about the world do change, nonetheless 
adhere to the view that the canons of legitimate scientific inference are perennial 
and unchanging. (Included here are thinkers as diverse as Popper* Nagel, Carnap, 
Hesse, and Lakatos, among others.) The case we have before us stands as a vivid 
refutation of their claims that scientific standards of theory evaluation are 
immutable. It simply cannot be denied that, prior to the early nineteenth century, 
the ability of a theory to make successful, surprising predictions was no sine qua 
non for its acceptability; nor can it be denied that by the turn of the twentieth
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century, the requirement of predictivity was a commonplace in both scientific and 
philosophical circles. (Laudan, 1981b, p. 181)
According to this account, not only was there a change from the Newtonian inductivist 
methodological requirements to the method of hypothesis (or the hypothetico-deductive 
methodology), the change there was, was a very radical one. Newtonian inductive 
methodology, it is claimed, banned the use of hypotheses in science, and it emphasized 
the requirement that the claims of science must be based on inductions from the
i
phenomena. But proponents of the wave theory were committed to the method of 
hypothesis:
The epistemology prevalent in the second half of the 18th century was altogether 
incompatible with the various ether theories that emerged in the natural philosophy 
of that period. ... Some of the early proponents of ethereal explanations chose to 
abandon or modify that prevalent epistemology so as to provide a philosophical 
justification for theorizing about ether. ..[T]he emergence of the optical ether in 
the early 19th century prompted a ... radical critique of classical epistemology, a 
critique that produced some highly innovative and historically influential 
methodological ideas. (Laudan, 1981b, p. 157-158, my emphasis)
Concerning the initial opposition to the wave theory by Scottish natural philosophers, he 
also claims that:
The primary reason for the opposition to the ether theories was the widespread 
acceptance among Scottish philosophers and scientists of a trenchant inductivism 
and empiricism, according to which speculative hypotheses and imperceptible 
entities were inconsistent with the search for reliable science. (Laudan, 1981b, 
p. 170).
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Laudan is not alone in the attribution of a change in methodology to this 
revolution. The historian Geoffrey Cantor also insists that while corpuscularians "followed 
the [eighteenth-century] common-sense philosophers in considering induction to be the 
proper scientific method" (Cantor, 1975, p .I l l) ,  "supporters of the wave theory, unlike 
its objectors, championed the method of hypothesis". (Cantor, 1975, p.114)2:
Although in the eighteenth century, almost every British natural philosopher 
accepted without question the corpuscular interpretation of Newton’s writings on 
optics, by the 1830s most British philosophers had rejected Newton’s corpuscular 
theory in favour of the wave theory of light. Intimately bound up with this 
scientific "revolution" in optical theory was a change in scientific methodology: 
the replacement of the method of induction by the method of hypothesis. (Cantor, 
1975, p. 109)
In this chapter, I shall argue that contrary to Laudan’s (and Cantor’s) claim, no radical 
methodological change accompanied the change in substantive theoretical assumptions. 
The real methodological debate between corpuscularians and wave theorists, Ijshall argue, 
concerned the point at which it became rational to abandon a theory faced with 
accumulating empirical and theoretical difficulties. I start by taking a closer look at 
Laudan’s analysis of this historical episode.
There is, of course, an old distinction between implicit and explicit methodology: 
a distinction we called upon before and which is again vital here. A scientist’s explicit 
methodology is what she actually says and writes in her reflections on her scientific
2One significant difference between Laudan’s and Cantor’s treatment of the optical revolution is that while 
Laudan compares the methodology of 19th century wave theorists with that of 18th century corpuscularians, 
Cantor (in his 1975 and 1983) compares the debate between 19th century wave and corpuscular theorists.
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method, while implicit methodology is exhibited by her practices and choices. A 
scientist’s implicit and explicit methodology may either cohere or diverge. That is, the 
methodology to which a scientist is really committed could be very different from what 
she describes as her methodology. Most philosophers and historians, for instance, see 
Newton as the best example of a great scientist whose explicit pronouncements about the 
methods he adopted are completely at odds with his implicit, real, methodology. (After 
all, Newton, it is often said, explicitly claimed that he had no use for hypotheses in 
experimental philosophy yet his works are full of them.)3
Unfortunately, Laudan is not very clear on whether the radical change he claims 
occurred was merely in explicit methodology, or in both explicit and implicit 
methodology. Is the change Laudan describes in his account of this episode a mere change 
in the way scientists were likely to describe their methodological requirements, or was 
there also a change is implicit, real, methodology? Were proponents of the corpuscular
theory genuinely committed to a Newtonian inductive methodology, while wave theorists..........
were genuinely committed to the method of hypothesis?
Of course it would hardly be surprising if a change occurred in the sorts of explicit 
methodological pronouncements scientists were likely to make alongside change in theory.
No doubt some 18th century scientists at least had convinced themselves that the ^
3I should point out immediately that I think this popular perception of Newton is unjustified. For although 
there is absolutely no doubt that Newton held hypotheses in low esteem, Newton was also very careful in his 
definition of hypothesis: "Whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an hypothesis; and 
hypotheses whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in 
experimental philosophy. In this philosophy, particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and 
afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetrability, the mobility, and the impulsive 
forces of bodies, and the laws of motion, and of gravitation, were discovered". (Principia, p.547)
It should also be noted that Laudan docs not claim that Newton himself was a strict inductivist who 
rejected observation transcendent hypotheses.
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Newtonian theory of light involved no hypothetical elements; while the all-pervading ether 
involved in the wave theory was more obviously hypothetical. But the issue of the 
rationality of science concerns implicit methodology— have scientists implicitly always 
judged theories by the same standards? Is Laudan really claiming that 18th century 
scientists would not have preferred a truly hypothetical but predictively successful theory 
even if one were available? And that only in the 19th century did predictive success 
become a really operative criterion?
I believe that Laudan is simply confused on this issue. A good deal of what he 
says is addressed only to the weak, unsurprising claim of a change at the explicit level:
The chief source for this shift in the explicit attitudes of philosophers and 
scientists towards the legitimacy of postulating unseen entities was a prior shift in 
the character of physical theory itself. Specifically, by the 1830s scientists found 
themselves working with theories that, as they eventually discovered, violated their 
own explicit characterizations of the aims of theorizing. Confounded by that 
discovery, they eventually reappraised their explicit axiology. (Laudan, 1984, p.56)
But in the very last footnote of an article in which Laudan advances his claim of radical 
methodological change, Laudan also seems to imply that the only change thefe was was 
a change in explicit methodology:
A minor caveat is in order ... Several philosophers and scientists before the 
nineteenth century (e.g., Boyle, Huygens, and Liebniz) had claimed that the ability 
of a theory to make surprising predictions was an epistemic advantage. But prior 
to the 1820s no systematic arguments had been made to the effect that such an 
ability was a sine qua non for an adequate theory. (Laudan, 1981b, p.185, fn.92)
Surely if the methodological change that occurred in the 1820s was merely in the ability
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of scientists to spell out the requirement of independent predictive support, then this 
historical episode provides no real support to the no-invariant-methodology thesis. 
Evidence of change in explicit methodological requirements alone do not provide any 
viable challenge to the traditional approach to scientific methodology because when 
traditional philosophers like Popper and Lakatos spoke of a fixed set of methodological 
requirements, their object of concern was not what scientists actually said (or wrote down) 
in their reflections on methodology. Their object of concern was a much more restricted 
set of norms which is revealed or exhibited by the actual choices and practices of 
scientists in situations of theory choice.
If Laudan’s claim is merely that there was a change in explicit methodology, then 
the traditionalist could readily concede such radical change. The traditionalist would 
however insist that whatever changes might have occurred in explicit methodology have 
all been governed by implicit methodology which is itself unchanging.
I hesitate, in-attributing a "change in explicit methodology view alone” to Laudan 
because he evidently believes that his analysis of this historical episode provides evidence 
against the traditional approach:
... many philosophers of science and theorists of scientific change ... adhere to the 
view that the canons of legitimate scientific inference are perennial and 
unchanging. (Included here are thinkers as diverse as Popper, Nagel, Carnap, 
Hesse, and Lakatos, among others.) The case we have before us stands as a vivid 
refutation of their claim that scientific standards of theory evaluation are 
immutable. (Laudan, 1981b, p. 181)
And Laudan also claims that Newtonian inductivism "was altogether incompatible with
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the various ether theories" of the 18th century. Because of these claims of Laudan’s 
(despite the suggestions of the caveat below), I shall take Laudan’s fu ll view to be that 
there were changes in both implicit and explicit methodology. In Laudan’s treatment of 
the 19th century revolution in optics, therefore, proponents of the corpuscular theoiy did 
not merely claim to be strict empiricists. Strict empiricism was in fact the methodology 
they actually practised. Conversely, wave theorists were committed both in practice and 
in writing to the method of hypothesis.
Laudan divides his analysis of this historical episode into two phases; 1740-1810 
as the first phase, and 1820-1840 as the second phase. Laudan claims that during the first 
phase several thinkers developed theories which postulated the existence of an invisible 
ether, thereby contradicting the strictures of Newtonian inductivism. There was a strain 
or incompatibility between the developing ether theories and the methodological 
requirements of Newtonianism which had been in force since the triumph of Newton’s 
ideas. ----------- ------ .... ..
According to Laudan, there were two types of responses to this tension between 
Newtonian inductivism and ethereal explanations. Philosophers like Thomas Reid rejected 
ethereal explanations by allowing their inductive methodological strictures to take priority, 
while others like David Hartley and GeorgoLesage developed an alternative methodology 
to legitimize ethereal explanations.
Hartley, for instance, was convinced of the explanatory importance of the ether. 
He maintained that the ether explained a broad range of phenomena: ethereal explanations 
were employed in accounting for the phenomena of heat, gravity, electricity, and 
magnetism. But most important for Hartley was the use of the ether in explanations of
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psychological problems concerning perception, memory, habit, etc. Hartley assumed that 
the brain and the nervous system are both filled with the ether, and that psychological 
functions were the result of vibrations within the ether.
Hartley realised that he could not deduce the existence of the ether from the 
phenomena. He was also aware that there was no direct empirical evidence for the 
existence of the ether. Hence he had to supply an epistemological justification for his 
ethereal explanations by developing a new method of post hoc confirmation in which:
... broad explanatory scope compensated for the unobservability of its explanatory 
agents and mitigated its failure to exhibit a traditional inductive warrant (Laudan, 
1981b, p. 161)
Hartley’s suggestion was that the method of inductivism is not the only route to 
knowledge. He therefore advocated the method o f hypothesis as a complementary method 
to Newtonian inductivism. This method, according to Laudan, has,the following structure:
Here is a phenomena x.
But i f  there were an ether, then x.
(Probably) there is an ether. (Laudan, 1981, p. 161)
And Laudan quotes Hartley as follows:
Let us suppose the existence of the aether, with these its properties, to be destitute 
of all direct evidence, still, i f  it serves to explain a great variety o f phenomena, 
it will have an indirect evidence in its favour by this means. (Quoted in Laudan, 
1981, p. 161)
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Laudan insists that Hartley’s version of the method of hypothesis is just as stated below. 
That is, the method justifies the acceptance of any theory in as much as an assumption 
of that theory would explain a wide variety of phenomena:
... Hartley merely insisted that if a hypothesis is compatible with all the available 
evidence, then that hypothesis ’has all the same evidence in its favour, ...* In a 
nutshell, Hartley’s method of hypothesis boils down to the claim that a hypothesis 
warrants belief if it has a large number of known positive instances .. . .  (Laudan, 
1981, p. 163)
According to Laudan, although Hartley emphasized that his method of hypothesis does 
not, and cannot, guarantee the truth of the hypotheses it sanctions, the method was still 
rejected by Newtonian inductivists. The primary objection to Hartley’s methodology was 
simply that it violated Newtonian inductivism by postulating unobservables.
Laudan discusses Reid’s criticism of Hartley’s method of hypothesis. In Laudan’s 
view, "one of the foundation stones of Reid’s philosophical system and the central attitude 
he adopted from Newton, was his suspicion of, bordering on contempt for, any theories, 
hypotheses, or conjectures which are not induced from experimental observations". 
(Laudan, 1981, p.89) Given Reid’s (and inductivists*) commitment to an extreme 
empiricist version of Newtonianism, he simply could not countenance the method of 
hypothesis.
But there was a further objection to the method of hypothesis. This objection was 
that, at best, the method can only show that a conjectured theory ’saves the phenomena’. 
But if suitable ad hoc modifications are made, various rival theories could all be adjusted 
to accommodate the phenomena:
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Not surprisingly, this epistemology carried little weight with most of Hartley’s 
inductivist contemporaries. As they could point out, there were many rival systems 
of natural philosophy that - after suitable ad hoc modifications - could be 
reconciled with all known phenomena. ... ’saving the phenomena was an 
insufficient warrant for accepting a theory. (Laudan, 1981b, p. 163)
Although the 18th century defence of the method of hypothesis by Hartley was 
unsuccessful, Laudan insists that the development of the wave theory of light in the early 
19th century by people such as Young and Fresnel brought about a new version of the 
method of hypothesis. It was this new version of the method of hypothesis that eventually 
forced the radical rejection of Newtonian inductivism. As already mentioned, one major 
objection to the 18th century version of the method of hypothesis was that its proponents 
could not provide any adequate criterion for distinguishing genuine hypothesis from ad 
hoc ones. Hartley and his 18th century proponents of the method of hypothesis regarded 
all consequences of theories as evidence for theories. 19th century proponents of the wave 
theory, however, developed a new method of theory appraisal in which theories that go 
beyond the phenomena are accepted only if they have independent predictive warrant.
The condition of independent warrant requires a theory either to successfully 
predict new facts, or to explain phenomena it was not originally designed to explain. So 
unlike Hartley’s version of the method, ’saving the phenomena* was not enough:
In brief, this criterion, which was nowhere prominent in the late 18th-century 
debates about the methodological credentials of subtle fluid, amounts to the claim 
that an hypothesis which successfully predicts future states of affairs (particularly 
if those states are ’surprising’ ones), or which explains phenomena it was not 
specifically designed to explain, acquires thereby a legitimacy which hypotheses 
which merely explain what is already known generally do not possess. (Laudan, 
1981b, p.173)
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In Laudan’s view, the requirement that a hypothesis yield successful surprising 
predictions, and the requirement that it ought to explain facts it was not originally 
designed to explain, were both read off, the obvious success of the wave theory.
For the requirement that a hypothesis, in order to be successful, make surprising 
predictions, and the requirement that it explain various previously known phenomena were 
precisely those features that led to the widespread acceptance of the wave theory during 
the 19th century.
The key points involved in Laudan’s reconstruction of this historical episode can 
be stated as follows:
(1) All the historical evidence Laudan has merely support the view that in their 
explicit methodology, 18th century defenders of the corpuscular theory upheld a 
version of Newtonian inductivism which rejected hypothesis. But since: (a) 
evidence of change in explicit methodology alone provides no viable challenge to 
the traditional view of an invariant set of methodological criteria; and (b) Laudan 
claims that this historical episode "refutes" the traditional approach to 
methodology, I will take it that Laudan’s full view implies the following: 18th 
century defenders of the corpuscular theory of light genuinely accepted (and 
adopted in practice) an empiricist version of Newtonian inductivism which banned 
all theoretical entities.
(2) Because of the unobservability of the ether, 18th century proponents of ethereal 
theories such as Hartley were forced to develop an alternative methodology—
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namely the method of hypothesis- to legitimize their theories. But because the 
18th century versions of the method of hypothesis legitimized all spurious and ad 
hoc hypotheses in so far as they ’save the phenomena*, the method of hypothesis 
and its then associated ethereal theories were rejected.
(3) Because of the apparent explanatory superiority of the wave theory over the 
corpuscular theory (the wave theory explained all the optical phenomena the 
corpuscular theory could explain, and it also explained phenomena such as 
interference which the corpuscular theory could not explain), 19th century 
proponents of the wave theory were also forced to modify the method of 
hypothesis to which they were committed. Specifically, they added the condition 
of independent predictive warrant.
(4).— -Newtonian inductivism was not merely different from the new version of the 
method of hypothesis, "the epistemology prevalent in the second half of the 18th 
century was altogether incompatible with the various ethereal theories which 
emerged in the natural philosophy of that period ... [and] the emergence of the 
optical ether in the early 19th century prompted a more radical critique of classical 
epistemology, a critique which produced some innovative historically influential 
methodological ideas". (Laudan, 1981b, pp.157-158) The most significant o f these 
innovative methodological ideas was the requirement o f independent predictive 
warrant. Indeed, "no epistemologist in the 18th century would have been 
impressed [by the condition of independent predictive warrant], for the notion of
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independent support... is very much a product of the early-19th century." (Laudan, 
1981, p.175)
In the remainder of this chapter, I will challenge Laudan’s reconstruction of this historical 
episode. Specifically, I will argue that Laudan is mistaken in claiming that the condition 
of independent predictive warrant is "a product of the early-19th century". Natural 
philosophers, including proponents of the corpuscular theory, have long recognized the 
virtue of the condition of independent predictive warrant. I will discuss at length the 
methodological writings of two defenders of the corpuscular theory in support of my 
claim. The first is David Brewster, whom Laudan does not discuss. The second natural 
philosopher is however Thomas Reid, Laudan’s chief example of a strict inductivist. I will 
argue that Laudan is very selective in his presentation of Reid’s methodological 
commitments. Reid was not as hard-headed about hypotheses as Laudan makes him. 
Moreover, Reid certainly accepted a criterion of independent warrant which is similar in 
structure to the condition of independent predictive warrant.
2. DAVID BREWSTER4
Brewster was a 19th century defender of the particulate theory of light who did not accept 
the wave theory of light:
^The treatment of Brewster given in this section follows on, and significantly modifies, that given by John 
Worrall (1990a)
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I have not yet ventured to kneel at the new shrine [that is, the shrine of the wave 
theory] and I must acknowledge myself subject to the national weakness which 
urges me to venerate, and even to support, the falling temple in which Newton 
once worshipped. (Brewster 1833, p.361).
Laudan maintains that coipuscularians were all inductivists who rejected the method of 
hypothesis and its condition of independent predictive warrant. Since Brewster was a 
corpuscularian who did not accept the wave theory of light, does this imply that he was 
a strict empiricist who rejected the method of hypothesis as Laudan would have us 
believe?
The first major problem for Laudan is that Brewster did not reject the method of 
hypothesis tout court. He took a very modest attitude to the method because he merely 
rejected it as a method for inferring the truth o f  theories. Indeed Brewster explicitly 
claims that:
Twenty theories, indeed, may all enjoy the merit of accounting for a certain class 
of facts, provided that they have all contrived to interweave some common 
principle to which these facts are actually related. (Brewster, 1833b, p.360)
Brewster was also careful not to throw the baby out with the bath water he did not claim 
that because a hypothesis can be contrived to suit the evidence, all hypotheses must be 
rejected. Because of this, he claimed that:
I have long been an admirer of the singular power of this theory [i.e. the wave 
theory] to explain some of the most perplexing phenomena of optics; and the 
recent discoveries of Professor Airy, Mr. Hamilton and Mr. Lloyd afford the finest 
examples of the influence in predicting new phenomena. (Brewster, 1833, p.360)
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In fact Brewster went as far as conceding that the predictive success of the wave theory 
indicates that:
... it must contain amongst its assumptions (though as a physical theory it may still 
be false) some principle which is inherent in, and inseparable from, the real 
producing cause of the phenomena of ligh t... . (Brewster, 1838, p.306)
But Brewster went on to explain why he rejected the wave theory. One of his reasons for 
rejecting the theory was due precisely to his cautious attitude to the method of hypothesis. 
Brewster, just like his contemporary wave theorists, recognized the fact that a theory, like 
the wave theory, which explained a wide range of phenomena may be false as a physical 
theory: "The power of a theory, however, to explain and predict facts, is by no means 
a test of its truth ...". (Brewster, 1833, p.360)
Brewster justified his disbelief in the physical truth of the wave theory by pointing 
out that the theory fails to give any viable explanation of the phenomena of dispersion and 
selective absorbtion. Indeed, just like wave theorists, Brewster acknowledged the 
significance of predictive success. But unlike the wave theorists, he refused to infer the 
truth of a predictively successful theory precisely because he believed that such a theory 
could nonetheless be false. Truth, Brewster believed, is underdetermined by predictive 
success.
There should be no controversy over Brewster’s recognition of the virtues of the 
method of hypothesis. For Brewster recognized the difference between the 18th century 
usage of the method (i.e. the usage of Hartley and Lesage in which all that was required 
of a hypothesis was the ability to ’save the phenomena’-  even if in an ad hoc manner),
1 6 0
Optics and Method
and the 19th century usage (in which, according to Laudan, the condition of independent 
predictive warrant was adopted). In his already quoted 1838 review of Comte’s Course 
o f Positive Philosophy, Brewster was very clear about the condition of independent 
predictive warrant:
... when he who discovers new facts, detects also their relation to other 
phenomena, and when he is so fortunate as to determine the laws which they 
follow, and to predict from these laws phenomena or results previously unknown. 
he entitles himself to a high place among the aristocracy o f knowledge. (Brewster, 
1838, p.272, my emphasis)
As already mentioned, Brewster accepted that the wave theory was empirically successful 
in the sense that it predicted previously unknown phenomena, and he recognized that the 
theory was able to explain numerous previously known facts. But unlike his wave theory 
contemporaries, he was not convinced of the physical existence of "an ether, invisible, 
intangible, imponderable, inseparable from all bodies, and extending from our own eye 
to the remotest verge of the starry heavens." (Brewster, 1838, p.306)
The first major problem for Laudan is therefore that the condition of independent 
predictive warrant which he claims is exclusive to wave theorists is in fact not exclusive 
to them. Corpuscularians like Brewster also accepted this condition, hence the radical 
change in methodological requirements Laudan identifies in this historical episode is non­
existent.
The second major problem for Laudan is that Brewster in fact explicitly claims 
that unobservable hypothesis and entities perform useful roles in experimental philosophy. 
Again in his review of Comte, Brewster is very clear on his stance about hypotheses.
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First, Brewster agrees with Comte’s rejection of "unrestrained" speculative hypotheses:
Previous to the sixteenth century the active explorers of science were few in 
number, and even these few had scarcely thrown off the incubus of scholastic 
philosophy. Speculation unrestrained and licentious threw its blighting sirocco over 
the green pastures of knowledge, and prejudice and mysticism involved them in 
their exhalations. ... Those who are thus blind to the force of physical truth, are 
not likely to discover the errors which their own minds create and cherish. 
(Brewster, 1838, pp.272-273)
But Brewster went on to claim that although "a class of speculators have no position in 
the lists of science, and they deserve none ... in thus denouncing their labours, we must 
carefully distinguish them from a higher order of theorists, whose scientific acquirements 
are undoubted ..." (Brewster, 1838, p.273). Indeed Brewster criticized Comte for the 
"grave error" of not distinguishing between the justified and unjustified uses of 
hypotheses:
... we are strongly impressed with the conviction that our author [i.e. Comte] is but 
imperfectly acquainted with the recent acquisitions which science has made; and 
this opinion is confirmed by his repeated denunciations of the undulatory theory 
as an assumption utterly fantastical, and calculated only to check the progress of 
legitimate discovery. This grave error ... appears to originate from two causes - 
from his excluding all hypotheses as unscientific ... and from his not being aware 
of the actual power of the undulatory theoiy in predicting as well as in explaining 
phenomena. (Brewster, 1838, pp.305-306)
And Brewster went on to criticize Comte for failing to recognize three legitimate uses of 
hypotheses:
The hypotheses which our author condemns may be arranged in three classes -
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those which serve no other puipose than that of an artificial memory to groupe and 
recall insulated facts; those which afford an explanation of facts otherwise 
unintelligible without making any assumption incompatible with our positive 
knowledge; and those to which this condition unite the still more important one 
of being able to predict new facts, and extend by real discoveries the bounds of 
our positive knowledge. The first of these classes of hypotheses is a veiy humble 
one; but even in its simple mnemonic character we are not disposed to reject its 
aid. Though it can neither explain nor predict phenomena, it may direct the 
enquirer, and even lead to discovery. ... The same observations are applicable a 
fortiori to the second class of hypotheses, and still more emphatically to the third, 
which claims the transcendent merit of predicting new phenomena. (Brewster, 
1838, p.306)
Most significantly of all for Laudan’s treatment of this historical episode is that Brewster 
also explicitly claims that the wave theory belongs to his third class of justified 
hypotheses, and that it "is a valuable instrument of discovery":
... Though the undulatory theory does assume an ether, invisible, intangible, 
imponderable, inseparable from all bodies, and extending from our eye to the 
remotest verge of the starry heavens; yet, as the expounder of phenomena the most 
complex, and otherwise inexplicable; and as the predicter of highly important 
facts, it must contain among its assumptions (though, as a physical theory, it may 
still be false) some principle which is inherent in, and inseparable from, the real 
producing cause of the phenomena of light; and to this extent it is worthy of our 
adoption as a valuable instrument of discovery, and of our admiration as an 
ingenious and fertile philosophical conception. (Brewster, 1838, p.306)
Brewster’s full recognition and acceptance of the condition of independent 
predictive warrant hints at one fundamental problem with Laudan’s reticulational analysis 
of this 19th century revolution. The problem is that Laudan constantly shifts between 
changes in explicit and implicit methodology. The evidence of radical change Laudan has 
is all evidence of change in explicit methodology. But he wants to argue for the stronger 
claim that there was a radical change in the real, implicit, revealed methodology.
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Unfortunately if methodology is taken at the implicit level, at the level of the real 
principles which governed scientists’ actual choices, there is no evidence of a radical 
change which accompanied the change in substantive ideas.
Laudan’s claim "that the epistemology prevalent in the second half of the 18th 
century was altogether incompatible with the various ethereal theories which emerged in 
the natural philosophy of that period" is therefore unjustified. The two most significant 
differences Laudan identifies in these supposedly incompatible methodologies (namely, 
(a) the criterion of independent predictive warrant, and (b) the role of unobservable 
hypotheses) are not exclusive to wave theorists.
Of course Laudan could claim that Brewster was an exception. Brewster, Laudan 
could claim, simply failed to recognize that his acceptance of hypotheses and predictive 
success threatened the corpuscular theory. To close this avenue of retreat for Laudan, I 
will proceed to argue that Thomas Reid, whom Laudan has written extensively on as a 
bona fide Newtonian inductivist (hence, according to Laudan, a strict empiricist), is also 
not as hard-headed as Laudan makes him.5
5As already mentioned (fn.2 below) Laudan compares the methodology of 18th century coipuscularians with 
that of 19th century wave theorists. But Laudan also claims that the condition of independent predictive warrant 
"is a product of the early-19th century" (Laudan, 1981, p.130). So Laudan could object to my treatment of any 
{l9th century corpuscularian by claiming that, just like their wave theory counterparts, they accepted the condition 
of independent predictive warrant. That is, Laudan could insist that only 18th century corpuscularians, but not 
19th century corpuscularians, adopted Newtonian inductivism. I do not think this move is open to Laudan. First, 
Laudan himself seems to imply that 19th century Newtonianism was incompatible with 19th century versions 
of the method of hypothesis. As already mentioned (fn.2 below) G.N. Cantor (who also claims that there was 
a radical change in methodology associated with the change from particles to waves) compares the methodology 
of 19th century corpuscularians with the methodology of 19lh century wave theorists. Laudan refer to Cantor’s 
discussion of this part of the historical episode approvingly in a footnote: "I shall not discuss the first 
methodological debate which the wave theory provoked, namely, that between Young and Brougham [the second 
being the debate between Mill and Whewcll]. I skip over it for two reasons: (1) it has already been investigated 
at length by G. Cantor in his "Henry Brougham and the Scottish methodological tradition",... (2) it represents 
a more vituperative but less substantive replay of the earlier ether debates I have discussed with Brougham 
playing Reid to Young’s Hartley". (Laudan, 1981b, p. 184, fn.64) In short, in Laudan’s view, 19th century 
corpuscularians such as Brougham and Brewster were very much strict Newtonian inductivists.
But we need not dally any longer on the question of whether Laudan is also committed to the view that
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3. THOMAS REID
According to Laudan, "one of the foundation stones of Reid’s philosophical system and 
the central attitude he adopted from Newton, was his suspicion of, bordering on contempt 
for, any theories, hypotheses, or conjectures which are not induced from experiments and 
observations". (Laudan, 1981a, p.89) In Laudan’s opinion, Reid’s inteipretation of 
Newton’s methodological requirement "amounts to the claim that any putative causal 
explanation (a) must be sufficient to explain the relevant appearances and (b) must 
postulate entities and mechanisms whose existence can be directly ascertained. ... What 
this amounts to is the claim that unobservable entities, because we can have no direct 
evidence of their existence, have no role to play in causal explanations. In Reid’s hands, 
Newton’s first rule of reasoning becomes a vehicle for excluding all theoretical entities 
from natural philosophy." (Laudan, 1981a, p.93)
We need to be clear about Laudan’s full claim. Laudan mentions a distinction 
between a discredited non-empirical use of hypotheses, and an empirical usage. In its non- 
empirical usage, an hypothesis is any conjecture or theory which either: (i) can not be 
falsified or refuted by any experiment or empirical fact, or which (ii) though falsifiable, 
(and perhaps has been falsified), is insulated from rejection by its proponents on ad hoc 
grounds. The chief examples of this sort of non-empirical hypotheses are Descartes* seven 
laws of motion and the vortex theory. Despite the fact that these hypotheses were 
incompatible with empirical evidence, Cartesians still defended the truth of these 
hypotheses on a priori grounds. Indeed, Cartesians regarded their hypotheses as non-
the method of 19th century corpuscularians was incompatible with the methodology of 19th century wave 
theorists. This is because 18th century Newtonians such as Reid provide ample difficulties for Laudan’s claim 
of radical methodological change.
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empirical in the sense that they were held as untestable against any empirical evidence. 
Laudan’s suggestion is not merely that Reid rejected non-empirical hypotheses, but 
allowed empirical ones as legitimate in natural philosophy. On Laudan’s reading of him, 
Reid rejected all types of hypotheses. This is why Laudan insists that Reid "maintained 
that a patient and methodical induction coupled with a scrupulous repudiation of all things 
hypothetical was the panacea for most of the ills besetting philosophy and science". 
(Laudan, 1981a, p.89)
But is Laudan’s interpretation of Reid’s methodological commitments correct? 
There can be no doubt that Laudan is correct in his claim that Reid was an empiricist for 
whom observation and empirical evidence were the prime criteria of appraisal. But it is 
also evident that Laudan takes too extreme an interpretation of Reid’s empiricism. For 
Reid in fact explicitly concedes that hypotheses (empirical or non-empirical) have useful 
roles to play in natural philosophy. In one of his letters to Lord Karnes, (dated 16th of 
December 1780), Reid is very categorical about this:
I would discourage no man from conjecturing, only I  wish him not to take 
conjectures for knowledge, or to expect that others should do so. Conjecturing may 
be a useful step even in natural philosophy. Thus, attending to such a 
phenomenon, I conjecture that it may be owing to such a cause. This may lead me 
to make the experiments or observations proper for discovering whether that is 
really the cause or not: and if I discover, either that it is or is not, my knowledge 
is improved; and my conjecture was a step to that improvement. But, while I  rest 
in my conjecture, my judgement remains in suspense, and all I  can say is, it may 
be so, and it may be otherwise. (Reid, 1872, pp.56-57, my emphasis)
Indeed, the italicized portions of this quotation is the key to the correct understanding of 
Reid’s main discontent with hypotheses. Properly interpreted, Reid’s attitude towards
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hypotheses is founded not so much on the fact that hypotheses transcend the phenomena. 
Rather it is based on Reid’s belief that although the only sort of justification we can have 
for a hypothesis is probabilistic, proponents of specific hypotheses often advance their pet 
conjectures as indubitable truths:
There is such proneness in men of genius to invent hypotheses, and in others to 
acquiesce in them, as the utmost which the human faculties can attain in 
philosophy, that it is of the last consequence to the progress of real knowledge, 
that men should have a clear and distinct understanding of the nature of 
hypotheses in philosophy, and of the regard that is due to them. Although some 
hypotheses may have a considerable degree of probability, yet it is evidently in the 
nature o f conjecture to be uncertain. In every case the assent ought to be 
proportioned to the evidence; for to believe firmly what has but a small degree o f 
probability, is a manifest abuse o f our understanding. (Reid, 1872, p.235, my 
emphasis)
Reid believed that inventors of hypotheses have mostly abused hypotheses in this manner 
(i.e. the "assent" given to specific hypotheses is never "proportioned to the evidence"):
The world has been so long befooled by hypotheses in all parts of philosophy, that 
it is of the utmost consequence to every man who would make any progress in 
real knowledge, to treat them with just contempt, as the reveries of vain and 
fanciful men, whose pride makes them conceive themselves able to unfold the 
mysteries of nature by the force of their genius. (Reid, 1872, p.236)
And Reid was so discontented with this abuse of hypotheses that he advised us to adopt 
the following as heuristics:
Let us, therefore, lay down this as a fundamental principle in our inquiries into the 
structure of the mind and its operations - that no regard is due to the conjectures 
or hypotheses of philosophers, however ancient, however generally received. Let
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us accustom ourselves to try every opinion by the touchstone of fact and 
experience. What can fairly be deduced from facts duly observed or sufficiently 
attested, is genuine and pure; it is the voice of God, and no fiction of human 
imagination. (Reid, 1872 p.236)
But we should not be carried away by Reid’s criticism of the illegitimate use of 
hypotheses into thinking that he is advising that we reject all hypotheses. In fact, in the 
already mentioned letter to Lord Karnes, Reid sets out clearly what he considers to be the 
legitimate use of hypotheses:
A cause that is conjectured ought to be such, that, if it really does exist, it will 
produce the effect. If it have not this quality, it hardly deserves the name of a 
conjecture. Supposing it have this quality, the question remains - whether does it 
exist or not? And this, being a question of fact, is to be tried by positive evidence. 
(Reid, 1872, p.57)
Reid’s point is that it is not enough that a theory entail the evidence, for the theory to be 
acceptable. Just like Brewster, Reid required independent support, and he sets out his 
requirement of independent support as follows:
All investigation of what we call the causes of natural phenomena may be reduced 
to this syllogism-
I f  such a cause exists, it will produce such a phenomena: but that cause does 
exist: Therefore, &c. (Reid, 1872, p.57, my emphasis)
And he claims that:
The first proposition [in the syllogism below] is merely hypothetical. And a man
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in his closet, without consulting nature, may make a thousand such propositions, 
and connect them into a system; but this is only a system of hypotheses, 
conjectures, or theories; and there cannot be one conclusion in natural philosophy 
drawn from it, until he consults nature, and discovers whether the causes he has 
conjectured do really exist. (Reid, 1872, p.57, my emphasis)
Reid did not merely pay lip service to his demand for independent support He specifically 
criticized natural philosophers like Descartes for not providing independent support for 
their hypotheses:
... Des Cartes conjectured, that the planets are earned round the sun in a vortex 
of subtle matter. The cause here assigned is sufficient to produce the effect It 
may, therefore be entitled to the name of a conjecture. But where is the evidence 
of the existence of such a vortex? If there be no evidence for i t  even though there 
were none against it, it is a conjecture only, and ought to have no admittance into 
the chaste natural philosophy. (Reid, 1872, p.57)
Other than being able to account for the phenomena (or as Reid would have put it, other 
than being sufficient to produce the effect), a conjectured cause must also "be tried by 
positive evidence".
Laudan is therefore mistaken to insist that "what this [requirement of Reid’s] 
amounts to is that unobservable entities, because we can have no direct evidence of their 
existence, have no role to play in causal explanations". (Laudan, 1981a, p.93) Even when 
there is no direct evidence for the existence of a conjectured cause, Reid is willing to 
allow them in causal explanations as long as we do not turn any such unsupported 
conjectures into indubitable truths.
To forestall one possible objection to my interpretation of Reid’s methodological 
commitments, I will distinguish between two different attitudes Reid might have taken
1 6 9
Optics and Method
towards hypothesis:
1. hypotheses are heuristically useful in the sense that although they are not 
worthy of acceptance, they are sometimes useful aids to scientific 
understanding,
2. that hypotheses may be accepted in science but only i f  they have 
independent support.
These two attitudes are of course perfectly consistent. Hypotheses may be heuristically 
fruitful even when they have no independent support, but only accepted in science if they 
do. And indeed, as I shall argue shortly, I believe that Reid clearly held that both claims 
are true.
The foregoing makes it clear that Reid at least adopted the first attitude, and T 
think Reid adopted the second and strolnger attitude. My view is supported by Reid’s 
distinction between the roles of the ether in Newton and Hartley’s writings. In Reid’s 
opinion, Newton’s conjecture of the ether as the cause of gravitation is a good example 
of the legitimate use of hypotheses, while Hartley’s commitment to the ether is the prime 
example of the abuse of hypotheses. According to Reid:
Sir Isaac Newton, in all his philosophical writings, took great care to distinguish 
his doctrines, which he pretended to prove by just induction, from his conjectures, 
which were to stand or fall as future experiments and observations should establish 
or refute them. His conjectures he has put in the form of queries, that they might 
not be regarded as truths, but be inquired into, and determined according to the 
evidence to be found against them. Those who mistake his queries for a part of his
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doctrine, do him great injustice, and degrade him to the rank of the common herd 
of philosophers, who have in all ages adulterated philosophy by mixing conjecture 
with truth, and their own fancies with the oracles of nature. (Reid, 1872, p.249)
Reid went on to cite Newton’s conjecture of the ether as the cause of gravitation as a 
legitimate use of hypotheses. He also claimed that in Hartley’s hands, Newton’s ether was 
illegitimately used. Hartley’s use was illegitimate not because Hartley’s ether was 
unobservable (while Newton’s ether was observable!); rather it was illegitimate because 
although Hartley had no justifiable empirical evidence for postulating the ether, he 
nonetheless took the ether to be the true cause of neuro-psychological phenomena:
As to the vibrations and vibratiuncles, whether of an elastic aether, or of the 
infinitesimal particles of the brain and nerves, there may be such things for all we 
know; and men may rationally inquire whether they can find evidence of their 
existence; but while we have no proof of their existence, to apply them to the 
solution of phenomena, and to build a system upon them, is what I conceive we 
call building a castle in the air. (Reid, 1872, p.250, my emphasis)
And Reid continues:
I f ... we regard the authority of Sir Isaac Newton, we ought to hold the existence 
of such an aether as a matter not established by proof, but to be examined into by 
experiments; and I have never heard that, since his time, any new evidence has 
been found of its existence. "But", says Dr. Hartley, "supposing the existence of 
the aether, and of its properties, to be destitute of all direct evidence, still if it 
serves to account for a great variety of phenomena, it will have an indirect 
evidence in its favour by this means." There never was an hypothesis invented by 
an ingenious man which has not this evidence in its favour. The vortices of Des 
Cartes, the sylphs and gnomes of Mr. Pope, serve to account for a great variety 
of phenomena. (Reid, 1872, p.250)
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The problem with Hartley’s use of the ether is that it takes the mere fact that a hypothesis 
succeeds in saving the phenomena as evidence for the truth of that hypothesis. Reid 
however demanded more than this. In Reid’s methodology, before a conjecture can be 
regarded as true, it must have independent empirical support. Failing this, the conjecture 
could still be adopted in explanations as long as it is properly recognized as a conjecture: 
a hypothetical claim which should "not be received as truth..., but be inquired into, and 
determined according to the evidence to be found for or against [it]". (Reid, 1872, p.249)
The cases of Brewster and Reid, when properly analyzed, support (though of 
course do not establish) the view that there was no radical change in scientific 
methodology which accompanied the change in substantive beliefs. Newtonian inductivism 
and the method of hypothesis were, at least, not as radically different as Laudan would 
have us believe. One main similarity between these two methodologies is that both 
allowed the use of hypotheses about unobservables. Secondly, both methodologies had 
their respective conditions of independent warrant. So, the only radical change there was 
accompanying change in substantive ideas was in explicit methodology.
The fundamental problem with Laudan’s interpretation of this episode is that he 
wants to claim more than he justifiably can on the basis of the evidence he has. An 
alternative interpretation of the . methodological dispute and differences between 
corpuscularians and wave theorists can be given.
Worrall [1990a], for instance, argues that the disagreement between David 
Brewster and the wave theorists was chiefly over "the way forward". As shown below,
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Brewster, just like the wave theorists accepted that the predictive and empirical success 
of a theory counts favourably in its support. Brewster further argued that the then 
available versions of the wave theory could not give any adequate account of dispersion 
and selective absorption. Brewster, however, felt that this was not a problem confronting 
only the then available versions of the wave theory. His full view was that there are 
reasons to think that any version of the wave theory would be unable to explain these 
phenomena. And as the corpuscular theory was then the only viable and serious alternative 
to the wave theory, Brewster decided to continue working on this alternative.
Proponents of the wave theory of course accepted Brewster’s point that their 
current versions of the theory could not account for these phenomena. But they also 
pointed out that the corpuscular theory could not give any good explanation of these 
phenomena. Moreover, they maintained that the wave theory was empirically more 
successful than the corpuscular theory. So, they regarded the wave theoiy as providing the 
best way forward.
Brewster had no justified counter-argument to the wave theorists’ claim that the 
corpuscular theory was the less successful theory. All Brewster could do was to nurse the 
hope that the corpuscular programme would eventually stage a comeback.
Can we generalize the disagreement between Brewster and the wave theorists? I 
think we can. The debate between corpuscularians (not just Brewster) and wave theorists 
seem to be about the way forward. As I have argued below, the condition of independent 
support which Laudan claims is exclusive to the wave theorists was in fact accepted by 
corpuscularians like Reid. Further historical research might well reveal that such a 
generalization is justified. But that is not the subject of this dissertation. It is sufficient
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for this present work to show that key "inductivists"-- amongst them Laudan’s chief 
example, Reid- also accepted the condition of independent empirical support.
4. Relativism and Reticulational Reconstructions
I have just shown that Laudan’s reconstruction of the 19th century revolution in optics is 
suspect. But suppose, for the sake of argument, that we accept it. Can the reticulated view 
of scientific rationality provide any viable explanation of the "revolution" thus described? 
My view is that, even if Laudan’s reticulational account is taken at its face value, it fails 
to exhibit the rationality and progress of science.
According to Laudan’s reticulational view, scientific change, including eventually 
radical change, occurs piecemeal. For instance, when there is a change at the theoretical 
level, there is no change at the methodological and axiological levels as these two levels 
provide the arbiter for change at the theoretical level. Rationality is exhibited within the 
reticulated account only if certain aspects of scientific commitment remain temporarily 
fixed and so provide legitimation for a changing element.
In his reticulational reconstruction of the optical revolution, Laudan specifically 
identifies theoretical commitment as the first changing element.
... the emergence of the optical ether in the early 19th century prompted a more 
radical critique of classical epistemology, a critique that produced some innovative 
and historically influential methodological ideas. (Laudan, 1981b, pp.157-158)
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But herein lies the problem for Laudan’s reticulational reconstruction of this 19th century 
revolution. John Worrall states the problem succincdy as follows:
... if Newtonian inductivism really were in force at the time Fresnel developed the 
wave theory (and i f  any Newtonian inductivism really does ban genuinely 
theoretical entities) then the acceptance of that theory by the scientific community 
could not have been rational. Conversely, of course, if the initial acceptance of the 
wave theory was rational, then Newtonian inductivism (as described by Laudan) 
was not really in force at the time. In neither case can there have been a real shift 
in methodology which can be explained as the rational response to the prior 
acceptance of the wave theory. (Worrall, 1988, p.266)
This is because if change first occurred in theoretical commitment, the reticulational view 
will require the unchanging elements (i.e. methodology and axiology) to provide the 
justification and rational for the changing element. But the Newtonian inductivist 
methodology Laudan describes cannot provide the rationale for the change to an 
unobservable! So, no piecemeal, and at the same time rational, reconstruction of this 
change can be run along reticulational lines. Conversely, if the initial acceptance of the 
wave theory was rational, then surely inductivism couldn’t have been the methodology 
that was truly in force.
My claim is that a reticulational explanation of the 19th century revolution in 
optics surreptitiously precludes rationality. Laudan claims that there was a change from 
a set, {T,&M,&A,} (i.e. the corpuscular theory and its associated Newtonian 
methodological and axiological requirements) to another set2 {T2&M2&A2} (i.e. the wave 
theory and its associated methodology and axiology). While the holist sees a revolutionary 
change in world view from set! to set2, Laudan sees a more gradual type of change.
In Laudan’s more gradual picture of step-by-step changes that eventually result in 
the change from set, (T,&M,&A,) to set2 (T2&M2&A2), he explicitly identifies the
1 7 5
Optics and Method
theoretical component (i.e T,) of setj as the first component to change. Hence, the first 
stage in the change form set! to set2 was the change from (T1&M1&A1) to 
Proponents of the reticulational view would therefore have to claim the following:
T2 was preferred to Tj while Mj and A x were still in force. But as Mj was 
incompatible with T2 ("the epistemology prevalent in the second half of the 18th 
century was altogether incompatible with the various ethereal theories which 
emerged in the natural philosophy of that period" [Laudan, 1981b, p. 157]), 
proponents of T2 had to look for an alternative methodology-- namely, M2. ("... 
proponents of ethereal explanations chose to abandon or modify that prevailing 
epistemology so as to provide a philosophical justification for theorizing about the 
ether" [Laudan, 1981, p. 157]).
How can a theory which is "altogether incompatible" with the prescriptions of a 
methodology be adjudged better by the very methodology with which it is incompatible? 
This problem arises because Laudan’s reticulation requires that the unchanging elements 
of a set (T&M&A) provide the arbiter for the changing element. Unfortunately, as far as 
this particular historical episode is concerned, if we accept the reticulational account, then 
it is impossible for M, to rank T2 over T,. M! is incompatible with T2, but Laudan cannot 
run a reticulational reconstruction of this episode unless M, is able to adjudge T2 the 
better theory.
But supposing we grant or overlook (again for the sake of argument) the 
impossible move from OI^&Mj&Aj) to (T ^ M j&Aj). The next step in Laudan’s
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reticulation is equally problematic. In the second step, we have a change from 
(T^&Mj&A,) to (T2&M2&A,). In this step, the change is from to M2, while T2 and A, 
justify this change. But how can T2 rationally constrain the change from to M2 in step 
2 if M, has already ranked T2 over T, in step 1? There is no way we can run a 
reticulational reconstruction of this historical episode as Laudan believes.
Of course, as Laudan now claims that he is not interested in explaining the past 
choices of scientists as rational or irrational, he could claim that his view of scientific 
change merely accounts for scientific progress. This, however, would leave the problem 
entirely untouched because such a view cannot give any genuine explanation of progress 
in science either. We all agree that progress presupposes change. Progress presupposes 
that we can talk of transitions from a theory 7, to a theory T2, and so on. What distin­
guishes progress from mere change, however, is the verdict that T2 is in some objective 
sense better than theory 7\, and that the acceptance of T2 is based on good reasons. For 
instance, if a scientist were to accept an objectively better theory for the wrong reason 
(e.g. if a scientist were to accept Einstein’s theory of relativist simply because of the 
ethnic origins of Einstein, and for no other reason), that scientist’s choice would not have 
been rational. And by the same token, the choice cannot properly be regarded as 
progressive.
But Laudan’s account of scientific progress cannot deliver the judgement that the 
acceptance of theory T2 (e.g the wave theory) over theory Tx (e.g the corpuscular theory) 
is based oh good reasons. And if change is not a result of good objective reasons, such 
change cannot constitute progress.
There is a further problem with Laudan’s reticulational reconstruction of this
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historical episode. Laudan explicitly claims that in his reticulational view, rationality is 
preserved by allowing change in only one component at a time ("If a scientist’s 
methodology fails to justify his ontology; if his methodology fails to promote his aims; 
if his cognitive aims prove to be utopian ... the scientist will have compelling reasons for 
replacing one component or other of his world view with an element that does the better 
job. Yet he need not modify everything else. [Laudan, 1984, p.74].") He however 
sometimes give the impression that the first step in the piecemeal change involved a 
concurrent change in both axiology and theory:
Clearly, what confronted all these scientists [i.e David Hartley, George Lesage, and 
Roger Boscovich] was a manifest conflict between "official" aims and goals of 
science and the types of theories they were constructing. The choice was a difficult 
one: either abandon microtheorizing altogether ... or else develop an alternative 
axiology of science which would provide conceptual legitimation for theories 
lacking a direct observational warrant. ... But they realized that such a goal made 
no sense in the absence of methods warranting claims about unobservable entities. 
Thus to make good their proposed aims, they had to develop an alternative 
methodology for science. (Laudan, 1984, p*57)
If Laudan’s full view is that there were radical concurrent changes in both axiology 
and theory, then, surely the reticulational view is very close to the Kuhnian holistic view. 
Indeed, I would argue that it is too close to holism for comfort.
As I argued in chapter 3 (section 2) below, Laudan does not provide us with any 
adequate definition or characterization of axiological values. His best characterization is 
that "an attribute will count as a cognitive value or aim if that attribute represents a 
property of theories which we deem to be constitutive of good science". (Laudan, 1984, 
p.xii, fn2) But as I also argued below, this definition turns all methodological rules into
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axiological goals as well. Indeed, this characterization of axiology seems to suggest that 
methodological commitments are implicit in axiological goals. Hence, a commitment to 
a given set of axiological goals would at the same time be a commitment to a given set 
of methodological standards.
But if any given set of axiological commitments has its associated set of 
methodological commitments, and hence the change that occurred in 19th century optics 
involved concurrent changes in both axiology and methodology, then the reticulational 
account of the 19th century revolution in optics is not significantly different from the 
account a holist would give. Surely we can turn Laudan’s criticism of holism back on his 
own position:
When scientific change is construed so globally, it is no small challenge to see 
how it could be other than a conversion experience. If different scientists not only 
espouse different theories but also subscribe to different standards of appraisal and 
ground those standards in different and conflicting systems of cognitive goals, then 
it is difficult indeed to imagine that scientific change could be other than 
whimsical change of style or taste. (Laudan, 1984, p.72)
5. CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter I examined one historical episode advanced by Laudan as an example of 
radical change in methodology. Contrary to Laudan’s claim that this "case stands as a 
vivid refutation of [the] claim that scientific standards of theory evaluation are immutable" 
(Laudan, 1981b, p. 181), my examination of the episode establishes the following:
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1. Laudan’s treatment of the change from particles to waves succeeds, at best, only in 
showing that there were changes in scientists explicit characterizations of their 
methodological commitments - not in the implicit methodology which really guided their 
views. But radical change in explicit methodological pronouncements alone provides no 
challenge to the traditional approach which is exclusively concerned with the invariance 
of implicit methodological commitments.
2. There is a distinction to be made between "narrow" and "broad" construals of the 
flexible notion of "methodology". Although these two notions are both capable of degrees 
such that some methodological rules are broader than (or narrower than) others, clear cut 
particular examples of each can be given. "Don’t accept theories before testing them 
against their plausible rivals" is a narrow methodological rule, as is "other things being 
equal, prefer theories that have made successful predictions". But rules such as: "prefer 
wave explanations in optics", "look for deterministic theories", or "prefer ’compositional’ 
explanations to ’perfectionist’ ones in chemistry" are examples of broad methodology. Of 
course the sons of theories scientists looked for in optics after 1830 tended to be wave 
theories and thus there is no doubt that once the particulate theory was rejected and the 
wave theory accepted in its stead, scientific explanations were cast in terms of the broad 
methodological requirements of the prevalent theory. But change in broad methodology 
provides no real treat to the traditional approach which is concerned with methodology 
narrowly conceived as the basic principles o f scientific theory appraisal.
3. Although Laudan gives the impression that he is concerned with change in
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methodology narrowly conceived, his analysis fails to provide any viable support to a "no- 
invariant-raz/Tow-methodology view". His claim is that predictive success was not part of 
18th century methodology and that scientists only started to invoke this in the early 19th 
century as a result of the triumph of the wave theory. But in fact, the narrow 
methodological requirements of predictive success Laudan associates with the wave theory 
is by no means exclusive to wave theorists. Proponents of the particulate theory also 
accept the virtues of this methodological requirement. Significantly, Thomas Reid, 
Laudan’s own main example of a Newtonian inductivist, accepts the virtues of this narrow 
methodological requirements. (The claim that this was a dispute about physics conducted 
against the background of a neutral and generally accepted set of methodological 
standards has been argued independently by Achienstein (1991). Achienstein argues for 
a particular fixed methodology - one involving a requirement of "independent warrant". 
Achienstein’s methodological views raise problems of their own and, since I am only 
concerned to argue that Laudan has provided no evidence that narrow methodological 
standards changed, I have not gone into Achinstein’s views.)
4. The methodological debate that actually ensued between proponents of the particulate 
theory and defenders of the wave theory was really about the way forward. Proponents 
of the particulate theory such as Brewster argued that the theory might, or even would, 
eventually stage a comeback and be more successful that its wave rival. But defenders of 
the wave theory maintained that the wave theory had amassed enough successes to justify 
pursuing it exclusively in further theoretical investigations in optics.
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5. Although I showed that Laudan’s reconstruction of this historical episode is suspect, 
I further argued that even if (for the sake of argument) we accept it, the reticulational 
version of methodological naturalism provides no rational explanation of the change from 
particles to waves. This is because Laudan’s reticulation specifies that the change from 
particles to waves was piecemeal. In particular, Laudan’s account specifies that while 
there was a radical change in theoretical commitments (i.e. from the particle theory to the 
wave theory) there was no corresponding change in methodological and axiological 
commitments. (These two elements were, according to Laudan, also changed in a 
piecemeal fashion at a later stage.) The axiology and methodology (which are the two 
unchanging elements in this first move) thereby provided the rationale and justification 
for radical change in theoretical commitment. But herein lies the problem. If Newtonian 
inductivism was really the methodology in force at the time of the acceptance of the wave 
theory, then the change could not have been rational. For how can a Newtonian 
inductivism which (according to Laudan) is "altogether incompatible" with the formulation 
of theoretical entities such as the lumeniferous ether adjudge the wave theory better - 
when on Laudan’s own account that theory gives a central role to the lumeniferous ether?
The point is simply that if Newtonianism was really in force at the time of the 
acceptance of the wave theory, then that acceptance couldn’t have been justifiable. But 
if Newtonian inductivism was not really the methodology in force when the wave theory 
was accepted, then we cannot rightly claim that there was a radical change in real implicit 
methodology. Scientists must have been operating with a methodology quite different for 
the Newtonian inductivism described by Laudan. Whichever of these options is accepted, 
the conclusion remains the same: the 19th century revolution in optics provides no viable
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support to the historical claim of the no-invariant-methodology thesis.
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CHAPTER 5
General Conclusions: The Thesis Set in Context
In this thesis, I have examined in detail two versions of the naturalist view - due to 
Laudan and Shapere - that methodological standards of theory appraisal are 
components of science like any other, and as such are subject to radical change as 
science develops. This naturalist view challenges the traditional view (upheld by 
Popper, Carnap, and others) according to which the objectivity and rationality of 
science can only be exhibited if the principles for the objective ranking of theories 
. are themselves ahistorical, or at any~ rate, * not dependent upon any specific 
substantive scientific claim for their validity.
Traditionalists like Carnap and Popper held that there is a logic of empirical 
support on the basis of which theories are appraised objectively in accordance with 
the evidence. This tradition held that the rationality of the development of science 
can only be exhibited if a new theory can be shown to be better empirically 
supported (or, in Popperian terms, better "corroborted") than the old theory: 
switching to the new theory is rational only if the new theory is better supported 
by the evidence. Such judgments, according to the traditionalist, required that the 
principles of theory appraisal are themselves not subject to change. Principles of
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appraisal are therefore the unjudged judges which provide the basis for the 
objective and rational evaluation of the switch to a new theory. If methods of 
appraisal were not independent of the content and context of the theories they are 
meant to appraise (so the traditionalist insists), we would not be able to account for 
the progress of science. All that we would be able to say is that a given context (or 
theory) judges itself better than its rival.
The naturalist, however, insists that the traditional view of an ahistorical 
method, which, once discovered (or invented) is immutable, unchanging, and not 
influenced by substantive developments within science is historically and 
philosophically untenable. The naturalists' discontent with the traditional approach 
stems from the fact that the traditionalist adopts an a priorist view of methodology. 
The most explicit characterization of a priori knowledge is that of Kant's: "we shall 
understand as a priori knowledge, not knowledge which is independent of this or 
that experience, but knowledge absolutely independent of all experience". (Kant, 
1781, B2-3) But if disputes in methodology arise (as naturalists insist they do) how 
could they be adjudicated if these principles of methodology are a priori?
The naturalist questions the two central assumptions of the traditionalist, 
viz: (i) the assumption that methodology is actually independent of substantive 
science; and (ii) the assumption that such independence is necessary for the 
rationality and objectivity of science. The main virtue of naturalism is that it shows 
that traditionalists have overlooked (or at any rate not laid sufficient emphasis on) 
one important sense in which science has learnt from, and built on, its substantive 
discoveries. If methodology is interpreted broadly, there is no doubt that we have 
acquired new rules, principles, and standards of appraisal as a result of changes in
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our substantive beliefs about the world. The switch to double-blind from single­
blind clinical trials illustrates the naturalists' point very well. There is no doubt that 
the discovery of secondary placebo effects (i.e. that in single-blind trials, not only 
might experimenters still convey their own therapeutic expectations to patients, 
experimenters' expectations might also affect their own judgements of whether a 
patient has benefitted from treatment) informed the discovery of a new 
methodological standard (namely, double-blind methodology). This new 
methodology stands or falls with the secondary placebo effect. Its validity and 
adequacy is not independent of substantive developments within science. The 
naturalist is therefore correct in claiming that the traditional stance that 
methodology is ahistorical, invariant, and presuppositionless, or at any rate, not 
dependent upon any specific substantive scientific knowledge, is - when 
methodology is considered in this broad sense - insensitive to the developments 
within science.
Nonetheless, my thesis has been that \yhile I agree with the naturalist that 
traditional a priorists* accounts have often been insensitive to the history of science, 
naturalists like Shapere and Laudan have over-reacted. In defending the view that 
methods of evaluation have changed in response to new substantive information, 
Laudan and Shapere have gone too far. Not all rules-of evaluation can be up for 
grabs if the progress of science is to be objectively and rationally explained. For if 
all the methods, standards, rules of reasoning, and indeed everything in science is 
subject to possible radical change, then when two competing theories are truly 
radically different, it would be impossible to evaluate and choose (rationally) 
between them.
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Shapere and Laudan are, as I explained, fully aware of the threat of
relativism. Indeed they both set themselves the task of giving an account of
scientific change in which nothing is invariant or ahistorical, but in which, an
objective ranking of rival (and radically different) theories can be given. I have
argued in this thesis that, despite their best efforts, Laudan and Shapere have failed.
<
They have failed not because naturalism, considered as the simple thesis that 
philosophers and methodologists must pay close attention to the history and 
workings of science, is itself hopeless or wrongheaded. On the contrary, this thesis 
is to be applauded. Rather, they have failed because they have taken their view too 
far. Methodology considered broadly is no doubt highly sensitive to substantive 
developments within science, yet a core of principles and rules of appraisal must be 
invariant if the progress and rationality of science is to be preserved.
Shapere and Laudan both explicitly claim to "naturalise" the whole of 
methodology - no principle is sacrosanct, all are at any rate potentially open to 
revision in the light of developments in science. However attractive this idea— - 
might be - not least in seeming to avoid the traditional problems associated with 
the validation of a priori methodology - I have shown in this thesis that it is 
untenable: if  taken seriously it collapses into relativism, i f  it avoids relativism it 
implicity appeals to a core o f a priori, non-naturalised, principles.
In defence of my position, I noted that even in Shapere and Laudan's 
respective views, the rationality and progress of science is preserved if and only if 
certain core aspects of their views of scientific rationality are taken to be invariant. 
Thus in Shapere’s view, the process of exhibiting chain-of-reasoning connections 
between radically different domains of inquiry is a process which all radical (but
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rational) changes must exhibit. Hence in Shapere's view, the acceptance of a new 
set of methodological standards in favour of an old one is rational only if we can 
trace chain-of-reasoning connections. But suppose we pose a second order question 
about the process of exhibiting chain-of-reasoning connections. Would radical 
change remain rational i f  the notion o f what counts (formally) as a "chain-of- 
reasoning connection” were itself up for grabs, subject to change as science 
develops and different from context to context? Evidently not. For although Shapere 
maintains explicitly that all methodological constraints are subject to possible 
radical change, he takes great care to argue that he avoids Kuhnian relativism 
because of the role of this process of a "chain of reasoning" in effecting, or 
adjudicating radical change. Shapere avoids relativism only because he is himself 
committed to the view that, even in cases of apparent radical methodological 
change, there is a deeper level of connections that in fact explain such change as a 
proper chain-of-reasoning.
As I have indicated in the body of the thesis (sections 4 and 5 of chapter 3) 
Laudan's view also appears to give a rational explanation of change in science only 
in so far as some of its tools of evaluation are implicitly assumed to be invariant. 
(This again despite explicit claims that on his position all methodological prinicples 
are at least potentially criticisable and changeable as science "progresses".) For 
instance, the requirement that the cognitive goals of science be non-utopian, and 
the inductive requirement which urges us to continue adopting those means which 
have hitherto been successful in bringing certain aims of science into fruition. 
Laudan himself unwittingly concedes that these tools of evaluation are at the core 
of rationality, and are, if objectivity is to be maintained, as such invariant:
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... it is at the very core of our conception of the rational and the reasonable 
that anything judged as satisfying that family of concepts must, in 
appropriate senses, be thought to be both possible and actionable. To adopt 
a goal with the feature that we can conceive of no action that would be apt 
to promote it, or a goal whose realization we could not recognize even if 
we had achieved it, is surely a mark of unreasonableness and irrationality. 
(Laudan, 1984, p.51)
I showed in chapter 3 that Laudan’s convincing (and undoubtedly 
important) cases of change in methodology - such as the switch to "double-blind 
methodology" in the clinical trials of drugs - are all cases of change in "broad 
methodology". And I showed that such changes can be explained as rational only 
if they can be exhibited to consist of "plugging " new substantive discoveries (in 
this case, for example, the discovery that clinicials expectations might affect 
outcome) into core and fixed principles (in this case, for example, the principle that 
theories should always be tested against plausible rivals). The one case that 
Laudan cites of a radical change in methodology that cannot be dealt with in this 
way, the one case that seems clearly to be one of (an alleged) change in "narrow" 
core methodology, is his case of the change from inductivist to hypothetico- 
deductivist methodology which Laudan sees as an accompaniement of the early 
19th Century revolution in optics. This is why I devoted chapter 4 to a detailed 
consideration of this particular case.
In the very broadest sense of methodology there was of course a change in 
optics in the early 19th century: 18th century theorists had looked for ("preferred") 
particulate explanations of the optical phenomena, while after the "revolution" 
scientists looked for ("preferred") wave theories. But Laudan argues the much 
more striking claim that the requirement that a theory be predictively successful in
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order to be accepted in science was not pan of methodology in the 18th Century 
and came to be so only in tandem with the acceptance of the wave theory in the 
early part of the 19th. This looks like a change in "narrow" or "core" 
methodology. In chapter 4, I argued two things. First that Laudan’s claim to 
explain the rationale for the wave "revolution" in a "reticulated" way that allows 
change at the same time in methodology from inductivism to hypothetico- 
deductivism in fact fails. And secondly I argue that, historically speaking, there is 
no evidence for, and some evidence against, Laudan’s claim. Once we make the 
distinction between explicit methodology (the sort of claims scientists explicitly 
make about the way they conduct their science) and implicit methodology (the 
principles and standards of appraisal that really govern their work), then there is at 
best evidence of some change in explicit methodological pronouncements 
associated with the switch to the wave theory. I argue that 18th century theorists 
too accepted that theories are better if they are predictively successful. (Achinstein 
too in his (1990) treatment came to the same conclusion: that the particle-wave 
debate was an argument over physics and not over methodology.)
Let me emphasise that I do not in this thesis argue against the naturalist 
claim that some methodological rules (even core ones) in a way carry substantive 
content about the world. Even "traditionalists" when forced into a comer tended to 
admit this. For example the preference for "unified", "simple" theories of the world 
and a corresponding suspicion of theories that make "ad hoc exceptions" will only 
work (that is, only lead toward "truer" theories) in a world which is governed by 
unified simple laws. But as Imre Lakatos used to say, it is perfectly possible that 
God drew up a blueprint for the universe which made it Einsteinian, except for 17
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exceptions. Our methodology commits us to ignoring this possibility and hence to 
making a very general, but nonetheless substantive, assumption about the universe. 
I have not challenged the idea that some methodological principles may be 
substantive (’synthetic") in this manner. What I have challenged is the idea that all 
can be considered corrigible in the light of developments within science, without 
thereby sacrificing rationality.
Finally, let me emphasise that my conclusions apply directly only to the 
positions of Shapere and of Laudan, since these are the only "naturalistic" 
positions that I have considered. There are of course plenty of other defences of 
naturalism in philosophy of science (and in epistemology generally) and I make no 
claim that my strictures apply directly to any of these. I selected the positions of 
Laudan and Shapere for special study, however, because those positions do seem to 
me to be both exceptionally well articulated and thought-through, and exceptionally 
sensitive to and well-informed about the^actual procedures of science. Moreover, it 
does seem to me that the quite general criticisms that I bring to bear on these 
positions do present important obstacles for any attempt fully to naturalise 
philosophy of science. I do not see how the naturalist can avoid the following 
dilemma: either she claims that all methodological principles are subject to 
criticism and possible change as science changes and then fails to explain the 
development of science as rational, or she gives herself the chance to explain the 
development of science as rational by holding that at least a core of methodological 
principles are sacrosanct - but then she faces the "old" problems of justification 
with respect to this core. At any rate, my argument that these two leading attempts
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to naturalise philosophy of science fail to avoid this dilemma, puts the ball back in 
the naturalist’s court.
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Appendix
Relativism Defined
What exactly does the "relativism" that I have accused Laudan and Shapere of failing 
to avoid involve? Although the main thrust of the relativism I discuss is clear - namely 
a denial of any absolute or objective sense in which theories can be said to have 
improved over time - the charge of relativism can be understood in a variety of senses 
and some clarification of the precise sense of it I adopt is in order here.
A distinction can be made between at least three different senses of relativism:
Relativism!: Relativism, is the thesis that there are no truths over and above those 
relative to a framework. Newton-Smith characterizes relativism o f truth as follows: 
"something, s is true for 'F and s is false for <|>." (Newton-Smith, 1982, p.107)
Relativism2: This is the thesis that there are no reasons for accepting or preferring a 
claim or belief p  to not-/?, but only reasons for accepting or preferring relative to a 
framework. Newton-Smith has also characterized the relativism o f reason as follows: 
"/? is a reason for holding that p is true for \|t while R is not a reason for holding p to 
be true for <J>". (Newton-Smith, 1982, p. 110)
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Relativism3: This is the version of relativism discussed in this thesis. Relativism3 
(which I describe as methodological relativism, or MR for short) is a specific version 
of what others have described as epistemological relativism. Harvey Siegel describes 
epistemological relativism (ER) as follows:
For any knowledge-claim /?, p  can be evaluated (assessed, established, etc.) 
only according to (with reference to) one or another set of background 
principles and standards of evaluation sl9...,sn; and, given a different set (or sets) 
of background principles and standards sr ,...,sn there is no neutral (that is, 
neutral with respect to the two (or more) alternative set of principles and 
standards) way of choosing between the two (or more) alternative sets in 
evaluating/? with respect to ... rational justification, /?'s ... rational justifiability
is relative to standards used in evaluating/?. (Siegel, 1987, p.6)
MR is a version of ER because while ER is concerned with the justification of 
knowledge claims writ large, MR only asserts a thesis about the epistemological status 
of scientific theories and the rules and principles for the appraisal of these theories. 
More specifically, MR is the thesis that the justification or rational adequacy of
scientific theories are assessable only in terms of a given set of background
methodological principles and standards - principles and standards which are 
themselves adjudged in the light of their associated research traditions or historical 
epochs.
MR as I have used it in this dissertation makes a two-fold claim. It makes a 
claim about the evaluation of scientific theories on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, it makes a claim about the adequacy of the methodological rules for the 
appraisal of scientific theories. The full thesis of MR is therefore that the adequacy of 
scientific theories can only be assessed by methodological rules and principles that are
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unique to each historical epoch or research tradition, and that these methodological 
rules and principles in turn derive their acceptability or adequacy from the substantive 
content of the sciences within which they are to operate. That is, the methods which 
are the instruments for the evaluation of scientific theories are themselves assessed by 
the changing content and context of science.
But what exactly is the problem with relativism? Why should the adoption of a 
relativistic process of appraisal be a vice? One main objection - perhaps the main 
traditional objection - is that relativism is incoherent. One version of the charge, for 
instance maintains that the notions of truth and reason are intricately linked with a 
traditional account of meaning, translation and truth-conditions. On this traditional 
account, if two sentences p and p ’ have the same meaning, then p  must be true in 
virtue of whatever makes p* true. So to claim that a sentence p  (which has the same 
meaning as /?’) can be true while p ' is false would lead to incoherence.
Of course there are various counter-arguments the relativist could give to the 
charge of incoherence. The relativist could for instance exempt relativism from 
applying to itself by claiming that the truth or justifications of all statements, claims, 
theories, methods, etc, {with the sole exemption o f the general thesis o f relativism) are 
relative to specific backgrounds of assumption. Alternatively, the relativist could 
protest that the traditional notions of "rightness" and "good reasons" implicitly assume 
the very absolutist conceptions he seeks to reject.
The main problem with MR is not so much that it may be incoherent. Rather, 
the problem is that it cannot fully account for the progress of science. The empirical 
and predictive success of theories in the mature sciences seem to provide a prima facie
argument for the view that there has been cognitive improvement in our scientific 
understanding of the natural world. The relativism I am concerned with is that which 
claims that this prima facie argument for the cognitive progress of our scientific 
knowledge fails. It claims that we can only say that our present theories are better 
relative to the standards that scientists at present happen to adopt, and that as a result 
of this, we cannot claim that a theory such as the -photon theory is objectively superior 
to the corpuscular theory.
Although the problem of relativism features a lot in my discussion, my aims 
did not include that of refuting relativism. My task was simply the following. As a 
result of the publication of Kuhn’s The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, various 
philosophers of science (including Laudan and Shapere) have argued that any view of 
science in which the adequacy of theories are assessed in light of methods and 
standards which are themselves subject to radical change (and are justifiable only 
during the historical epoch in which they are produced) has the problem of relativism 
to oveTcome. More specifically, both Shapere and Laudan argue that a view such as 
Kuhn’s is unacceptable because it can’t say why new theories are objectively superior 
to their extant rivals.
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I outlined the arguments in support of 
the view that defending the no-invariant-methodology thesis inevitably leads to 
relativism. In particular, I showed that naturalists like Laudan and Shapere also accept 
that at least some versions of the no-invariant-methodology thesis have the problem of 
relativism to overcome. The two nonetheless claim that their respective naturalistic 
versions of the no-invariant-methodology thesis avoid the pitfalls of relativism.
What I have argued is that despite their best efforts, these two proponents of
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methodological naturalism have not delivered the best of both worlds: methodological 
naturalism does not succeed in avoiding relativism while at the same time it genuinely 
accepts "the radical change in methodology" view of the Kuhnians. Via a detailed 
assessment of the views of Shapere and Laudan, I argued that naturalists give the 
impression of overcoming relativism only because they implicitly assume some 
absolute, theory and context neutral, set of evaluative standards. I identified these 
implicitly assumed standards, and confront Laudan and Shapere with a dilemma: either 
they allow radical change to extend to these implicitly assumed standards, in which 
case the adequacy of these standards would be dependent upon the specific epoch and 
context within which they are formulated (and naturalists would end up with the sort 
of relativism they themselves accuse Kuhnians of espousing); or naturalist come out 
clean by accepting these standards as absolute, or at least invariant and neutral. 
Whichever arm of the dilemma they chose, naturalist would have failed in their self­
assigned task of giving "an account of the knowledge-seeking and knowledge-acquiring 
enterprise ... which, While not relying on any form of the Inviolability thesis, will not 
also collapse into relativism". (Shapere, 1984, p.xxi)
No doubt a proponent of the no-invariant-methodology thesis who fully accepts 
the relativistic conclusions of his naturalism could bite the bullet and proclaim 
relativism virtuous. But the subject of my concern in this dissertation is not those 
versions of the no-invariant-methodological thesis that positively defend and endorse 
relativism. My target is those versions of methodological naturalism that explicitly 
reject, and claim to avoid, relativism. What I have argued in this thesis is that in so far 
as the no-invariant-methodology thesis is fully accepted, naturalism ultimately fails to 
overcome the problem of relativism.
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